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Draft Convention Preamble 
The  High  Contracting  Parties  to  the  Treat) 
establishing  the  European  Economic  Com-
munity, 
Guided by the wish to implement the provisions 
of Article 220 of the said Treaty which concern 
the possibility  of  mergers  between  companies 
or  firms  governed  by  the  laws  of  different 
countries, 
Considering that the legal obstacles standing in 
the way of such operations should be removed 
without  prejudice  to  the  application  to  com-
panies  or firms  of the other provisions of the 
Treaty, 
Have decided to conclude the present Conven-
tion  on  the  international  merger  of  'societes 
anonymes' and for this purpose have appointed 
as their plenipotentiaries: 
His Majesty the King of the Bdgians: 
The  President  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany: 
The President of the French Republic: 
The President of the Italian Republic: 
His  Royal  Highness  the  Grand  Duke  of 
Luxembourg: 
Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands: 
WHO,  meeting  in  the  Council,  and  after 
exchanging their respective  full  powers, found 
in good and due form, 
HAVE  REACHED  AGREEMENT  ON  THE 
FOLLOWING  PROVISIONS: 
s.  13173 Chapter  I 
Field  of  application 
Article 11 
1.  Companies  formed  in  accordance  with 
the law of the different Contracting States may 
merge pursuant to the provisions of the present 
Convention provided they are accorded recog-
nition  in  the  Contracting  States  by  virtue  of 
the  Convention  of  29  February  1968  on  the 
mutual  recognition  of  companies  and  legal 
persons. 
First variantll 
2.  \Vhere one of the merging  companies  is 
not  accorded  recognition  in  a  Contracting 
State by virtue of Article 3 or Articl.e  9 of the 
Convention  on  the  mutual  recognition  of 
companies  and  legal  persons,  the  present 
Convention shall not apply if one of the merging 
companies or the new company has its seat in 
the territory of the said State. 
3 .  If  none  of  the  merging  companies  nor 
the new company has  its  seat in the territory 
of the  State  which,  by  virtue  of  Article  3  or 
Article 9 of the Convention of 29 February 1968, 
does  not  accord  recognition  to  one  of  such 
companies,  the  merger  shall  not  be  effective 
with respect to that State. 
Second  variant3 
2.  Where  one  of the merging  companies  is 
not  accorded  recognition  in  a  Contracting 
State by virtue of Article 3 or Article 9 of the 
Convention  on  the  mutual  recognition  of 
companies  and  legal  persons,  the  present 
Convention shall not apply if one of the merging 
companies  or  the  new  company  has  its  seat 
in the territory of the said State. 
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Article 2 
Companies within the meaning of Article 1 are: 
- Ia  societe  anonyme - de  naamloze ven-
nootschap of Belgian law, 
die Aktiengesellschaft of German law, 
Ia societe anonyme of French law, 
Ia societe anonyme of Luxembourg law, 
de naamloze vennootschap of Netherlands 
law. 
Article 34 
The merger may occur either by acquisition of 
one  (or  several]  company  [ies]  by  another in 
accordance with Chapter II, or by the formation 
of  a  new  company  in  accordance  with 
Chapter III of the present Convention. 
Chapter II 
Merger  by  acquisition 
Section 1 
Definition  of merger  by acquisition 
Article 4 
Merger by acquisition is the operation whereby 
one company transfers to another, by winding 
1  The Belgian delegation has made a general reservation 
with respect  to the whole  of  the problem raised by  the 
definition of the field of application of the Convention. 
The French delegation has  proposed a  text limiting the 
field  of  application  of  the  Convention  in  cases  where 
the  decision-making  centre  of one  of  the companies is 
located outside the Community. 
The delegations considered that the problem involved one 
of economic policy to be examined in the Council. 
2  The  German,  French  and Italian  delegations  favour 
this variant. 
3  The Belgian, Luxembourg and Netherlands delegations 
favour  this  variant.  The  German  delegation  might 
possibly endorse it as well. 
4  The words between square brackets were proposed by 
the Italian  delegation;  this  proposal did  not  meet  with 
the approval of the other delegations. 
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dation procedure,  the whole  of  its  assets  and 
liabilities by allotting to the shareholders of the 
company  acquired  shares  in  the  acquiring 
company and, where applicable, by payment in 
cash of a balance not exceeding ten per cent of 
the  nominal  value  of  the  shares  allotted  or, 
in  the  absence  of  a  nominal  value,  of  their 
book value. 
Article 5 
1.  The  provisions  of  the  present  chapter 
shall  also  be  applicable  where  one  of  the 
companies holds all or part of the shares of the 
other. 
2.  However,  where the  acqumng  company 
holds  all  the shares  of the company acquired, 
the provisions  of  Article  8,  para. 1,  b)  and c) 
shall not be applicable.  In this case: 
(a)  the report provided for in Article 11  shall 
be prepared only for the acquiring company; 
(b)  each of the reports provided for in Article 
12  shall  be prepared in  accordance with  such 
text but shall be submitted solely to the share-
holders of the acquiring company. 
Article 6 
Merger· by  acquisition may also  take place in 
respect  of  a  company acquired in liquidation 
where the law applicable to such  company so 
permits  and  provided  that  the  company 
acquired  has  not yet  commenced  distributing 
its assets among its shareholders. 
Section 2 
Preparation of the  merger 
Article 7 
1 .  The  organs  of  the  merging  companies 
which, according to the law applicable to each 
s.  13/73 
of the companies,  are  duly  authorized  in  the 
case of mergers, shall prepare a merger plan in 
writing. 
2.  This plan shall take the form of a notarial 
deed  where  the  law applicable  to  one  of  the 
merging cotnpanies so requires. 
3.  Where, by virtue of the law applicable to 
one  of  the  companies,  a  contract  has  to  be 
drawn up prior to the decisions  of the general 
meetings,  such  contract  shall  constitute  the 
merger plan within the meaning of the present 
Convention. 
Article 8 
1.  The  merger  plan  shall  include  as  a 
mm1mum: 
(a)  the  name,  legal  form  and  seat  of  the 
mergmg compames; 
(b)  the  share  exchange  ratio  and,  where 
applicable, the amount of the cash payment; 
(c)  the  procedure  for  the  allotment  of  the 
shares in the acquiring company and the date 
from which such shares entitle participation in 
the profits; 
(d)  the date from which the operations of the 
company acquired are deemed to be effected on 
behalf of the acquiring company; 
(e)  the  rights  which  are  accorded  by  the 
acquiring  company  to  shareholders  having 
special rights and to holders of securities other 
than  shares,  or  the  measures  proposed  m 
respect of them. 
2.  The  merger  plan shall  in  addition  state 
that the merger  is  subject  to the  approval  of 
the  merger  plan  by  the  competent  organs 
defined in Article 16. 
Article 9 
To be annexed to the merger plan are: 
(a)  the.  up-to-date  statutes  of  the  merging 
comparues; 
13 (b)  the balance sheets, profit and loss accounts 
and annual reports  of  the merging  companies 
for the last three financial years; 
(c)  an  interim  statement  of  accounts  as  at 
the first  day  of  the  second  month  preceding 
the  date  of  the  merger  plan  where  the  last 
balance sheet relates to a financial year which 
ended more than six months prior to that date; 
(d)  the reports of the competent organs of the 
merging companies as provided for in Article 11; 
(e)  the  'experts'  reports  as  provided  for  in 
Article 12. 
Article  10 
The interim statement of accounts provided for 
in Article 9, c) shall be drawn up in accordance 
with the same methods and shall be presented 
in  the  same  way  as  the  last  annual  balance 
sheet. 
However, 
(a)  no new actual inventory shall be drawn up, 
(b)  the valuations appearing in the last balance 
sheet  shall  be  amended  only  in  the  light  of 
movements in book entries;  but account shall 
be taken: 
(i)  of interim depreciations and reserves, 
(ii)  of substantial changes in actual values not 
reflected in book entries. 
Article 11 
The organs of each of the merging companies, 
authorized  according  to  the  law  respectively 
applicable  to  them,  shall  prepare  a  detailed 
report explaining and justifying, from the legal 
and economic point of  view,  the merger  plan 
and in particular the share exchange ratio. 
Article 121 
1 .  At least one expert shall be appointed to 
each  of  the  merging  companies.  The  same 
person may be appointed only to one company. 
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2.  Such  experts  shall  be  independent  and, 
according to the law applicable to the company 
to which they are appointed, qualified to under-
take the legally  prescribed examination of the 
annual accounts of such company. 
3.  The method of appointment of the experts 
shall be determined by the law of the company 
to  which  they  are  appointed.  They  may  be 
the  persons  responsible  for  examining  the 
annual accounts  where such persons fulfil  the 
conditions  of  paragraph  2  of  the  present 
Article. 
4 .  The  experts  shall  examine  the  merger 
plan and prepare a report for the shareholders. 
The object  and contents  of such  report shall 
be determined, for each company, by the law 
applicable  to  that  company,  but  the  experts 
shall in any event state whether, in their opinion, 
the exchange ratio is  justified or not. 
5.  The  declaration  referred  to  in  the  pre-
ceding paragraph shall be supported at the least 
by the following matters: 
(a)  the  relative  assets  of  the  companies  on 
the basis of actual values; 
(b)  the  relative  earnings  of  the  companies, 
taking account of future prospects; 
(c)  the  valuation  criteria  in  respect  of  net 
assets and earnings. 
6.  The  report  shall  in  addition  indicate 
special evaluation difficulties, if any. 
7.  Each  expert  shall  be  entitled  to  obtain 
from  the  merging  companies  all  useful 
information and documents  and to undertake 
any necessary verification. 
Article 13 
1  .  In each of the Contracting States to whose 
laws the merging companies are subject, notice 
1  The Belgian delegation expressed a reservation on this 
text.  See appendix 3 of the report published hereafter. 
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one  month  prior  to  the  date  for  which  the 
general  meeting  is  convened,  in  the  national 
gazette  designated  for  the  publication  of 
amendments to the statutes.  The publication 
of  the notice shall take place according to the 
provisions  of  the  law  applicable  to  each  of 
the companies. 
2.  Such  notice  shall  contain  the  matters 
stipulated  in  Article  8.  It  shall  in  addition 
state the disclosure arrangements provided for 
in Articles 14 and 15, the right of consultation 
and the right to obtain copies granted by such 
provisions as well as  the right of the creditors 
to request the giving of a  security pursuant to 
Articles 18 to 21. 
Article 14 
1 .  The merger plan, as  well as  the annexes 
referred to in Article 9,  a),  b) and c),  shall be 
deposited on the date of the convening of the 
general meeting which has to vote on the merger 
plan and in any event at least one month prior 
to the date of such meeting, in the file opened 
in the name of each of the merging companies 
in accordance with the law applicable to it. 
2.  A copy in full or in part of the documents 
referred to in paragraph 1 shall be obtainable 
simply upon request; the cost of such copy may 
not exceed the applicable administrative costs. 
Article 15 
1.  From  the time  of  the  convening  of  the 
general meeting which is  to vote on the merger 
plan,  and  in  any  event  during  the  period  of 
one  month  before  the  date  of  the  meeting, 
each shareholder shall  be entitled to examine, 
at the registered  office,  the  merger  plan  and 
the annexes referred to in Article 9. 
2.  A copy in full or in part of the documents 
referred to in paragraph 1 shall be obtainable 
by all shareholders, without charge and simply 
upon request. 
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Section 3 
Merger Decision 
Article 16 
1.  The merger shall require the approval of 
the  general  meeting  of  each  of  the  merging 
compames. 
2.  Where, according to the provisions of the 
law of the State to which one of the companies 
is  subject,  a  merger contract is  to be prepared 
subsequent  to  the  decisions  of  the  general 
meetings, such provisions shall be applied. 
3.  The provisions of the law to which each 
of the companies is subject, concerning interven-
tion  in  the  merger  decision  by  shareholders 
having  special  rights  or  holders  of  securities 
other than shares, shall be applicable. 
Article 17 
1 .  The convening, composition and holding 
of general meetings as  well as the quorum and 
majority conditions shall be governed, for each 
of  the  merging  companies,  by  the  provisions 
of the law applicable to it in the case of mergers 
or, failing this, to amendments to the statutes. 
2.  The law of the company acquired or its 
statutes  may  lay  down  special  majority  or 
quorum  conditions  for  mergers  governed  by 
the present Convention.  However, in no event 
may such requirement be: 
(i)  either a majority exceeding 3/4 of the votes 
cast  at  the  general  meeting  and  a  quorum 
exceeding  one  half  of  the  shares  with  voting 
rights  upon a  first convening and one quarter 
of such shares upon a second convening; 
(ii)  or, if the law  makes  no  provision for  a 
quorum, a  majority exceeding 3/4 of the votes 
cast  and  4/5  of  the  registered  share  capital 
represented at the meeting taking the decision. 
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Protection of creditors 
Article 18 
1 .  . Creditors  other  than  debenture  holders 
of the company acquired whose claim preceeds 
the publication of the notice of the merger plan 
concerning  this  company  may,  within  thirty 
days  of  such publication, require the granting 
of a security. 
2.  Failing  agreement  within  eight  days  of 
receipt of the creditor's request by the company, 
the court shall  postpone the entry into  effect 
of the merger until the granting of the security 
as  ordered  by  it or until  the  rejection  of the 
application.  The court shall reject the request 
if  the creditor already disposes of  an adequate 
security  or if  one  of  the  merging  companies 
establishes  that  the  acquiring  company  is 
manifestly solvent. 
3.  The  company  shall  be  exempt  from 
granting  a  security  if  the  debt,  even  if  it has 
not  matured,  is  repaid  either  prior  to  the 
decision of the court or not later than one month 
of such decision. 
Article 19 
1 .  The creditors other than debenture holders 
of the company acquired whose claim preceeds 
the  fulfilment  of  the  disclosure  formalities 
referred  to  in  Article  27  may,  within  three 
months of the completion of these formalities, 
require  the  granting  of  a  security  by  the 
acquiring  company.  However,  the  creditors 
who were entitled to require a security from the 
company acquired  in  pursuance  of  Article  18 
may  not  avail  themselves  of  the  provisions 
of the present Article. 
2.  Failing  agreement  within  eight  days  of 
receipt by the company of the creditor's request, 
the court may order the granting of a security. 
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Should the company fail to grant such security 
within  one  month of  the  court's  decision  the 
claim  shall  be  immediately  enforceable.  The 
court  may  reject  the  application  where  the 
creditor already disposes of a sufficient security 
or  where  it  is  established  that  the  acquiring 
company is manifestly solvent. 
3.  The  company  is  exempt  from  gtvmg  a 
security  where  the  debt,  even  if  it  has  not 
matured,  is  repaid  either  prior to the  court's 
decision  or not later then one month of such 
decision. 
4.  The  application  of  the  present  Article 
shall  in  no  way  prejudice  the  effects  of  the 
merger. 
Article 20 
Without prejudice to the rules  relating to the 
collective  exercise  of  their  rights,  Articles  18 
and 19 shall be applied to the debenture holders 
of  the  company  acquired,  unless  the  merger 
has  been  approved  by  a  general  meeting  of 
debenture holders or, if the law governing the 
company  acquired  contains  no  provision  for 
such a  meeting or does not grant it the power 
to approve the merger, by the debenture holders 
individually. 
Article 21 
Each Contracting State may declare: 
(a)  that it  will  apply  only  article  19  to  the 
creditors, whether debenture holders  or other-
wise; 
(b)  that it will apply to the creditors, whether 
debenture holders or otherwise, of the acquiring 
company, where the latter is subject to its laws, 
the same provisions  as  to the creditors of the 
company acquired. 
Article 22 
The  provisions  of  the  law,  concerning  the 
protection  of  shareholders  with  special  rights 
s.  13/73 or bearers  of  secuntles  other than  shares,  to 
which  each  of  the  merging  compames  Is 
subject, shall be applicable. 
Section 5 
Provisions  on the  question  of participation1 
See appendix 2 of the report published hereafter. 
Section 6 
Control and disclosure  of the merger 
Article 23 
1.  Where the law applicable  to  one  of the 
merging  companies  makes  provision,  in  the 
event  of  a  merger,  for  a  preventive  control 
of  legality,  judicial  or  administrative,  the 
provisions relating to such control shall  apply 
to such company according to the law to which 
it is subject. 
2.  Where  the  law  does  not  provide  for  a 
preventive control and where such control does 
not apply to all the legal acts necessary for the 
merger, then the minutes of the general meetings 
which  decide  on  the  merger  and,  where 
applicable,  the  merger  contract subsequent  to 
such general  meetings,  shall  be  drawn up and 
certified by notarial deed. 
Article 24 
1.  If the  control  referred  to  in  Article  23, 
paragraph  1  is  prescribed  for  each  of  the 
merging companies, it shall relate solely: 
(a)  as regards each company, to the legal acts 
and formalities required of it and to the absence 
of a judicial decision of postponement taken by 
virtue of Article 18; 
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(b)  furthermore,  as  regards  the  acqumng 
company, to the merger plan within the meaning 
of Article 7. 
2.  If the control is  not prescribed for  each 
of the merging companies it shall be concerned 
solely  with  the  legal  acts  and  formalities 
required  of  the  company  [companies]  sub-
jected2  to  such  control  and  with  the absence 
of a judicial decision of postponement taken by 
virtue of Article 18.  As  to the other company 
[the other companies]2, the notary shall verify 
and certify solely: 
(i)  the existence and legality of the legal  acts 
and  formalities  required  of  the  company  for 
which he is acting and of the merger plan within 
the meaning of Article 7; 
(ii)  the absence of a  judicial decision of post-
ponement taken by virtue of Article 18. 
3.  Where  the  law  of  one  of  the  merging 
companies  prescribes  the  conclusion  of  a 
merger  contract  after  the  approval  of  the 
merger  by  the  companies  in  question,  the 
control  or,  where  applicable,  the  verification 
by notary provided for in the previous paragraph 
shall relate solely: 
(a)  as to the company of which the law requires 
this  contract, to the legal  acts  and formalities 
required of such company; 
(b)  as  to the other company, to the legal acts 
and formalities  required of it and in addition, 
if  the  law  to  which  such  company  is  subject 
provides for a control subsequent to the merger 
contract, to such contract; 
(c)  as  to each company, to the absence  of a 
judicial  decision  of  postponement  taken  by 
virtue of Article 18. 
In  the  case  provided  for  in  the  present 
paragraph,  the  control  or verification  of  the 
1  The Italian delegation is opposed to the introduction 
into the Convention of provisions on this subject. 
2  The words between  square brackets  take account of 
the reservation expressed by  the ltalien delegation with 
respect to Article 3. merger  plan  within  the  meaning  of  Article  7 
shall be effected in the State where the control 
or verification formalities are completed in the 
first place. 
Article 25 
1 .  Where  a  control  is  necessary  both  as 
regards the acquiring company and the company 
acquired,  this  shall  be  carried  out first  of  all 
on  the  acquiring  company  and  the  control 
necessary on the company acquired may proceed 
only  if  proof  is  provided  that  the  necessary 
control  formalities  have  been  carried  out  on 
the acquiring company. 
2.  Where the control is  only required either 
in respect of the company acquired or in respect 
of  the  acquiring  company,  it  can  take  place 
only  upon  production  of  the  notarial  deed 
recording the decision  by the general  meeting 
of the other company approving the merger. 
3.  The provisions of paragraph 1 above are 
not  applicable  in  cases  where  the  law of  the 
company  acquired  prescribes  the  conclusion 
of a merger contract after approval of the merger 
by  the  companies  in question  and  where  the 
law of the acquiring company requires a control 
of  the  merger  subsequent  to  the  conclusion 
of such contract. 
Article 26 
1 .  Where the conclusion of a merger contract 
is  not  prescribed  by  the  law  of  one  of  the 
merging  companies  or  where  the  merger 
contract  prescribed  by  one  of  such  laws  was 
concluded before the general meetings decided 
upon it, the merger shall take effect on one of 
the following dates: 
(a)  on the date of the notarial deed recording 
the  decision  of  the  general  meeting  either  of 
the  company  acquired  or  of  the  acquiring 
company  which  ever  is  the  last  to  approve 
the merger where neither of these companies is 
subject to control; 
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(b)  on the date of completion, which regard to 
the company acquired, of the control formalities 
where  such  control  is  necessary  both  for  the 
acquiring  company  and  for  the  company 
acquired; 
(c)  on the date of completion of the control 
formalities  either with regard to the company 
acquired  or  with  regard  to  the  acquiring 
company, where such control is  necessary only 
for one of such companies. 
2 .  Where the merger contract prescribed by 
the law of one of  the merging  companies was 
concluded after the approval of the merger by 
the  companies  in  question,  the  merger  shall 
take  effect  on the  date  of  conclusion  of  the 
merger  contract;  however,  where  the  merger 
requires  a  control  of  one  of  the  merging 
companies and where such control occurs only 
after the conclusion of the merger contract, the 
merger  shall  take  effect  only  on  the  date  of 
completion  of  the  control  formalities · of  the 
company  acquired  or,  where  no  control  is 
necessary of the latter, on the date of completion 
of  the  control  formalities  of  the  acquiring 
company. 
Article 27 
1.  The  procedures  for  disclosure  shall  be 
determined  in  respect  of  each  of the  merging 
companies by the law applicable to it. 
2.  Apart  from  the  matters  prescribed  for 
each  of  the  companies  by the law  applicable 
to  it,  the  disclosure  shall  mention  the  place 
and  date  of  performance  of  the  disclosure 
formalities  laid down in Articles  13  and 14. 
3.  The acquiring company may itself under-
take the disclosure  formalities  relating  to  the 
company acquired. 
Article 28 
Subject  to  the  application  of  Article  31,  the 
merger  may  be  invoked  against  third-parties 
under the conditions laid down in the provisions 
s.  13/73 of the law to which  each of the companies is 
subject,  on  the  invoking  of  mergers  against 
third-parties  or,  in  the  absence  of  such 
provisions, on amendments to the statutes. 
Section 7 
Effects  of the  merger 
Article 29 
Subject to the provisions of Article 31, a merger 
shall automatically entail the universal transfer, 
both as between the company acquired and the 
acquiring company and as regards third parties, 
of the whole of the capital (assets and liabilities) 
of  the  company  acquired  to  the  acquiring 
company. 
[Article 301 
1 .  The employment contracts concluded by 
the  company  acquired  shall  be  automatically 
transferred  to the  acquiring  company.  In his 
relations  with  the  acquiring  company,  the 
employee  retains  the seniority  acquired in the 
service  of  the  company  acquired;  the  legal 
effects  of  such  seniority  shall  be  determined 
by  the  employment  contract  and  by  the  law 
applicable to such contract. 
2.  Where the dismissal or resignation of  the 
employee caused by his  refusal  to exercise his 
activity  in a  country other than that in  which 
he exercised it prior to the merger, takes effect 
by  virtue  of  the  law  applicable  to  the 
employment contract prior to the  merger,  the 
termination  of such contract shall  be  deemed 
to have occurred by the action of the employer. 
3.  However,  the  previous  paragraph  shall 
not be applicable if the employee has given an 
undertaking, in his  employment contract with 
the company acquired to work, if  need be,  in 
the country where  he is  requested to  exercise 
his  activity,  unless  such  undertaking  is  in-
s.  13/73 
validated  by  virtue  of  the  law  governing  the 
employment contract. 
4.  Paragraph  2  shall  also  be  applicable 
when the merger entails  any  other substantial 
change to the employment contract.] 
Article 31 
1.  Where  the  law  applicable  to  certain 
assets  brought  in  by  the  company  acquired 
requires  special  formalities,  in  the  event  of 
merger,  to enable  the  transfer  to  be  invoked 
against  third  parties,  then  such  formalities 
shall  be  carried  out  in  accordance  with  and 
their effect as  well as  the consequences of non-
compliance shall be determined by such law. 
2.  The acquiring company may itself under-
take such formalities. 
Article 32 
The issue of the shares of the acquiring company 
and of certificates  representing  such  shares  as 
well  as,  where  applicable,  of the cash  adjust-
ment,  shall  take  place  pursuant to  the  law 
1  All the delegations have approved the contents of this 
Article but only four delegations are in favour of retaining 
it in the Convention. 
The Belgian delegation considers that it should not appear 
because  social  questions  should  be  settled  as  a  whole 
and because the solutions given by this text could prejudge 
those which might be adopted in the framework of the 
activities  undertaken  by  the  Commission  on the social 
problems of international concentrations. 
The Luxembourg delegation shares the point of view of 
the Belgian delegation. 
The Italian delegation considers that this Article should 
be supplemented by two provisions: 
.  one, for a special indemnity for employees affected by 
a decision to transfer the place of work, 
.  the other, for a period of reflection additional to the 
period of notice for employees  to whom proposals are 
made  in  respect  of  a  substantial  change  in  their 
employment contract. 
This proposal did not meet with the approval of the other 
delegations. 
19 applicable  to  the  company  acquired  in  the 
event  of  merger,  or  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of the merger  plan insofar  as  such 
provisions are compatible with such law. 
Section 8 
Liability  and nullity 
Article 33 
Any liability which may be incurred by reason 
of the merger operations shall be governed, in 
respect  of  each  of  the  merging  companies, 
by the law applicable to it in the event of merger. 
Article 34 
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 35, 
the  conditions  for  and  the  effects  of  nullity 
of  the  acts  leading  to  the  merger  shall  be 
governed,  in  respect  of  each  of  the  merging 
companies,  by  the law  applicable  to  it in the 
event of merger. 
Article 35 
After  the  date fixed  in Article  26,  the nullity 
of the merger may no longer be established or 
pronounced,  except  for  lack  of  judicial  or 
administrative  control  or  certification  in  due 
legal form.  However, if  in one of such cases 
the law  applicable  to  the  acquiring  company 
excludes  the nullity  of  the merger  or subjects 
it  to  special  conditions,  such  law  shall  be 
applicable. 
Article 36 
The  civil  sanctions  other  than  nullity  of  the 
merger  which  may  arise  where nullity  cannot 
be  established  or  pronounced  in  application 
of the present Convention shall be  determined 
by the law applicable to the acquiring company 
in case of merger.  However, when the action 
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for the  granting  of  such  sanctions  is  brought 
by  the  shareholders,  the  creditors  or  the 
contracting partners of the company acquired, 
such sanctions shall be determined by the law 
governing the company acquired applicable in 
case of merger. 
Article 37 
The  nullity  of  the  merger  provided  for  in 
Article  35  may  no  longer  be  established  or 
pronounced where it is still possible to eliminate 
the  cause  thereof  and  where  regularization 
occurs in  the time-limit fixed  by  the court. 
Article 38 
An action for nullity may no longer be brought 
after  the  expiry  of  a  period  of  six  months 
from  the  date  on which  the  merger  may  be 
invoked against the party seeking the nullity. 
Article 39 
1 .  The decision establishing or pronouncing 
the nullity of the merger shall be published in 
the  States  where  the  seat  of  the  companies 
having merged was located. 
2.  The procedure for and the effects of this 
publication shall be governed by the provisions 
of the law to which  each of  the companies is 
subject,  on the  invoking  against  third  parties 
of amendments to the statutes. 
3.  Opposition  by  third  parties,  should  the 
law  of  the  State  where  the  decision  was 
pronounced so provide, is no longer admissible 
after the expiry of a period of six months from 
the  performance  of  the  disclosure  formalities 
set out in the preceding paragraphs. 
Article 40 
1 .  The decision establishing or pronouncing 
the  nullity  of  the  merger  shall  not  of  itself 
s.  13173 affect the validity of the commitments entered 
into  by  the  acquiring  company  or  of  those 
assumed  towards  it  prior  to  the  disclosure 
referred to in Article 39. 
2.  The  companies  which  have  taken  part 
in  the  merger  shall  bear  joint  and  several 
liability for the commitments of  the acquiring 
company referred to in the previous paragraph. 
Chapter  Ill 
Merger by formation  of a  new company 
Section 1 
Definition  of merger  by formation 
of a  new company 
Article 41 
Merger by formation of a new company is  the 
operation whereby  several  companies  transfer 
to a company which they form by winding up 
but without implementation of  the liquidation 
procedure,  the  whole  of  their  capital  (assets 
and liabilities)  by alloting to their shareholders 
· shares in the new company and,  where appli-
cable,  by  payment  in  cash  of  a  balance  not 
exceeding  ten  per  cent  of  the  nominal  value 
of  the  shares  allotted or, in the  absence  of  a 
nominal value, of their book value. 
Article 42 
1 .  The  provisions  of  the  present  chapter 
shall  also  be  applicable  where  one  of  the 
companies  holds  all  or part of  the  shares  of 
another. 
2.  However,  where  one  of  the  merging 
companies holds  all the shares  of  another, the 
report  provided  for  in  Article  11  shall  be 
prepared  only  for the first  company.  In  the 
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same  case,  each  of  the  reports  provided  for 
in  Article  12  shall  be  prepared in accordance 
with  such  text  but  shall  be  submitted  solely 
to  the  shareholders  of  the  company  which 
holds all the shares of the other company. 
Article 43 
Merger by formation of a  new company may 
also  take  place  where  the  companies  which 
cease  to  exist  are  in  liquidation  if  the  laws 
respectively  applicable  to  such  companies  so 
permit  and  provided  that  they  have  not  yet 
commenced  distributing  their  assets  among 
their shareholders. 
Section 2 
Provisions  of Chapter II  applicable to merger 
by  formation  of  a  new company 
Article 44 
1.  Articles  7  to 20,  21  a),  22,  23,  24  (with 
the  exception  of  paragraph  1,  b),  29,  [30], 
31  and  321,  of  Chapter  II  of  the  present 
Convention  shall  be  applicable  to  merger  by 
formation  of  a  new  company.  For  such 
application, the expressions 'merging companies' 
or 'company acquired', refer to the companies 
which  cease  to  exist,  and  the  expression 
'acquiring company' refers to the new company. 
2.  Article 8,  paragraph 1,  (a)  shall likewise 
be applicable to the new company. 
3.  For  the  application  of  Articles  9,  a), 
14 and 15, the draft statutes of the new company 
shall be added to the statutes of the companies 
which cease to exist. 
4.  For  the  application  of  Article  19,  the 
reference  to Article  27  shall  be  replaced  by  a 
reference to Article 48.  · 
1  This list will possibly have to be supplemented, taking 
account of the texts of Chapter II, Section 5. 
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Special  provisions 
Article 45 
1.  The merger plan or the draft statutes of 
the new company shall state the names  of the 
members  of  the  organs  of the  new  company 
whose  appointment,  according  to  the  law 
of the country of the registered  office  of such 
company, is to be decided either by the general 
meeting  or  the  companies  which  themselves 
cease to exist. 
2.  The  merger  plan  and the  draft  statutes 
of the new company shall be approved by the 
general  meetings  of  each  of  the  companies 
which cease to exist. 
Article 46 
The  new  company  shall  be  formed  and  the 
disclosure  c.£  its  formation shall  be ensured in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  law 
of  the  country  of  its  registered  office  which 
apply  to  the  formation  of  companies  as  the 
result  of  a  merger  or,  failing  such  provisions 
pursuant to the general  law on the formation 
of companies. 
Article 47 
The  merger  shall  take  effect  on  the  date  on 
which  the  new  company  acquires  legal  per-
sonality. 
Article 48 
1  .  The procedure for  the  disclosure  of the 
merger shall  be  determined in respect  of  each 
of  the companies  which  cease to exist  by  the 
law applicable to it. 
2.  Apart from the matter presented for each 
of the companies which cease to exist and for 
the  new  company  by  the  law  applicable  to 
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them,  the  disclosure  shall  mention  the  place 
and  date  of  performance  of  the  disclosure 
formalities laid down in Articles 13 and 14. 
3.  The new  company  may  itself  undertake 
the  disclosure  formalities  relating  to  the 
companies which cease to exist. 
Article 49 
Subject  to  the  application  of  Article  31,  the 
merger  may  be  invoked  against  third  parties 
under the conditions laid down in the provisions 
of  the  law  to  which  each  of  the  companies 
which  cease  to  exist  and  the  new  company 
are subject on the invoking of mergers  against 
third  parties  or,  in  the  absence  of  such  pro-
visions, on amendments to the statutes. 
Article 50 
Any liability which may  be incurred by reason 
of  the  merger  operations  shall  be  governed, 
in  respect  of  each  of  the  companies  which 
cease to exist, by the law applicable to it in the 
event of merger and for the new  company by 
the  law  applicable  in  the  event  of  formation 
of a  company in the country of its  registered 
office. 
Article 51 
The  conditions  for  and  the  effects  of  nullity 
of  the  acts  leading  to  the  merger  shall  be 
governed, in respect of  each of  the companies 
which  cease  to  exist,  by  the  law  applicable 
to it in the event of merger. 
Article 52 
1 .  The  nullity  of  the  new  company  shall 
be  governed  by  the law of the country of its 
registered  office  applicable  on the  formation 
of a company. 
2.  The nullity of the merger may take place 
only if the new company is annulled. 
s.  13/73 Chapter  IV 
General  provisions 
Article 53 
The  decisions  taken  by  the  judicial  or 
administrative  authorities  of  a  Contracting 
State in the exercise  of the preventive  control 
of legality  provided for in Articles  23  and 24 
shall  be  recognized  in  the  other  Contracting 
States in accordance with the provisions of the 
Convention of  27  September 1968  on jurisdic-
tion and the enforcement of civil and commercial 
judgements. 
Article 54 
1.  The  persons  who  shall  have  the  power 
to  draw  up  the  notarial  deeds  referred  to  in 
the present Convention shall be those authorized 
to draw up such deeds  in the territory  of the 
State  to  whose  laws  the  company  to  which 
they relate is  subject. 
2.  The deeds  relating to several  companies 
jointly  may  be  drawn  up  by  the  persons 
authorized in one of the States to whose laws 
such companies are respectively subject. 
3.  The  national  provisions  relating  to  the 
territorial  authority  of  persons  to  draw  up 
notarial deeds shall remain unaffected. 
Article 55 
The  notarial  and  the  deeds  of  a  judicial  or 
administrative  authority  drawn  up  in connec-
tion  with  a  merger  shall  be  exempt  from 
authentication and any other similar formality. 
Article 56 
The present Convention shall not affect national 
and Community merger control provisions other 
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than the preventive control of legality laid down 
in  Articles  23  and  24.  However,  the  nullity 
of a  merger,  even  if  it  is  provided for by the 
law under which such control has taken place, 
can  be  established  or  pronounced  only  in 
accordance with Articles 35 and 52, paragraph 2. 
Chapter  V 
Interpretation  of the  Convention 
by the  Court  of Justice 
of the  European  Communities 
Article 57 
The  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 
Communities  shall  have  jurisdiction  to  give 
preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the 
present Convention. 
Article 58 
1.  Where  a  question  relating  to  the  inter-
pretation  of  the  present  Convention  is  raised 
before a  court or tribunal of one of the Con-
tracting States,  that court or tribunal  may,  if 
it considers that a  decision on the question is 
necessary  to  enable  it  to  give  judgement, 
request  the  Court  of  Justice  to  give  a  ruling 
there on. 
2.  Where  any  such  question  is  raised  in  a 
case pending before a national court or tribunal 
against  whose  decisions  there  is  no  judicial 
remedy  under  national  law,  that  court  or 
tribunal  shall  bring  the  matter  before  the 
Court of Justice. 
Article 59 
1 .  Insofar  as  the  present  Convention  does 
not  provide  otherwise,  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic 
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on the Statute of the  Court of  Justice,  which 
are applicable where the Court is  called  upon 
to give preliminary rulings, shall likewise apply 
to  the  interpretation  procedure  under  the 
present Convention. 
2.  The  rules  of  procedure  of  the  Court 
of  Justice shall  be adapted and supplemented 
if  necessary in accordance with Article  188  of 
the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community. 
Article 601 
1 .  The relevant  authority  of  a  Contracting 
State may request the Court of  Justice to give 
a  ruling on a  question of interpretation of the 
present  Convention  if  the  decisions  given  by 
courts or tribunals of such State are at variance 
with  the  interpretation  given  either  by  the 
Court of Justice,  or by  a  decision  of  a  court 
or  tribunal  of  another  Contracting  State 
[referred to in Article 58, paragraph 2, or which 
has  decided  on  appeal].  The  provisions  of 
the  present  paragraph  shall  apply  only  to 
decisions having the force of law. 
2.  The  interpretation  given  by  the  Court 
of  Justice  following  such  request  shall  not 
affect  the  decisions  in  respect  of  which  the 
interpretation was requested. 
3.  The Procureur  Gbteral  with  the  Courts 
of Cassation of  the Contracting States  or any 
other body  designated  by  a  Contracting State 
shall  be able  to  refer  to  the  Court of Justice 
a  request  for  interpretation  in  pursuance  of 
paragraph 1. 
4.  The  Registrar  of  the  Court  of  Justice 
shall  notify  the  Contracting States,  the  Com-
mission  and  the  Council  of  the  European 
Communities of  such request;  within  a  period 
of  two  months  from  this  notification,  they 
shall  be entitled to submit to the Court state-
ments of case or written observations. 
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5.  The  procedure  provided  for  in  the 
present  Article  shall  give  rise  neither  to  the 
giving nor to the refund of costs or expenses. 
Chapter  VI 
Final  provisions 
Article 61 
1 .  In the relations  between the  Contracting 
States the present Convention shall be applicable 
notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary 
on the international merger of societes anonymes 
by  shares arising under different national laws 
contained  in  other  conventions  to  which 
Contracting States are or may become party. 
2.  However,  the  present  Convention  shall 
not affect: 
- either the rules of domestic law, 
- or  the  provisions  of  international  con-
vention  which  are  or  which  may  come  into 
force and which provide, in other cases, for the 
possibility  of  international  mergers,  provided 
that  such  rules  or  provisions  are  compatible 
with  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Economic Community. 
Article 62 
The  present  Convention  shall  apply  to  the 
European  territory  of  the  Contracting  States, 
1  The German,  Belgian  and  Italian  delegations  are  in 
favour of the text between square brackets.  The French, 
Luxembourg  and  Dutch delegations  prefer  to  delete  it, 
but the Dutch delegation is  prepared to fall in with the 
decisions of the majority. 
The German delegation has formulated two reservations: 
(a)  it reserves the right to revert to this text at the time 
of the Council discussions, 
(b)  it has pointed out that the adoption of this Article 
should not prejudge the solution to be adopted in future 
conventions. 
s.  13/73 to  the  French  overseas  departements  and  to 
the French overseas territories.  The Kingdom 
of the Netherlands may, at the time of signing 
or  of  ratifying  the  present  Convention  or  at 
any time thereafter, by notice to the Secretary-
General  of  the  Council  of  the  European 
Communities, declare that the present Conven-
tion shall apply to Surinam and the Netherlands 
Antilles. 
Article 63 
The  present  Convention  shall  be  ratified  by 
the signatory States.  The instruments  of rati-
fication shall  be  deposited with the Secretary-
General  of  the  Council  of  the  European 
Communities. 
Article 64 
The present Convention shall  enter  into force 
on the first  day  of  the third month following 
the  deposit  of  the  instrument  of  ratification 
by  the  last  signatory  State  to  undertake  this 
formality. 
Article 65 
1 .  The declarations provided for in Article 21 
may  be  made on the date of signature  of the 
Convention or at any date thereafter. 
The declarations made not later than the time 
of  deposit  of  the  instrument  of  ratification 
shall take effect on the date of entry into force 
of the Convention. 
The declarations made subsequently shall take 
effect  on  the  first  day  of  the  third  month 
following their receipt by the Secretary-General 
of the Council of the European Communities. 
2.  Any  Contracting State  may  at  any time 
withdraw its declarations or any one of them. 
This withdrawal shall  take  effect  on the  first 
day of  the third month following  their receipt 
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by the Secretary-General of the Council of the 
European Communities.  It shall be final. 
3.  The  declarations  and  their  withdrawal 
shall  be  without  effect  on  mergers  the  plans 
for which were published previously according 
to Article 13. 
Article 66 
The  Secretary-General  of  the  Council  of  the 
European Communities shall notify the signatory 
States of: 
(a)  the  deposit  of  every  instrument  of  rati-
fication, 
(b)  the date of entry into force of the present 
Convention, 
(c)  the declarations and notifications received 
in pursuance of Articles 21, 62 and 65, 
(d)  the  dates  where  such  declarations  and 
notifications take effect. 
Article 67 
The  present  Convention  1s  concluded  for  an 
unlimited period. 
Article 68 
Any contracting State may request the revision 
of  the  present  Convention.  In  this  event,  a 
revision  conference  shall  be  convened  by  the 
President  of  the  Council  of  the  European 
Communities. 
Article 69 
The  present  Convention,  drafted  in  a  single 
copy, in the German, French, Italian and Dutch 
languages, all four texts being equally authentic, 
shall  be  deposited  in  the  archives  of  the 
Secretariat of the Council of the European Com-
munities.  The Secretary-General shall transmit 
a certified copy to each of the Governments of 
the Signatory States. 
25 IN  WITNESS  WHEREOF  the  undersigned 
plenipotentiaries  have  set  their  hands  to  the 
present Convention. 
Done at Brussels on ... 
For His Majesty the King of the Belgians, 
For  the  President  of the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany, 
For the President of the French Republic, 
For the President of the Italian Republic, 
For  His  Royal  Highness  the  Grand  Duke  of 
Luxembourg, 
For Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, 
26  s:  13/73 Joint declarations 
The  High  Contracting  Parties  to  the  Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Economic  Com-
munity, on the occasion of the signature of the 
Convention  on  the  international  merger  of 
societes  anonymes,  have  approved  the  text 
of the following declarations: 
Joint declaration No  11 
The Governments of the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the French 
Republic,  the  Italian  Republic,  the  Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, 
Wishing to ensure the protection of employees' 
rights  in  the  event  of  international  mergers 
of companies, 
Aware  of  the  fact  that  the  need  for  this 
protection  is  felt  not  only  on  the  occasion 
of international mergers of companies, but also 
in  all  cases  of  international  concentration 
operations, whatever form they assume, 
Desirous  of  guaranteeing  employees  effective 
protection without prejudicing any more favour-
able provisions from which they  benefit under 
the law applicable to them, 
Note  with  satisfaction  that  the  Commission 
of  the European Communities  has  decided  to 
set  up  for  this  purpose  a  working  group  to 
study the questions raised in this area by inter-
national concentration operations with a  view 
to  the  drawing  up  of  a  legal  instrument 
regulating these nutters. 
Joint  declaration No 2 
The Governments of the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the French 
Republic,  the  Italian  Republic,  the  Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, 
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Desirous  of  ensuring  as  effective  and uniform 
an application as  possible of the provisions of 
the present Convention, 
Declare  their  willingness  to  organize,  in  con-
junction with the Court of Justice, an exchange 
of  information  on  the  decisions  taken  in 
application  of  the  present  Convention  by  the 
courts  and tribunals  referred  to in  Article 58, 
paragraph 2.-
Joint declaration  No 3 
The Governments of the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the  Federal Republic  of  Germany,  the French 
Republic,  the  Italian  Republic,  the  Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, 
Aware  that  the  problem  of  international 
mergers  of  companies  raises  not only  strictly 
legal  questions  but  also  questions  concerning 
the tax treatment of such mergers, 
Convinced that the absence of a solution in this 
field  may prove an obstacle to the implement-
ation  of  international  mergers  of  companies 
and consequently may prevent the Convention 
from attaining its objectives, 
Declare  that the  solution  to  the  problems  of 
a tax nature referred to in the second paragraph 
is  an indispensable  condition for the effective 
application of the present Convention, and 
Therefore undertake to contribute to the very 
rapid  adoption,  in  the  framework  of  the 
European  Communities,  of  the  necessary 
measures in this respect. 
1  Four  delegations  are  in  favour  of  this  text.  The 
German and Dutch delegations,  on the other hand, are 
opposed to it. 
27 IN  WITNESS  WHEREOF  the  undersigned 
plenipotentiaries  have  set  their  hands  to  the 
present joint declarations. 
Done at Brussels on ... 
For His Majesty the King of the Belgians, 
For the  President  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany, 
For the President of the French Republic, 
For the President of the Italian Republic, 
For His  Royal  Highness  the  Grand  Duke  of 
Luxembourg, 
For Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, 
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Report on  the draft Introduction 
1.  On  31  March  1965,  even  before  the 
drafting  of  the  Convention  on  the  Mutual 
Recognition  of  Companies and Legal  Persons1 
was  fully  completed,  the  government  experts 
responsible for the drafting held  a preliminary 
exchange  of  views  on  the  Convention  on 
International Mergers, likewise to be negotiated 
pursuant  to  Article  220,  third  indent  of  the 
Treaty  of  Rome.  As  in  their  work  on  the 
earlier Convention, they were assisted here too 
by  the  representatives  of  the  Commission  of 
the European Economic Community (later  the 
Single  Commission  of  the  Communities)  and 
in  particular  by  the  Directorate  (later  the 
Directorate-General).  For the internal market 
and the approximation of laws, and throughout 
their  meetings  they  were  assisted  by  the 
comments  of  the  Secretary-General  of  The 
Hague  Convention  on  Private  International 
Law. 
After  more  than  seven  years  of  discussions-
conducted,  like  those  which  had  led  to  the 
preparation  of  the  draft  Convention  on  the 
Recognition  of  Companies,  under  the  chair-
manship  of  Mr Berthold  Goldman,  Professor 
at the Faculty of Law and Economic Sciences, 
and  subsequently  at  the  University  of  Law, 
Economics  and  Social  Sciences  of  Paris-the 
group of experts authorized Professor Goldman 
to transmit  the  draft  Convention  with  which 
this report is  concerned to the President of the 
Council  of  the  European  Communities,  the 
Permanent  Representatives  of  the  Member 
States  accredited  to  the  Communities,  and 
the  President  of  the  Commission  of  the 
Communities. 
2.  It was never questioned, at the outset or 
as  the  deliberations  proceeded,  that  in  the 
present  state  of the  economy  and  the Jaw  of 
the Member States of the EEC, the negotiation 
and  conclusion  of  such  a  Convention  was 
indeed  'necessary',  as  required  by  Article  220 
of the treaty. 
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3.  From  the  economic  point of  view,  first 
of all, it very soon became clear, following the 
entry into force  of  the EEC Treaty, that with 
one or two rare exceptions the size  of under-
takings in the Member States was not in keeping 
either with the requirements of the vast market 
which  would  be  created  by  the  progressive 
unification  of  national  markets  or  with  the 
competitive  needs  of  those  undertakings  in 
relation  to  undertakings  in  third  countries. 
In fact the Commission stressed in its  Memo-
randum  of  1  December  1965  on  industrial 
concentration  in  the  Common  Market2  that 
the latter 'requires undertakings on a European 
scale  to  ensure  that  the  advantages  of  mass 
production and scientific and technical research 
will  accrue  without restriction  to  180  million 
consumers'.  'Thus  many  European  under-
takings',  the  Memorandum  went  on,  'should 
adapt  themselves  through  internal  growth  or 
by  means  of mergers  with  other undertakings 
to this  expanded market.  Strengthening their 
competitiveness  is  also  advantageous  to  them 
in international competition with large under-
takings in third countries.' 
Five  years  later,  the  Commission  of  the 
Communities confirmed that view in its Memo-
randum  to  the  Council  on  the  Community's 
industrial  policy,3  which  states  as  follows 
(page 138): 
'The effect  of the creation  of  a  single  market 
for  all  products  and  the  free  movement  of 
people  and  the  means  of  production  within 
the  Community  is  not  solely  to  widen  the 
outlets  for  European  firms  and  intensify 
competition  on the  markets  of the  Six.  The 
economic union thus created greatly alters  the 
t  Supplement 2/69 - Bull. EC. 
Convention signed at Brussels on 29 February 1968. 
2  See text in Revue trimestrielle de droit europeen, 1966, 
651, cf. 
E.E.C.  Commission,  Ninth  General  Report  on  the 
Activities of the Community, June 1966, para. 70 et seq. 
3  Industrial Policy of the Community, Memorandum of 
the Commission to the Council, Brussels 1970; ECSC -
EEC - EAEC  Fourth  General Report on the Activities 
of the Communities, February 1971, para. 205 et seq  . 
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forces  them  to  change  their  structure,  their 
methods and often their size in  order to adapt 
themselves to the new conditions of the Common 
Market. 
These  changes  in  the  attitude,  structure  and 
size  of  firms  are indeed the economic ends to 
be  sough  after if  the  Community  is  expected 
to  provide  increased  productivity,  a  better 
capacity  for  financing  and  research,  greater 
ability  to  compete  in  the  international  field, 
in a word, quicker and more assured industrial 
growth.' 
This  did  not  of  course  mean  that  th~  con-
centration of firms  was regarded as  a panacea 
to be adopted wholesale and to be encouraged 
unreservedly.  In fact, even in the 1965 Memo-
randum  the  Commission  pointed  out  that 
'while a  positive  attitude to concentrations  is 
essential  in  the  present  era  of  European  in-
tegration, the interplay of the rules of competi-
tion in the Treaty must at the same time make 
it  possible  for  small  and  medium-sized  firms 
to maintain their  specific  role  and to prevent 
the  abuse  of  dominant  positions  by  firms 
inside  and  outside  the  Community'  .1  This 
same  concern,  strengthened  by  the  trend 
observed  in  the  meantime  towards  economic 
concentration  in  certain  sectors,  is  expressed 
in the Memorandum on industrial policy2  and 
in other documents issued by the Commission.  3 
It is shared by the Governments of the Member 
States,  and both there  and at the level  of the 
organs  of  the Community  there  is  a  growing 
anxiety  to  ensure  that  the  concentration  of 
firms  does  not impair the rights  and interests 
of employees. 
But  for  all  these  limitations  and  proper  pre-
cautions,  the  intra-Community  concentration 
of firms is  nevertheless economically necessary, 
and always will be.  Such concentrations have 
-of course taken place ever since the establishment 
of the Common Market, between undertakings 
in different Member States, e.g.  by the acquisi-
tion of interests; on the other hand, the general 
and contractual law of those States raises legal 
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and  fiscal  obstacles  to  mergers  of  companies 
that more  often  than not appear to  be insur-
mountable  and  in  any  event  have  not  been 
surmounted up to the present.  Yet the merger 
is  not only the ideal form from a legal part of 
view,  since  it  replaces  two  or  more  existing 
legal persons by a single one, thus making the 
legal unity and the economic unity of the under-
taking  coincide.  Mergers  can  also  have  ad-
vantages  in  regard  to  the  operation  and 
management  of  the  undertaking  since,  in  a 
better  way  than  the  acquisition  of  interests, 
in  certain  circumstances  at  any  rate,  they 
permit unity  of  management, the transmission 
of  directives  and  information,  rationalization 
of  production  and  its  discribution  among the 
different industrial units.4 
4.  The  strictly  legal  obstacles  to  mergers 
derive  from the company law  of  the Member 
States. 
(a)  Netherlands  law to date does not include 
any  provisions  relating  to  domestic  mergers 
of  companies,  so  that  naturally  there  is  no 
legal instrument to use in the case of a merger 
of  a  Netherlands  company  with  a  company 
of another State. 
1  Revue trimestrielle de droit europeen, 1966, 651.  -
2  E.E.C.  Commission,  Industrial  Policy  of  the 
Community,  Memorandum  of  the  Commission  to  the 
Council, Brussels 1970, 157-158. 
3  See  for  example: Premiere  orientation  pour  une 
politique energetique communautaire.  Supplement 12/68 
Bull. CE. 
4  See  for  example the work of  the Symposia of Paris, 
26-28  October 1967 (Mergers, cooperation, concentration 
of entreprises): Revue du  Marche  Commun 1968,  n°  1, 
and  of  Rome  (10-13  October  1968),  Federation  of 
European Jurists, and: La fusion des societes de capitaux 
relevant  de  legislations  nationales  differentes  (opening 
statement by  L.  Dabin, Reports by  B.  Goldman and P. 
Sanders,  Discussion)  in: Le  rapprochement  du  droit  de 
l'economie  en  Europe  (Angleichung  des  Rechts  der 
Wirtschaft in Europa), Kolner Schriften zum Europarecht, 
Cologne-Berlin-Bonn-Munich 1971, p. 285 et seq. 
s.  13/73 (b)  The  interpretation  of  texts  relating  to 
the change  of  nationality  of companies1  leads 
to  the  conclusion  that  in  Belgium,  France 
and Luxembourg the acquisition of a company 
of  one  of  these  countries  by  a  company  of 
another State requires the unanimous approval 
of  the  members.  But  as  we  know,  this  is 
virtually  never  attainable  in  companies  of 
certain  size  where  the  shares  are  distributed 
among  a  large  number  of  shareholders.  In 
those  same  countries,  acquisition of  a  foreign 
company by  a local company could be decided 
by  the  extraordinary  general  meeting  under 
the  usual  quorum  and  majority  conditions, 
but  this  possibility  has  no  practical  value 
unless it is  to be found in the same way in the 
company acquired.2 
(c)  The  German  doctrine  goes  further;  it 
regards  mergers  between  a  German  company 
and  a  foreign  company  as  ruled  out  by  law 
at all  times,  whether the German company is 
acquired  or  being  acquired  (or  is  the  new 
company or one of those ceasing to exist.3 
(d)  Italian law4  is  in fact alone in recognizing 
international  mergers,  provided  they  are  ap-
proved,  at  the  level  of  the  Italian  company 
(and  if  it is  a  societe  anonyme  by  the  extra-
ordinary  general  meeting  whose  decision  is 
taken  on  the  basis  of  the  quorum  and  the 
majority prescribed for changes to the statutes. 
Even then,  it should also  be  pointed out that 
at least a Part of the Italian doctrine5 considers 
that shareholders who have  voted  against the 
decision  to  merge  are  entitled  to  exercise  the 
right  of  withdrawal  (  recesso)  expressly  laid 
down in  Article  2437  of  the  Codice  civile  in 
the  case  of  transfer  of  the  registered  office 
of  an  Italian  company  abroad.  But  quite 
apart  from  this  difficulty-which  it  will  be 
seen was finallv overcome in the Convention6-
it  will  be  noted  here  again  that  this  liberal 
feature  of  Italian  law  would  only  have  the 
effect of facilitating mergers between an Italian 
company  and  a  foreign  company  where  an 
Italian company was  taken over by  a  Belgian, 
French  or  Luxembourg  company  (or  in  the 
event of the disappearance of an Italian company 
by its  merging into a  new company set  up  in 
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accordance with the law of one of these three 
countries).  In  practice,  in  any  case,  no  case 
is  cited  in Italy  of  mergers  which  have  come 
about in this way. 
5.  No  international  convention  binding  on 
the Member States, or only some of them exists 
1  See in regard to France: Law of 24 July 1966, Art. 60, 
154.  In Belgium, the same inference can be drawn from 
Article  70  of  the  consolidated  laws  of  commercial 
companies (C.  Comm., Book I,  Title IX, Laws of 6 Jan-
uary  1958  and 23  February 1967),  which states that the 
general  meeting  'shall  have  the  right,  unless  otherwise 
provided, to amend the statutes but shall not change any 
of the essential  features  of the  company'.  Nationality 
is undoubtedly one of these essential features, which may 
have led to the authoritative contention that agreement, 
even  if  unanimous,  by  the  shareholders  would  be 
insufficient to  effect  any change,  since  in fact  it would 
necessitate the formation of a new company (see J.  Van 
Ryn, Principes de  droit commercial, I. 799); for the case 
where the acquired company differs in nationality from 
the company acquired see  in particular op.  cit.  No 853, 
and J.G.  Renauld: La  fusion  des  societes  en droit belge, 
Rev.  de  dr.  intern.  et de  dr.  compare,  1962,  217.  For 
Luxembourg, see L. soc. comm., Article 67, 2. 
2  These  solutions  apply  even  more so  to partnerships 
where the contractual character is far more marked, but 
admittedly it is generally less difficult in such partnerships 
to obtain the unanimous agreement of the partners. 
3  See  Gessler,  Report to  the  International  Symposium 
on  European  Law,  Brussels,  1961,  pp.  41-42;  Beitzke, 
Unternehmungsverflechtung in Europa  und das  deutsche 
Gesellschaftsrecht (Groupings of  undertakings in Europe 
and  German  company  law)  Report  to  the  Rome 
Symposium  of  the  Federation  of  European  Jurists, 
October 1968, para. Ill, No 20. 
4  Codice civile, Article 2365, 2369.  These texts do not 
rule out, either explicity  or implicitly, the power of the 
extraordinary general meeting to change the nationality 
of  the company.  Furthermore,  Article  1369  authorizes 
transfer of the registered office abroad without requiring 
unanimity. 
5  See  Brunetti,  Trattato  del  diritto  delle  societa,  1947-
1950, 561, note 20; also the authors quoted by B. Goldman, 
Report to  the  Paris  Symposium,  October  1967,  Revue 
du Marche commun, 1968, pp. 300-301.  For the opposite 
view see Franceschelli, ibid, p. 336. 
6  The provisions in the Convention concerning approval 
of  the  merger  by  the  general  meetings  of  each  of  the 
companies merging do not grant the right of withdrawal 
in  the  case  of  shareholders  who  have  voted  against 
approval  (see  para.  45  et  seq.  below),  whereas  such  a 
provision  was  envisaged  and  discussed  by  the  group 
during their work. 
33 to mitigate the solutions of their national legal 
systems in regard to international mergers. 
The  possibility  of  such  mitigation  could  be 
inferred from Article 154 of the French Law of 
24  July  1966 on societes  commerciales1  which 
adopts  provision  introduced  previously  into 
Article  31  of  the  Law  of  24  July  1867 
and stipulates  that 'the extraordinary  general 
meeting (of a societe anonyme) may change the 
nationality of  the company, provided the host 
country has concluded a special agreement with 
France under which acquisition of its nationality 
and  transfer  of  the  registered  office  to  its 
territory  are  permitted,  while  the  company 
retains its legal personality'.  Indeed, insofar as 
the requirement of unanimous approval of the 
shareholders  for  the  acquisition  of  a  French 
company by a foreign company is to be deduced 
by  applying  the  doctrine  of  the  impossibility 
of  changing  the  nationality  of  the  company 
without  such  approval  (a  deduction  which  is 
debatable,  since  it  is  difficult  to  hold  that  a 
company  which  is  acquired  and  therefore 
ceases  to  exist,  changes  nationality),  it could 
be  argued  that  the  extraordinary  general 
meeting can validly decide such an acquisition 
where  the acquiring company is  of  a  country 
with which there is  an agreement such as  that 
envisaged  in  Article  154.  But to date France 
has not concluded any such agreement. 
In fact Article 4, para. 2,  of The Hague  Con-
vention  of 1956  on the recognition  of foreign 
companies,  associations  and foundations,  fur-
nishes  the  only  semblance  of  an  attempt  to 
regulate  the problem of  international  mergers 
in the relations between several States (including 
those  which  shortly  afterwards  were  to form 
the European Economic Community);  But the 
restraint  of  this  text  indicates  the  difficulty 
of such regulation.  It stipulates that 'mergers 
between a company, association or foundation 
which has acquired legal personality in one of 
the Contracting States and a company, associa-
tion  or foundation  which  has  acquired  legal 
personality  in  another  Contracting State shall 
be  recognized  in  all  the  Contracting  States, 
provided  it  is  recognized  in  the  States  con-
cerned'.  In other words, a  State party to the 
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Convention  (which  incidentally  has  not  yet 
entered into force)  could not refuse to recognize 
the validity and the effects of a merger between 
companies belonging to two other Contracting 
States which allow mergers.  But since in fact 
such  mergers  would  only  be  recognized  by 
two  States  parties  to  the  Convention  and  at 
the same time Members of the Community in 
very  special  circumstances  (in  practice  this 
means,  as  will  be  recalled-leaving  aside  the 
case  of  a  Belgian,  French  or  Luxembourg 
company whose shareholders had unanimously 
approved an acquisition by a foreign company-
the  acquisition  of  an  Italian  company  by  a 
company other than a  German or Netherlands 
company)  the  text  in  question  would  in any 
event add little to the present state of the law 
on this subject.  · 
6.  This lack of  rules  to cover international 
mergers  made  the  convention  envisaged  in 
Article  220  of  the  Treaty  indispensable  once 
the  economic  need  for  such  mergers  was 
recognized. 
But vis-a-vis company law, the drafting of such 
a  convention  was  bound to create  difficulties 
stemming from  the often profound differences 
between  the  national  law  of  the  Member 
States  in  regard  to  internal  mergers,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  fact,  already  mentioned,  that 
there is  no  legislation  with this  object in the 
Netherlands. 
Indeed,  leaving  aside  the  purely  technical 
differences,  which  in  the  last  resort  could  be 
regarded as negligeable and citing only examples 
here,  it will  be  recalled  that these  legislations 
differ  particulary in that some do  not require 
the conclusion of a  merger agreement between 
the  management  organs  of  the  companies  in 
question  prior  to  action  by  their  general 
meetings  (Belgium  and  Luxembourg);  French 
law  provides  for  a  draft contract; in  German 
law  a  contract  must  be  made,  but it can  be 
concluded before or after the general meetings; 
finally  Italian  legislation  stipulates  a  contract 
1  journal Officiel de la Republique franfaise, 26 July 1966. 
s.  13/73 subsequent  to  the  concordant  resolutions  of 
the general  meetings.  Similarly,  German  law, 
Italian law to a more limited extent French law 
exercise  a  justicial preventive control over the 
legality of mergers, whereas the law of Belgium 
and  Luxembourg  regards  the  obligatory  em-
ployment of a notary as  the means of ensuring 
their  regularity.  Again,  the  protection  of 
creditors,  particularly  those  of  the  acquired 
company is regulated according to very different 
principles in the different legislations. 
These various questions will recur again below 
when we come to examine the provisions of the 
Convention concerning them.  But the examples 
given are sufficient to make it clear that it was 
not  always  possible  to  regulate  international 
mergers  by  designating  one  national  law  as 
appropriate  to  determine  the  conditions,  ma-
chinery and effects applicable in each particular 
case.  The answer was often not easily divisible, 
so that it could not be found, in respect of any 
particular company, by  applying its  governing 
law.  In  fact,  because  of  the  divergencies 
between  the  laws  of  the Member  States,  the 
unrestricted application of such a method would 
have  had  the  effect  of  making  the  juridical 
regime  of  international  mergers  in  some 
instances  more  liberal,  in  others  more  re-
strictive,  according  to  whether  they  were 
subject, as  a  result of the links  connecting the 
companies  concerned,  with  the  laws  of  this 
or that Member State. 
Consequently, it was essential to combine this 
method of settling  disputes  with  a  number of 
uniform  substantive rules,  applicable  to  inter-
national mergers.  But here again, the achieve-
ment of uniformity, even partial, was hampered 
by the differences between national legislations 
in  regard  to  internal  mergers,  since  Member 
States  might  hesitate  to accept  in  the  case  of 
international  mergers  an  approach  too  far 
removed  from  that  they  normally  apply  in 
relation to domestic mergers. 
7.  These  difficulties  could  of  course  be 
reduced,  if  not removed,  by  the  coordination 
of  national  legislations  relating  to  domestic 
mergers  on the basis of Article 54, para. 3,  (g) 
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of  the  Treaty  of  Rome.  The  government 
expert  appointed  to  draw up  the  Convention 
on International  Mergers  raised  the  question 
when they began their deliberations whether it 
would not be wise for the group itself to work 
on the drafting of the directive on the coordina-
tion  of  domestic  law,  their  activities  in  the 
former  case  being  exercised  on  behalf  of 
Governments,  and  in  the  latter  within  the 
framework of the Commission.  But they very 
quickly agreed not to adopt that method, since 
its implementation would have raised objections 
of a theoretical nature, and in any event would 
have  come  up  against  very  serious  practical 
difficulties. 
The experts did,  however,  decide  at  the same 
time  to  keep  themselves  constantly  informed 
about the work of  preparing the  directive  on 
domestic  mergers  which,  as  we  know,  cul-
minated  in  the  draft  directive  transmitted  by 
the Commission to the Council on 16 June 19701. 
The government group, like the Commission's 
experts,  tried  as  far  as  possible  to  achieve  a 
similar if not an identical approach and indeed 
wording. 
But  the  coordination  of  the  provisions  of 
national  law  relating  to  domestic  mergers 
by  no  means  produced  complete  uniformity. 
For that reason, and also because the solutions, 
even when uniform, to the problem of domestic 
mergers  do  not  necessarily  always  apply  to 
international  mergers,  it  was  found  necessary 
to maintain in  the Convention a  combination 
of conflicts of laws, rules and substantive rules 
appropriate to international mergers. 
8.  As  the law governing the Member States 
stood  when  the  work  wa,s  begun,  and  as  it 
still  stands  today,  international  mergers  were 
likewise  faced,  and  are  still  faced,  with  tax 
obstacles which although merely de facto,  have 
nevertheless  in  many  instances  a  nullifying 
effect.  Such  are  in  particular  the  imposition 
of  charge  in  respect  of  unreal  value  on  the 
company acquired or the risk of double taxation 
(where  the acquiring company retains  a  place 
t  OJ C 89, 14.7.1970. 
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acquired). 
Hence the government experts observed at the 
very  outset that it would  be  useless  to  make 
international  mergers  legally  possible  vis-a-vis 
company law unless tax obstacles were removed. 
But  in  the  end  they  carne  to  the  conclusion 
that it would  be  better to  leave  it  to the tax 
experts  meeting  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Commission,  with  this  in  mind,  to  make  a 
proposal  for  a  directive  on  the  coordination 
of tax in that field;  and such a directive on the 
coordination of tax law in that field;  and such 
a  directive  was  in  fact  transmitted  by  the 
Commission to the Council on 18 March 1969;1 
but  it  has  not  been  adopted  to  date,  a  fact 
which  led  the  experts  to  append  to the  Con-
vention the text of a joint declaration designed 
to stress  the importance of the fiscal  problem 
inherent  in  international  mergers,  and  the 
solution of those problems  (para.  180  et seq.). 
9.  This  is  the  way  in  which  the  method 
used  in  the  Convention  to  solve  the  legal 
questions  raised by interna6onal mergers,  and 
the selection of such questions, were determined. 
As  we  have  seen,  the  method  combines  rules 
of conflict and substantive rules.  With regard 
to the selection, the Convention is  confined to 
matters  arising out of company law, although 
in the opinion of the large majority of delega-
tions,  individual  protection  of  employees  and 
their representation in the management, organs 
while also being an aspect of social legislation, 
could  not  be  left  out  of  the  Convention. 
Employees  are,  after  all,  connected  with  the 
undertaking in  hardly  less  strict  a  sense  than 
members  and  more  than  creditors,  so  that it 
would have been difficult not to make a  start 
at least on measures  designed to protect them 
in  the  event  of  international  mergers,  at  a 
time  when  measures  governing the  protection 
of  members  and  creditors  were  being worked 
out.  With regard to the representation of em-
ployees  in  the  company's  management  and 
supervisory organs, this has a direct bearing, in 
the  legal  systems  embodying  such  provisions, 
on the very structure of these bodies, so that the 
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matter is  just as  much of concern to company 
law as to sociallegislation.2 
10.  According  to  the  method  and  within 
the limitations thus laid down, the Convention 
establishes  first  of  all  the  field  of application 
(Chapter I,  Articles 1 to 3), subsequently deals 
with  mergers  by  acquisition  (Chapter  II, 
Articles  4  to  40),  and  then  with  mergers  by 
formation  of  a  new  company  (Chapter  III, 
Articles  41  to  52),  proceeding  here  wherever 
possible,  by  using  the  provisions  relating  to 
mergers by acquisition, Chapter IV (Articles 53 
to  56)  contains  general  provisions  relating to 
both types  of  mergers;  Chapter V  (Articles 57 
to  60)  deals  with  the  interpretation  of  the 
Convention  by  the  Court  of  Justice  of 
the  European  Communities  and  Chapter  VI 
(Articles 61  to 69)  contains the final provisions. 
Finally joint declarations attached. 
This report will follow the same arrangement. 
1  OJ C 39, 22.3.1969. 
2  For  the  individual  protection  of  workers  see  draft 
Convention, Article 30, para. 95  et seq.  below, and first 
Declaration  No 1,  para.  175  et seq.  below;  and for the 
problem  of  participation  see  Special  Report,  annex  2 
below. 
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Field  ~f application 
11.  In determining the scope of the Conven-
tion, it seemed  desirable  to  define  companies 
to- which  it  would  apply,  and  the  operations 
involved. 
The first  question  is  in  two  parts,  since  the 
companies  to  which  the  Convention  applies 
are  characterized,  first  of  all,  by  their  links 
with  the  Contracting  States  (see  below,  Sec-
tion  I)  and  secondly  by  their  legal  form 
(Section  11).  The second question is  answered 
by Article 3 of the Convention, which mentions, 
and hence brings within the field of application 
of the Convention, both mergers by acquisition 
and mergers by formation of a new company, 
thus  exclusing  other  operations,  even  if  they 
are  akin  to  mergers  (Section  III).  But  these 
provisions are pinpointed by  the definitions of 
the two types of  mergers, in  Articles 4 and 41 
of the Convention respectively,  and these  will 
be referred to again when the texts are discussed. 
Finally, it should be noted that the territorial 
scope of the Convention is  determined, in the 
usual way, in the final  provisions  (Article  62: 
see para. 166 below). 
Section 1 
Links  between the  companies  to which-
the  Convention  applies  and  the contracting 
States 
12.  The  definition  of  the  link  which  must 
connect  a  company  with  a  state  of  the 
Community  (or a  State which  is  a  party to a 
Convention  concluded  within  the  framework 
of the Community) so that it can benefit from 
the Community's rules  and institutions or the 
Community  convention  presents  very  serious 
difficulties  for  the  Member  States  and  the 
institutions  of  the  Community.  The  difficul-
ties  arise  not only  from  the  need  to  make  a 
selection from several  possible criteria for the 
legal links connecting a company with a State, 
but also  from  the fact  that in this  field  legal, 
economic  and  political  factors  are  closely 
intertwined. 
This  had  already  become  apparent  when  in 
the  general  programmes  of  December  1961  it 
was found necessary to determine the conditions 
governing  subsidiary  places  of  business  and 
business  operations carried out by  a  company 
belonging to one Member State on the territory 
of  another  (i.e.  the  only  types  of  action  at 
present  feasible  to  promote  the  international 
expansion of companies).  It was  nevertheless 
found  possible  to  combine  the  criterion  of 
linkage,  whether  abstract  or  legal,  under 
Article  58  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  and  con-
sisting  merely  of  'incorporation' in a  Member 
State,  with the  more  concrete  requirement  of 
an  affective  and  continous  link  with  the 
economy of a State, thus reflecting the condition 
of  a  prior  establishment  in  the  Community 
prescribed by Article 52 of the Treaty. 
The  question  was  to  arise  again  among  the 
Six  in  connexion  with  the  drafting  of  the 
Convention  on  the  Mutual  Recognition  of 
Companies  and  Legal  Persons,  and  it  was 
settled  by a  different  method though based on 
the same  principle-namely that as  a  general 
rule,  formation  in  accordance  with  the  law 
of a Contracting State and establishment of the 
registered  office  in  the  territories  where  the 
Convention applies were regarded as  sufficient 
to  warrant  recognition  under  it.  But  the 
option  was  allowed  to any  Contracting State 
of  refusing  to  recognize  companies  having 
their real  seat outside those territories, if they 
had 'no genuine link with the economy' of one 
of them (Convention on Recognition, Article 3). 
These same points relating to the economy and 
economic  policy  were  to  arise  also,  and even 
more  cogently,  in  connexion  with  intra-
Community mergers.  These are,  as  has  been 
said, one of the vital instruments for economic 
concentration  across  frontiers,  and  hence  for 
better  adaptation  of  undertakings  to  the 
37 Common Market and the strenthening of their 
international competitiveness.  Consequently, a 
particular  Government  might  consider  that 
mergers  should be reserved for undertakings-
and hence companies-genuinely linked to the 
Community  through  one  of  the  Contracting 
States.  Thus here again the requirement of an 
economic  and even  political  link  side  by  side 
with  the  legal  link  could  arise.  It  must  be 
added, too, that the difficulties  of defining the 
legal link were themselves increased by the risk 
of  different  treatment,  by  different  States, 
of one and the same company in respect of its 
recognition,  precisely  by  virtue  of  Article  3 
of  the  Convention  on  Recognition  (and  also 
Article 9, which provides that recognition may 
be  refused  for  reasons  of  public  policy  to  be 
assessed  separately by  each Contracting State). 
Furthermore, the separation between the legal 
and  economic  criteria  might  seem  artificial 
inasmuch as the severity of the latter can help 
to make the former more liberal. 
13.  At  all  events,  the  experts  were  obliged 
in  the  main to accept  the separate treatment. 
They abandoned  the idea  of  induding in the 
draft wording which would reflect the basically 
economic concern of one at least of the delega-
tions  because it had been  impossible  to reach 
even  a  partial  and  limited  agreement  to  its 
proposals;  and  they  decided  merely  that  a 
special  report  on  that  aspect  of  the  problem 
should be put before the representatives of the 
Member States  of the  Community  meeting  in 
the  Council;  only  at that political  level  could 
a reply to that concern be found, if it could be 
found at all. 
On the  other hand,  the  experts  attempted  to 
define the criterion of linkage of companies to 
whom  the  Convention  was  to  apply,  mainly 
if not exclusively from the legal point of view. 
Here  again,  however,  they  did  not  reach 
complete  agreement,  so  that  some  of  the 
provisions  of  Article  1  present two variants-
an indication of  the difficulty  of the problem 
even as  thus circumscribed. 
14.  Unanimity was found possible, however, 
m  regard  to  the  basic  definition  of  the  legal 
38 
criteria  of  linkage.  This  definition  is  estab-
lished, in paragraph 1 of Article 1,  by reference 
to the Convention of 29  February 1968  on the 
Mutual Recognition  of  Companies  and Legal 
Persons.  Thus in  virtue  of the provisions  of 
the present Convention, companies established 
in  accordance  with  the  law  of  the  different 
contracting  states  may  merge,  provided  they 
are recognized in  those States in virtue  of the 
Convention on Recognition, 
Each  of  these  three elements  in the text calls 
for some comments: 
(a)  The  object  of  Article  1  is  to  determine 
the  field  of  application  of  the  Convention 
vis-a-vis benefiting companies.  Hence it neither 
prejudges  nor  rules  out  the  possibility  and 
validity of international mergers carried out in 
accordance with other rules of law, contractual 
or general,  which  might  make  them  possible 
under  different  conditions.  Article  61  of  the 
Convention  confirms  the  point;  Article  1, 
para.  1,  merely  defines  the  companies  which 
may merge  'pursuant to the provisions  of the 
present  Convention',  but  not those  which  in 
general may take part in international mergers. 
(b)  These  companies  must  have  been  estab-
lished  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  the 
different Contracting States.  Establishment in 
accordance  with  the  law  of  one  of  the  Con-
tracting  States  is  already,  as  we  know,  the 
basic  condition  for  recognition  under  the 
Convention  on  Recognition;  and  it  is  note-
worthy  that  in  the  present  state  of  the  law 
among  the  Six,  the  further  requirement  of 
establishment  of  the  registered  office  'in  the 
territories  to  which  the  present  Convention 
applies'  added  nothing,  since  none  of  the 
legislations  in  question  allows  a  company  to 
be  set  up  under  its  provisions  by  fixing  its 
registered office abroad. 
But it was also pointed out that the Convention 
referred  only  to  mergers  between  companies 
set up in accordance with the law of different 
Contracting States, so that its field  of applica-
tion covered only international mergers.  More. 
over,  Article  220  of  the  Treaty  provides  for 
the negotiation of a  Convention only to cover 
s.  13/73 'the possibility of  mergers  between  companies 
or  firms  governed  by  the  laws  of  different 
countries'.  The  experts  agreed  to  specify  in 
that connexion that a merger of two companies 
of  a  single  State  which  ceased  to  exist to be 
replaced by a  new company set up in another 
State  did  not  come  within  the  scope  of  the 
Convention. 
(c)  Finally,  companies  cannot  merge  under 
the new  Convention unless  'they are accorded 
recognition  in  the Contracting States by virtue 
of the Convention of 29 February 1968'.  This 
condition  does  not  duplicate  the  requirement 
of  establishment  in  accordance  with  the  law 
of  a  Contracting  State,  since,  as  has  been 
mentioned, the Brussels  Convention allows for 
refusal  of  recognition  to  companies  thus 
established, which  means that only companies 
not so refused recognition benefit in all instances, 
and without restriction,  from  the  Convention 
on Mergers. 
15.  If one of the companies merging is  not 
recognized  (even  though  established  in  accor-
dance  with  the  law  of  a  Contracting  State) 
in virtue of Article 3  or Article 9 of the Con-
vention  on  Recognition,  serious  difficulties 
arise, and as we have already stated, the experts 
were  unable  to  solve  them  by  submitting  a 
unanimous  text,  so  that the  rest  of  Article  1 
consists of two variants. 
Before discussing each of them in turn, however, 
it  should  be  emphasized  that  all  the  experts 
felt  that  refusal  by  a  Contracting  State  to 
recognize one of the merging companies on the 
basis  of  Article  3  (real  seat  outside  the  ter-
ritories to which the Convention on Recognition 
applies)  or  Article  9  (public  policy)  of  the 
Convention  on  Recognition  was  bound  to 
have  some  effect  on  the  applicability  of  the 
new  Convention.  A  merger  after  all  implies 
the  performance  by  each  of  the  companies 
of a large number of important legal acts, and 
it is  difficult  to conceive  how the validity  of 
such  acts  could  fail  to  be  impugned  in  one 
way  or  another where  the  company  involved 
was not recognized  by  one of the Contracting 
States. 
s.  13/73 
16.  That being so, the most drastic solution 
would  have  been  to  rule  out the  application 
of  the  Convention  in  all  instances  where  one 
of  the  merging  companies  is  not  recognized, 
even  where  no  special  link  existed  between 
the  companies,  or  the  new  company  if  any, 
and the Contracting State refusing recognition. 
In practice,  for  example,  if  France  made  the 
declaration  provided  for  in  Article  3  of  the 
Convention on Recognition, a company having 
its  registered office  in the Netherlands  and its 
real  seat  at  Stockholm  would  not have  been 
able  to  merge  with  a  company  having  its 
registered  office  in  Luxembourg,  even  though 
neither the  Netherlands  nor Luxembourg had 
made or would make that same declaration. 
Logically, there were sound arguments both for 
and against this  solution.  It could be  said in 
its  favour  that  to  permit  the type  of  merger 
under consideration would render a  refusal  of 
recognition  meaningless,  even  though  it  was 
in  conformity  with  the  1968  Convention. 
Against it, it could be said that to rule out such 
mergers would be to inflict the effects of rdusal 
of  recognition  on  States  recognizing  the 
companies in question. 
In practice,  such  a  system  would have forced 
the control authorities  or the notary, in States 
recognizing  companies  wishing  to  merge,  to 
query  a  refusal  of  recognition,  often a  virtual 
refusal,  by  another  State.  It  was  certainly 
unreasonable to  impose such  a  task on them, 
and  the  responsabilities  which  could  arise 
therefrom. 
17.  Hence  the  delegations  which  had  ad-
vocated that drastic  course  agreed  to drop it, 
but subject to a  condition so to speak.  That 
is  the  significance  of  the  first  variant  of  the 
wording  of  the  text  following  paragraph  1. 
Other delegations did not accept the 'condition', 
and one of them stated that it was prepared to 
waive  it  hence  the  drafting  of  the  second 
variant. 
The  first  variant,  favoured  by  the  German, 
French  and  Italian  delegations,  consists  of 
two paragraphs. 
39 i)  The  first  paragraph  (which  would  form 
paragraph 2 of Article 1)  limits the effects of a 
refusal  of  recognition  so  that  it  would  only 
stand  in  the  way  of  the  appliCation  of  the 
Convention on Mergers if any of the companies 
merging  (thus  including  the  one  not  refused 
recognition, and irrespective of whether it was 
the acquiring company, the company acquired 
or the new company if  any, had its  registered 
office  in  the  territory,  from  which  state  the 
refusal emanates.  In such circumstances, that 
State  would  have  a  direct  interest  in  wit-
nessing  the  full  effect  of  its  non-recognition 
of one of. the merging companies; and it should 
be  stressed  that this  effect  would  be  general, 
inasmuch  as  the  merger  would  be  ruled  out 
even  in  respect  of  States  recognizing  the 
company  in  question.  Thus  a  Netherlands 
company  having  its  real  seat  in  the  United 
States,  and  hence  not  recognized  by  France, 
could  not  merge  with  a  company  having  its 
seat in France, could not merge with a company 
having its  seat  in  France,  and the ban would 
apply in respect  of  all  the Contracting States, 
including the Netherlands. 
ii)  The  Convention  would,  on  the  other 
hand,  continue  to  apply  where  none  of  the 
companies  in  question  had  its  seat  in  the 
territory of the State refusing to recognize one 
of them; in other words, in the example cited 
above  involving  a  Netherlands  company  not 
recognized  by  France  and  a  Luxembourg 
company, a merger would be possible. 
But  as  we  have  said,  this  limitation  of  the 
effects of refusal of recognition had a condition 
attached to it  by  the delegations which at the 
outset had not accepted it, namely the insertion 
in  the  Convention  of  the  second  paragraph 
of  the first  variant  (which  would form  para-
graph 3 of Article 1).  In virtue of this clause, 
the  type  of  merger  in  question,  even  though 
feasible  under  the  Convention  where  none 
of the merging companies nor the new company 
has  its  seat  in  the  territory  of  the  State  not 
recognizing  one  of  the  companies,  would  be 
ineffective vis-a-vis that State. 
18.  Other  delegations,  however,  felt  that 
the drawbacks to that type of partial veto  on 
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mergers  were  too great,  quite  apart from  the 
difficulties which would arise in its application. 
It  seemed  to  them that international  mergers 
would  thus  be  hedged  around  by  a  measure 
of  uncertainty  at  variance  with  the  interests 
of  members  and  outsiders,  and  they  feared 
that  the  companies  involved  might  thus  be 
constrained  to  give  up  the  idea,  so  that  an 
extreme situation would be reached where the 
Convention  was .  rendered  totally  inapplicable 
by  the mere refusal  by  one of the Contracting 
States to recognize  any one of the companies. 
This is  the situation catered for in the second 
variant  of  Article  1,  which  after  paragraph 1 
(adopted unanimously,  it will be remembered) 
consists  only  of  a  paragraph 2  identical with 
the corresponding wording of the first variant. 
But  in  this  instance,  that  would  be the  only 
concession made to the State refusing recogni-
tion:  the refusal would only be an obstacle to 
a  merger if  any  of the merging companies,  or 
the  new  company,  had  its  seat  within  the 
territory  of  that  State.  Except  in  those  cir-
cumstances,  the  merger  would  be  effective 
in respect of all the Contracting States, including 
the one which had refused to recognize one of 
the companies involved  (without prejudice,  of 
course, to the possibility open to any State to 
refuse  to  recognize  the  acquiring  company 
or the new company, subject to the conditions 
of  such  a  refusal,  as  defined  in  Article  3  or 
Article  9  of  the  1968  Convention,  being  ful-
filled). 
19.  The choice  between these  two  variants 
will  be  a  matter for  the Governments  of  the 
Member States, and it may be hoped that the 
choice  will  be  simplified  by  the  decision, 
likewise  to be  made by  them,  concerning  the 
strictly economic aspect of the link between the 
merging companies and the Contracting States. 
It  may  be added that in  the case  of  both the 
first and the second variants, there are technical 
points  common  ,...to  both  that  must  still  be 
clarified: 
(a)  The question  was asked how the refusal 
of recognition conditioning the non-applicability 
s.  13/73 of the Convention would be made known, or 
indeed  ascertained,  and  also  under  the  first 
variant  (Article  1,  para. 3),  the inapplicability 
of a merger to the State from which the refusal 
came.  The answer to this is  relatively simple. 
(i)  In the case of Article 1,  para. 2  (first  and 
second variants), one of the companies merging 
or the new company has its seat in the territory 
of the State refusing recognition.  The control 
authorities or notaries in that State will there-
fore  be in  a  position to  check  that  a  refusal 
of recognition has effectively or virtually been 
applied in respect of any one of the companies 
in question,  even  if  it has  its  seat in another 
State, since the refusal will be based either on 
the  declaration  envisaged  in  Article  3  of  the 
1968  Convention,  or  on  public  policy  as 
assessed  in  the  home  State.  The  control 
authorities or the notary in the other interested 
State will  not need  to  make this  check,  since 
in  any  event  an  impediment  to  the  merger 
will  be  raised  through  the  control  (admin-
istrative,  juridical or notarial)  exercised in the 
first State. 
(ii)  In the case of paragraph 3  (first variant), 
refusal  to  give  effect  to  the  merger  will  be 
decided by an administrative or judicial author-
ity  in  the  State  not  recognizing  one  of  the 
merging  companies.  This  authority  will  nat-
urally be in a position to check that recognition 
has been refused. 
It must at the same time be admitted that in 
this instance the notaries or control authorities 
in  the States  directly  interested in the merger 
may find  it extremely difficult to check or to 
predict  a  refusal  of  recognition  by  a  third 
State,  and  hence  the  fact  that  the  merger  is 
ineffective  within  the  territory  of  that  State. 
In the view of some delegations, this difficulty 
of  foreseeing  what  is  happening  constitutes 
a serious drawback to the first variant. 
(b)  It will have been noted, at the same time, 
that  in  regulating  the  case  where  one  of  the 
companies  in  question  has  its  seat  in  the 
territory of a State refusing recognition to one 
of  the  merging  companies  (paragraph  2,  first 
and second  variants)  or the  case  where  none 
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of the companies has its seat within the territory 
of that State  (first  variant,  paragraph 3),  the 
Convention does  not specify  whether it  is  the 
registered office or the real seat that is  meant. 
The inference is  that both are intended.  This 
means that the Convention will not be applicable 
where either one of the merging companies or 
the new company has its seat whether registered 
office or real in the territory of a State refusing 
recognition to one of  the companies  merging, 
this means  (if  the first variant is  adopted) that 
the inapplicability  of  the  merger  to  the State 
refusing  recognition  will  only  arise  where 
none of the companies in question has its seat 
(registered  office  or real),  within  the territory 
of  that  State,  since  otherwise  we  would  be 
back  to  paragraph  2,  and  the  Convention 
would be inapplicable. 
(c)  A  final  difficulty  relating  to  application 
was  raised  in  the  course  of  the  discussions, 
namely  where  an  exequatur  in  respect  of  a 
judgment recognizing the validity of a  merger 
taking place in a  Contracting State is  applied 
for  in  another  State  where  the  merger  is  in-
effective  {through the application of Article 1, 
first  variant,  paragraph  3),  as  a  result  of  a 
refusal to recognize one of the companies based 
on Article 9 of the Convention of 1968  (public 
policy). 
This  difficulty  is  bound  up  with  the  more 
general problem of the relationship between the 
Convention  of  27  September  1968  on  Juris-
diction  and  the  Enforcement  of  Civil  and 
Commercial  Judgments1  and  the  Convention 
on Mergers.  The group of experts considered 
that it was not called upon to take a stand on 
that question. 
20.  Finally,  attention  should  be  drawn 
to footnote  1  to Article 1  of the  Convention. 
This  expresses  the  general  reservations. · of 
two  delegations,  different  in  scope  no  doubt 
but  both . reflecting  the  economic  and  polit-
ical  problems  underlying  the  task  of  deter-
mining the companies which benefit under the 
1  Supplement 2/69- Bull. EC. 
41 Convention.  These could not be  solved,  and 
probably it was  too  much  to  expect  them  to 
be solved, at the expert level. 
The problems in question,  and the debates  to 
which they gave  rise  in  the group of experts, 
are the subject of a  special  report annexed to 
this report. 
Section 2 
Legal  form  of companies  to which  the 
Convention  applies 
21 .  Article  2  makes  IS  clear  that  the 
Convention  is  applicable  only  to  the  societe 
anonyme,  the  Aktiengesellschaft,  the  sociedt 
per azioni and the  naamloze vennootschap  of 
the  Contracting  States.  Thus  the  societes 
de  personnes, the societes  en  commandite par 
actions  as  well  as  the societes a  responsabilite 
limitee are excluded. 
With  regard  to  the  last-named,  the  question 
of  extending  the  Convention  to  cover  them 
arose in the course of the deliberations; but in 
the end  the experts felt  that in  any  event the 
first  thing to  be  done  was  to conclude  or at 
any  rate  to  produce  the  final  drafting  of  a 
Convention  confined  to  societes  anonymes 
which  it  need  hardly  be  said  are  the  most 
important type  in  trade  between the Member 
States of the Community and therefore between 
Contracting States-and to envisage the possi-
bility of drawing up later on, in the light of the 
experience  thus  gained,  a  new  convention 
extending the coverage in that way. 
Section 3 
Operations envisaged  under the  Convention 
22.  Article  3  refers  to  the  two  types  of 
mergers to be dealt with in chapters II  and III 
of the Convention respectively; merger acquisi-
tion and merger by formation of a new company. 
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It has already been pointed out that both these 
operations are carefully defined at the beginning 
of  the  relevant  chapters;  thus  studying  the 
definitions  is  the  only  way  to  determine  the 
operations in question. 
23.  But the very absence of reference in the 
text to  any  operations  other than  merger  by 
acquisition and merger by formation of a new 
company  leads  us  to  the conclusion  that the 
Convention  is  not  applicable  to  them,  even 
though  their  economic  results,  and  in  fact 
the rules of law governing them in the legislation 
of this or that Member State, make them akin 
to mergers. 
The  question  was  raised,  for  example,  in 
relation  to  'scission'  found,  for  example,  in 
French  law1  and  in  Belgian  tax  law2,  and 
mentioned  by  the  Belgian  delegation  as  a 
matter  of  great  economic  importance  for 
Belgium.  But  the  fact  that  the  questions 
raised by  the two types  of merger referred to 
are complex enough as  it is,  and the difficulty 
the  experts  had  in  resolving  them,  led  the 
experts to abandon any idea of regulating such 
'kindred  operations'.  It  may  be  noted  here 
and now, however,  that these  could perfectly 
well  arise  between  companies  in  different 
Contracting States in virtue of rules  of general 
or contract law other than those in the Con-
vention which  are already in force  or may  in 
due  course  come  into force.  This  point will 
be  raised  again  in  connexion  with  Article  61 
(see para. 165 below). 
1  Law of 24 July 1966, Article 371, para. 3, Article 382 
et seq. 
z  See J.G. Renauld, op.  cit., p. 77. 
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Merger  by  acquisition 
24.  This  chapter  contains  the  bulk  of  the 
substantive provisions of the Convention, since 
as has already been pointed out, the regulation 
of  mergers  by  formation  of  a  new  company 
has  in large  measure  been  dealt  with  simply 
by  referring to that of mergers  by  acquisition. 
First of all there is  a definition of this operation 
(Section  1)  consisting, as  will  be  seen,  of pro-
visions  which  help  to  delimit  the  field  of 
application of the Convention.  Next, following 
a plan that reflects as far as possible the chrono-
logical  order in which the various  phases  are 
carried  out or the problems  which  can  arise, 
the following are dealt with: preparation of the 
merger (Section 2); decision to merge (Section 3); 
protection of creditors (Section 4), the protection 
of  shareholders  being  covered  essentially  by 
provisions  contained  in  the  two  preceding 
sections;  control and  disclosure  of the merger 
(Section  5-Section  6  being  left  blank  for 
texts not yet proposed concerning the problem 
of  'participation':  see  para.  67  below);  the 
effects  of  the  merger  (Section  7);  and  finally, 
liability  which  may  be  incurred  and  nullity 
which may be declared (Section 8). 
Section 1 
Definition  of merger  by  acquisition 
25.  The  actual  definition  of  a  merger  by 
acquisition  is  given  in Article  4,  the wording 
of which is virtually identical to that of Article 2, 
paragraph 2, of the draft directive on domestic 
mergers of societes anonymes. 
The  characteristic  features  of  this  definition, 
similar to the conventional elements embodied 
in the notion of merger by acquisition already 
to  be  found  in  the  legislations  of  the  Con-
tracting States, are as follows: 
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(a)  In  a  merger  by  acquisition  the  company 
acquired is  wound up without implementation 
of  the  liquidation  procedure.  Thus  there  is 
no realization or dispersal of its assets, so that 
its industrial, commercial or financial potential 
transferred to the company acquiring it remains 
intact. 
(b)  By  this  operation  the  company  acquired 
transfers the whole of its capital to the company 
acquiring  it.  This  transfer  takes  place  'uno 
actu',  and in  the  ordinary  way  automatically 
(as  specified  in  Article  29  in  respect  of  the 
effects  of  mergers:  see  para.  91  below). 
Furthermore,  and even  though this  may  seem 
in  theory  to  be  superfluous,  it  is  expressly 
stated  that  the  capital  transferred  comprises 
'assets  and . liabilities',  thus  avoiding  any 
confusion  between  the  notion  of  capital  and 
that of the company's assets. 
(c)  In  exchange  for  the  capital  transferred, 
the shareholders of the company acquired  are 
allotted  shares  in  the  acquiring  company. 
This  again is  a  basic feature of the operation, 
distinguishing it from  the acquisition  of  assets 
through  debentures  or  cash  payment  and 
culminating  in  the  elimination  of  the  share-
holders  of  the  company  acquired.  Further-
more, in the legal system of all the Contracting 
States, this is  the only type of merger by which 
liabilities  can  be  transferred  without  the 
agreement  of  the  creditors  (subject  of  course 
to the arrangements made for their protection: 
see paragraph 52 et seq. below). 
(d)  But provision had to be made for the fact 
that  because  of  the  share  exchange  terms  it 
would not be possible to avoid all cash adjust-
ments.  These are therefore permissible without 
preventing  the  operation  from  constituting  a 
merger, provided they do not exceed 10 per cent 
'of the  nominal  value  of  the  shares  allotted, 
or  in  the  absence  of  a  nominal  value,  their 
book value'. 
The latter part of this provision was inserted to 
take  account  of  the  fact  that  some  of  the 
Contracting States (e.g.  in Belgium and Luxem-
43 bourg)1  have a  type of share without nominal 
value, and it was specified that the term 'book 
par value' meant the value obtained by dividing 
the  capital  by  the  number  of  shares  issued. 
The  Netherlands  delegation  proposed  at  one 
point  that  the  authorized  percentage  of  cash 
adjustment  should  be  calculated  in  relation 
to the 'actual value' of the shares handed over, 
but it finally abandoned the suggestion in view 
of the difficulty,  emphasized  by  other delega-
tions, of determining this. 
26.  Article 5, paragraph 1, specifies that the 
provisions  relating  to  mergers  by  acquisition 
are applicable where one of  the  companies  is 
the holder  of  all  or part of  the shares  of  the 
other company. 
This point could hardly give  rise  to objection 
where the share held by one of  the companies 
in  the  other company's  capital  does  not give 
it  control  of  the  latter.  In  particular,  the 
experts  did  not consider  that if  the company 
acquired holds shares in the company acquiring 
it and hands them over by virtue of the merger, 
the operation could be subject to the regulations 
governing acquisition by a company of its own 
shares,  simply  because  it is  part of  the  over-
all  transfer  of  the  whole  of  the  capital. 
Conversely,  where  the  acquiring  company 
holds shares in the company acquired the former 
will  receive  part  of  its  own  shares,  intended 
for  handing  over  to  the  shareholders  in  the 
acquired  company.  What finally  happens  to 
them-whether  they  are  extinguished  by  ab-
sorption  or  maintained  as  part  of  the  assets 
of the acquiring company for possible disposal 
at a later date-will depend on the law applicable 
to the  latter.  The same  applies  of course  in 
the  preceding  hypothesis  where  shares  in  the 
acquiring company are transferred to it because 
prior  to  the  merger  they  belonged  to  the 
company acquired. 
The  same  questions  arise,  and  the  replies  to 
them are the same, when the holdings  of  one 
of the companies  in  the other place  the latter 
under  the  former's  control.  It  is  in  fact 
fairly common for a parent company to absorb 
its  subsidiary.  The  reciprocal  operation  is 
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more  rarely  found,  but  it  can  nevertheless, 
especially  in  international  relations,  be  eco-
nomically  interesting  or  bring  legitimate  tax 
benefits,  so  that it should  be  brought  within 
the Convention.2 
This will apply both when the holdings involve 
a  majority of the shares  and when one of the 
companies  holds  all  the  shares  in  the  other. 
But  in  considering  this  possibility,  Article  5 
does  not  attempt  to  prejudge  the  treatment 
of  one-man  companies  by  the  Jaw  of  the 
various Contracting States.3  Moreover, it was 
pointed out that if it was the acquiring company 
that held all the shares in the company acquired, 
some  of  the  provisions  of  the  Convention 
concerning the points mentioned in the merger 
plan  (Article  8)  and  the  reports  relating  to 
that plan  (Article  11  and  12),  should  not be 
applied  or would  need  to  be  adapted to that 
particular case.  This is the object of Article 5 
para. 2,  which can be more usefully  discussed 
at the same time  as  the various  provisions  to 
which  it refers  (see  paras.  31  and  35  et  seq. 
below). 
27.  Article 6 states that mergers  by acquisi-
tion are possible with a company in liquidation, 
subject to two conditions: 
.(a)  The  company  acquired  must  not  have 
begun to distribute its  assets  among its share-
holders.  Thus  the  course  adopted-and  al-
ready recognized in the case of domestic mergers 
in French law (Law of 24 July 1966, Article 371), 
German  law  (Law  of  6  September  1965, 
Article 339,  para.  2)  and Belgian  law4-is not 
at variance with the principle that in the event 
1  For  Belgium  see  Lois  coordonnees,  Article  41;  for 
Luxembourg see: Law of 10 August 1915, Article 37. 
2  See the draft directive, Article 20, for the case where 
the acquiring company holds all the shares in the company 
acquired.  , While  not  ruling  out  regulation,  the  draft 
directive  does  not impose it in  the  reverse  case,  which 
definitely  does  not have the  practical interest within  a 
single country that it can have internationally. 
3  See Council Directive (68/151/EEC)  of 9 March 1968 
(OJ, No L 65, 14.3.1968), Article 11, para. 2, f). 
4  See  Van  Ryn, op.  cit.,  I,  852-3.  Van  Ommeslaghe, 
Rapport introductif du 20 fevrier 1967. 
s.  13/73 of  a  merger,  the company acquired is  wound 
up  without  being  liquidated.  The  transfer 
of the whole of the assets  remains possible so 
long as  distribution has not yet  begun;  and if 
a  part  of  the  liabilities  has  been  discharged, 
this will have an effect on the share exchange 
terms  but  will  not  jeopardize  the  economic 
object of the operation. 
(b)  The operation is  only possible where the 
law  applicable  to  the  company  acquired 
permits it. 
As  in  all  the  other  provisions  of  this  type 
embodied  in  the  Convention,  the  term  'law 
applicable to the company' must be understood 
to mean the rules of that law as  they relate to 
mergers.  In the present state of the legislations 
of the Contracting States, such rules exist only 
for  domestic  mergers,  and  originally  it  had 
been  proposed  to  refer  specifically  to  these. 
But  in  the  end  it  was  felt  that  it  would  be 
preferable  to  allow  for  cases  where  at  some 
futu.re  time  the  law  of  a  Contracting  State 
might  include  provisions  applicable  to  inter-
national  mergers.  These  would  then  rtpply, 
by virtue of all the provisions of the Convention 
specifying  the  law  of  a  Contracting  State  in 
relation to mergers. 
In  practice,  and  subject  to  the unlikely  event 
of measures applicable to international mergers 
being  taken  at  some  future· date  in  a  Con-
tracting State forbidding  such  mergers  with a 
company  acquired  in  liquidation,  the  rule  of 
conflict  in  Article  6  would  no  longer  work 
differently according to the links of the company 
acquired  if  the  draft  directive  on  internal 
mergers  was adopted without modification  of 
its  Article  2,  paragraph  4,  that  instrument 
furnishes the same solution, and it would thus 
be incorporated into the laws of all  the Con-
tracting States. 
Section 2 
Preparation of the merger 
28.  Under  this  heading,  Articles  7  to  15 
of the  Convention  deal  with the whole  series 
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of  questions  relating  to  the  merger  plan,  a 
document  which  together  with  its  annexes 
will serve as  a  basis for  the discussions in the 
general meetings  of shareholders by  which the 
merger  has  to  be  approved:  first  of  all  the 
actual requirements of the plan the conditions 
under  which  it  is  drawn  up,  its  form  and 
content  (see  para.  1  below),  then its  annexes, 
and  in  particular  the  ,interim  balance  sheet' 
and· the reports on the merger plan (para.  2), 
and  finally  the  disclosure  or  notice  required 
in respect of the merger plan and the annexes 
(para. 3). 
Paragraph 1 
The proposal to  merge 
29.  In  practice,  general  meetings  of  share-
holders  cannot  be  called to discuss  a  merger 
unless its conditions  and the arrangements for 
it have  been  drawn  up  in  advance  by  means 
of an agreement between the managing organs 
of the companies in question; conversely, such 
agreement does  not bind the companies unless 
it has the approval of their general meetings. 
But in the present state of company law in the 
Contracting  States  these  procedures,  which 
when all  is  said  and done,  are  basically ver? 
simple, are implemented by means of different 
legal  techniques.  German  law1  stipulates  a 
merger  contract;  French  law  a  'draft  merger 
contract'2  or  a  'merger  plan';3  the  laws  of 
Belgium  and  Luxembourg  make  no  mention 
of such a document; while Italian law prescribes 
an 'atto di fusione'  subsequent to the deliber-
ations of the general meetings.4 
The adoption of the draft directive on domestic 
mergers  should  cope  with  these  divergencies 
since in Article 3 paragraph 1, it provides  tha~ 
1  Aktiengesetz, 6 September  1966  (Bundesgesetzblatt I, 
p. 1089): paras. 340 and 341. 
2  Law of 24 July 1966, Article 374. 
3  D.  67.236,  23  March  1967  (Journal  officiel  de  la 
Republique fran(:aise,  24.3.1967, Article 254). 
4  Codice civile, Article 2504. 
45 'the  administrative  organs  of  each  of  the 
merging companies shall draw up a merger plan 
in  writing'.  But the  Convention had to  take 
account of the national laws as they now stand; 
thus in respect of the merger plan it embodies the 
substantive  rules  or  rules  of  conflict  which 
seemed  to  meet  the  needs  of  international 
mergers  and  could  be  put  into  application 
independently  of  the  coordination  of  the 
various  legislations  in  respect  of  internal 
mergers.  Care  was  taken,  however,  to  draft 
the  substantive  rules  governing  the  minimum 
content of the merger plan (see para. 31  below) 
in a manner as  close as possible to the wording 
of the corresponding text of the draft directive. 
30.  Article 7 of the Convention contains the 
provisions  relating  to  authorities  to  draw  up 
the  merger plan  and form  of  presentation  of 
the  instrument.  But  it  should  be  pointed 
out  first  of  all  that  it  stipulates,  implicitly 
no doubt but quite clearly, that the latter must 
be  drawn up,  subject to the proviso  (para.  3) 
that 'where by  virtue of the law applicable to 
one  of  the  companies,  a  contract  has  to  be 
drawn up prior to the decisions of the general 
meetings,  such  contract  shall  constitute  the 
merger  within  the  meaning  of  the  present 
Convention'.  The  reference  here  is  to  the 
approach found in German law, as  mentioned 
above  (see  p.  45,  footnote  1).  Thus  in  the 
event of a merger between a German company 
and  a  company  belonging  to  another  Con-
tracting  State,  the  preliminary  document-
which,  it  is  understood,  will  in  any  circum-
stances  be  a  single  document-will  take  the 
form of a  merger contract, though still subject 
to all the provisions of the Convention relating 
to the merger plan. 
The merger plan is drawn up by the organs of 
the  merging  companies  which  have  jurisdic-
tion in this matter for the purpose of .  mergers 
under the law applicable to each one of them. 
Thus  the  Convention  merely  introduces  a 
conflict  of  laws  provision,  particularly  so  as 
to  avoid  having  to  determine  the  respective 
roles of the 'board of directors' and the 'super-
visory  board' in  German or where  applicable 
46 
French  companies.  It should  be noted,  how-
ever, that the draft directive specifies that this 
jurisdiction is to be uniformly conferred on the 
'administrative  organs'  of  the  merging 
compames. 
Like  the  draft  directive  (Article  3,  para.  1) 
the  Convention  makes  it  mandatory  for  the 
merger plan in all circumstances to be drawn up 
in  writing;  furthermore,  the  prescribed  pro-
cedure must be followed, where this is required 
by  the law of one of  the companies  merging. 
This is  at present the case in German law, and 
nothing in  the  draft directive  provides  for  or 
implies  any modification  on this  point.  'Pre-
scribed procedure' in this context was taken to 
mean,  in  conformity  with the  meaning  usual 
in international conventions, notarial procedure, 
and the competence to draw up the prescribed 
notarial  deed  is  determined  by  Article  54  of 
the Convention (see para. 145 et seq. below). 
31.  Article  8  defines  the  minimum  content 
of  the  merger  project.  It  specifies  the  same 
items  as  Article  3,  paragraph 2,  of  the  draft 
directive  on domestic  mergers,  plus  the stipu-
lation 'that the merger is subject to the approval 
of  the  merger  plan  by  the  competent  organs 
defined in Article 16'.  It was deemed advisable 
to  mention  that  point  in  the  case  of  inter-
national mergers so as to prevent third parties 
who  were  ignorant  of  a  foreign  law  and 
perusing  the  plan  from  thinking  that  it  rep-
resents all that is required for a merger. 
The first  three  stipulations  do  not really  call 
for any special comment, exept that the second 
(share exchange terms)  and the third (arrange-
ments  for  the  allotment  of  the  shares  of  the 
acquiring  company  and  the  date from  which 
they give the right to participate in profits)  do 
not have to appear in the plan when the acquir-
ing company is  the holder of  all the shares of 
the company  acquired,  since  in these  circum-
stances  there  are  no  shareholders  outside  the 
acquiring  company  to  be  protected· by  this 
information.  The  purpose  of  the  fourth 
stipulation  (Article  8,  d)  is  to  make  known 
the 'internal date' of the merger, the date from 
which  the  acquiring  company  takes  responsi-
s.  13/73 bility.  for  the  operations  of  the  company 
acquired.  This  date,  which  must  be  fixed  in 
advance,  is  both in  law  and in  fact  different 
from  the  date  on  which  the  merger  takes 
effect  (Article  26:  see  para.  81  et  seq.  below) 
and the date when it may  be invoked against 
third parties  (Article  28:  see  para.  90  below). 
Lastly,  the  purpose  of  the  fifth  stipulation 
(Article  8,  e)  is  to  specify  and  make  known 
'the rights which are awarded by the acquiring 
company  shareholders  having  special  rights 
and to holders of securities  other than shares, 
or the measures proposed in respect of them'. 
The  text  was  deliberately  worded  in  very 
general terms  in view  of the various  types  of 
such  shares  and  securities  in  different  legal 
systems  and the different rights  which  can  be 
attached  to  them.  This  was  stressed  in  par-
ticular by the German delegation.  More often 
than  not,  the  securities  referred  to  will  be 
shares  giving  entitlement to statutory interest, 
a  preferential  dividend  or  a  bonus,  shares 
carrying  double  or  multiple  votes,  founders' 
shares,  shares in profits  or convertible  deben-
tures.  But  this  list  is  given. only  by  way  of 
example,  since the text embraces  in a  general 
way all shares other than 'ordinary' shares, or 
all  securities  conferring  rights  which  in  the 
event  of  a  merger,  can  give  entitlement  to 
special treatment,  i.e.  measures  additional to 
those  prescribed  under  the  Convention  for 
the benefit of all the shareholders and forming 
the general law applicable to mergers governed 
by  it.  It is  this  'special  treatment'  that must 
be  specified,  and consequently brought to the 
notice of the interested parties, by the disclos-
ure  of  the  merger notice  (Article  13,  para.  2: 
see para. 41  below). 
Paragraph 2 
The annexes  to the merger  plan 
The reports  of company  organs  and independent 
experts 
32.  Article 9  of  the  draft  Convention  lists 
the documents which must be  attached to the 
merger  plan.  These  largely  supplement  the 
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particulars, reduced to the indispensable mini-
mum,  furnished  by  the  merger  plan.  The 
first  three  documents  (statutes,  balance  sheets 
and 'interim' statements of  accounts: see  para-
graph 33 et seq. below in regard to the lastnamed 
item)  must be  made available not only to the 
shareholders  of  the  merging  companies  but 
also  to  any  other interested person,  and par-
ticularly  to  the  creditors  of  the  companies. 
The last two (reports  of company organs  and 
reports  of experts}  are on the other hand for 
shareholders only, since their publication could 
be harmful to the companies in question.  This 
distinction,  which  clarifies  the  list  given  in 
Article  9,  is  implemented  by Articles  14  and 
15  of the preliminary draft (see para. 42 et seq. 
below). 
33.  Particularly  noteworthy  among  the 
annexes specified in Article 9 is  the 'statement 
of  accounts'  (letter  c).  This  is  annexed  to 
the  balance  sheets,  profit-and-loss  accounts 
and annual reports  of  the  merging  companies 
for the previous three financial years  (required 
in  all  circumstances),  when  a  relatively  long 
period of time has elapsed since the end of the 
previous  financial  year  and  the  particulars 
given  in  the  bookkeeping  documents  relating 
to this last financial year might be dangerously 
out  of  date.  The  'statement  of  accounts' 
(which could thus be described as  an 'interim 
balance  sheet')  must  in fact  be  drawn  up  on 
the  first  day  of  the  second  month  preceding 
the  date  of  the  merger  plan  where  the  last 
balance  sheet  relates  to  a  financial  year  that 
ended  more  than  six  months  prior  to  that 
date.  In  practice,  therefore,  any  interested 
person can obtain information on the situation 
of  the  company  (insofar  as  this  can  be  done 
from a  book-keeping document)  at a  date not 
more than six months  before the merger plan 
(where the plan is  dated on the last day of the 
half  year  following  the  closure  of  the  last 
financial  year),  and  possibly  not  more  than 
two  months  and  one  day  before  the date of 
the plan. 
34.  Article  10  lays  down  the  procedure  for 
establishing  the interim  balance  where  this  is 
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that the content  of this  balance would  allow 
comparison with the balance sheets for previous 
years  without  at  the  same  time  forcing  the 
companies  in the middle  of the financial  year 
to  produce  a  document  that  would  conform 
strictly to the requirements of a  balance sheet 
proper. 
To make such a comparison possible, Article 10, 
paragraph 1,  specifies that the interim balance 
shall be drawn up 'in accordance with the same 
methods  and  shall  be  presented  in  the  same 
way as the last annual balance sheet'.  But the 
rest of the Article relaxes the usual requirements 
in  regard  to  balance  sheets  by  relieving  the 
companies  of  the  obligation  to  carry  out 
another  actual  stocktaking  operation  and  to 
take account of evaluation changes  other than 
those  resulting  from  book entries,  except  for 
interim  depreciation  and  reserves,  and  major 
changes  in  the  actual  value  of  items  in  the 
previous balance sheet.  The term 'depreciation 
and reserves' was intended to mean significant 
adjustments  made  either  by  deduction  from 
assets or entry under liabilities  (e.g.  for instal-
lation  costs,  frozen  assets,  stocks,  circulating 
capital credits, and property securities forming 
part  of  the  circulating  capital)  and  funds 
set  aside  to  cover  risks  and  outgoings  (e.g. 
pension funds  and similar items and provision 
for  taxes).  In  this  way  the  statement  of 
accounts  should  reflect  fairly  faithfully  the 
standing  of  a  concern  at  a  date  as  close  as 
possible  to  that  of  the  merger  plan,  without 
its preparation involving too heavy a burden. 
35 .  ·Article 11  provides that a report on the 
merger plan shall  be drawn up by  the  organs 
of each of the companies merging.  It will  be 
recalled  that this  report  must  be  annexed  to 
the  merger  plan but it will  also  be seen  that 
while it must  be  communicated to the  share-
holders (Article 15:  see para. 43  below), it does 
not, on the other hand, have to  be  published 
so as to be accessible to outsiders. 
As  in  the case  of the  merger  plan  (Article  7: 
see  para. 30 above),  the Convention  does  not 
specify  by  means  of  a  substantive  rule  the 
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organs competent to do this, the matter being 
left  to the law applicable to each of the com-
panies.  Here again, the reference is to the pro-
visions  of that law  as  they relate to mergers, 
or  at  the  present  time  the  rules  governing 
domestic mergers.  This means that in practice, 
if  the  draft  directive  were  adopted  without 
any change in Article 5, para. 1 of its text, in 
all  the Contracting States  this task would fall 
on  the  company's  administrative  organs.  If 
provisions  relating  to  international  mergers 
were  subsequently  adopted  in  a  Contracting 
State, they would have to be applied; but it is 
unlikely  that  they  would  not  entrust  the 
drafting  of  the  report  on  the  merger  to  the 
company's administrative organs. 
The  report  must  be  detailed,  and  it  must 
explain and justify the merger project from both 
the  legal  and  the  economic  points  of  view. 
These  stipulations  (likewise  identical  with 
those  in  the  draft  directive)  are  the  fruit  of 
lengthy discussions, and their aim is  to provide 
the  shareholders  with  complete  and  effective 
information  while  at  the  same  time  avoiding 
placing the organs of the company in a  strait-
jacket.  Let  us  bear  in  mind-even  though 
these comments cannot be regarded as reflecting 
categorical instructions concerning the structure 
of the report and the items  to  be included-
that the document must not be either vague or 
summary, and that it must furnish explanations 
and  justification,  both  of  a  legal  nature  (e.g. 
concerning the  organs  and the functioning  of 
the  acquiring  company  once  the  acquisition 
has taken place, and economic (e.g. enlightening 
shareholders as  to the company's potential and 
outlets, once the merger has taken place). 
But  the  only  'explanation  and  justification' 
mandatorily  prescribed  refer  to  the  share 
exchange  terms  (Article  11,  in  fine).  It will 
be seen below that this basic component of the 
plan must also  be  the subject of a  declaration 
in  the  experts'  reports,  as  distinct  from  the 
reports  of  the  organs  of  the  companies 
(Article  12:  see para. 37 below)  and must give 
certain  minimum  reasons,  which  are  statu-
torily  determined.  The  managements  organs 
are not obliged to incorporate these reasons in 
s.  13/73 their own report.  If they are asked to furnish 
justification  on  this  subject,  it  is  rather  to 
make them assume responsibility for the merger 
plan  and  in  particular  the  share  exchange 
terms. 
The provisions discussed concerning the content 
of the report of the company organs are identi-
cal  with  the  corresponding  provisions  of 
Article  5,  paragraph  1  of  the  draft  directive 
on domestic mergers. 
36.  The  experts  felt  that  as  it  stood,  this 
report was exclusively of interest to the share-
holders  of  the  merging  companies,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  the  justification  of  the 
share  exchange  terms  is  after  all  its  essential 
object.  Hence Article  5,  para.  2,  2)  provides 
that when the acquiring company is  the holder 
of all the shares in the company acquired, the 
report  called  for  under  Article  11  is  only 
drawn  up  for  the  former.  In  these  circum-
stances, there are in fact no shareholders of the 
company acquired with interests distinct from 
those of the acquiring company.  The latter's 
shareholders  will  be  informed  and  protected 
by explanations and justifications furnished in 
the report drawn up by its own administrative 
organs (and also, as will be seen, by the reports 
of experts). 
37.  Quite  apart  from  the  reports  of  the 
company organs, the merger  must also,  under 
Article  12,  be  the  subject  of  expert  reports 
which must likewise be annexed to the project 
(Article  9,  e)  and  must  be  communicated 
like  them  exclusively  to  the  shareholders  of 
each of the companies (Article 15:  see  para. 43 
below). 
(a)  In  its  first  two  paragraphs,  Article  12 
deals with the status, qualifications and appoint-
ment  of  the  experts.  They  must  be  inde-
pendent, which in accordance with a substantive 
rule  of  the  Convention  excludes  the  directors 
or employees of the company concerned. 
They must be  qualified;  but on that point the 
Convention confines itself to a rule of conflict: 
this  requirement  is  met  if  the  experts  are 
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fitted  to  carry  out,  in  accordance  with  the 
law applicable to the company to which they 
are  appointed,  the  auditing  prescribed  by 
law  of  the  annual  accounts  of  that  company 
(e.g.  'Wirtschaftspriifer'  in  Germany,  'com-
missaires  aux  comptes'  in  France,  'reviseurs 
d'entreprise' in Belgium).  This establishes the 
mutual  confidence  which  the  Contracting 
States  must show in regard to the professional 
competence and the moral character of persons 
recognized  under the laws of each of them as 
possessing these qualifications. 
In the same way, the law of  each company is 
cited in respect of the method of appointment 
of the experts attached to it (Article 12, para. 3), 
it  being  understood  that  persons  already  in 
charge of  the auditing of the annual accounts 
may  be  designated,  provided  they  fulfil  the 
conditions  laid  down  in  paragraph  1.  This 
means,  in  particular,  that  the  commissaire 
aux  comptes  (or  'Wirtschaftspriifer',  reviseur 
etc.)  of a company can be designated as  expert 
to scrutinize the  merger  plan concerning  that 
company,  even  though  he  is  also  linked  with 
it  by  a  contract  of  gainful  employment,  so 
long as  under the law governing the company 
such  contract  does  not  deprive  him  of  his 
independence.  In  a  more  general  way,  the 
appointment of experts can be made, under the 
provisions  of this  law,  either  by  those  organs 
of the company to which it grants jurisdiction 
for that purpose, or by a judicial or administra-
tive body. 
(b)  Article 12, paragraph 4, defines the duties 
of the experts and determines, by a rule which 
is  partly a rule of conflict and partly a substan-
tive rule, the object and content of their reports, 
drawn up separately for each company.  . 
The experts  examine  the  merger  project,  and 
draw  up  a  report  specified  as  being  'for the 
shareholders'  (Article  12,  para.  4).  Thus  the 
Convention abandons the idea of two distinct 
reports for  each company,  one to  be  brought 
to the notice of the administrative organs only, 
while the other alone would be communicated 
to  the  shareholders.  But  this  does  of  course 
not  prevent  the  administrative  organs  from 
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studies, which could be more detailed than the 
reports themselves. 
With regard to the object and content of these 
reports,  while in  general it is  left  to the  law 
(on  mergers)  applicable  to  each  company  to 
determine  these,  the  Convention  nevertheless 
defines  the  minimum  content  by  means  of 
substantive rules. 
Thus  each  of  the  experts  must  declare  m 
respect  of  the  company  to  which  he  is 
designated, whether in his  opinion the transfer 
exchange terms are or are not warranted.  They 
must  justify this  declaration  by  at least three 
categories  of  data,  covering  respectively  the 
relative  net  assets  of  the  companies  based on 
actual values, the relative value of the earnings 
of  the  companies  with  due  regard  to  future 
prospects,  and the criteria used for the evalu-
ation of the net assets and yields.  The wording 
here,  likewise  the  outcome of  lengthy  discus-
sions,  takes  account  of  the  essential  factors, 
practically  always  found,  on  which the  share 
exchange terms are based and the need to give 
shareholders  a  chance  to  assess  those  evalu-
ations  by explaining to them the criteria used 
in  making  them.  But  as  we  also  know,  in 
different types  of cases, variable factors  which 
it  would  be  useless  to  try  to  enumerate  ex-
haustively may enter into the evaluation of the 
assets  and  foreseeable  yield,  which  in  turn 
determine the share exchange terms and hence 
paragraph  6  provides,  also  in  a  substantive 
rule, that 'the report shall, in addition, indicate 
special difficulties of evaluation, if any'. 
It will be noted that these various stipulations 
also  appear in Article 5, paras. 2,  3  and 4  of 
the  draft  directive  on  domestic  mergers,  so 
that  the  insertion  of  substantive  rules  in  the 
Convention on this point should not cause any 
special complications for international mergers. 
Following  an  examination  of  this  clause  by 
the Belgian  Banking  Commission,  the Belgian 
delegation  proposed  in  a  note  sent  to  the 
Chairman  of  the group  and the  Commission 
services  for  the  November  1970  session  that 
adjustments  should  be  made  to  it.  The 
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proposal could not be  discussed  by  the group, 
since  the  text  had  already  been  adopted  on 
third reading,  and in virtue of an earlier pro-
cedural decision this prevented any re-examin-
ation.  In  view  of  this  decision,  the  Belgian 
delegation  agreed  not  to  press  for  a  further 
examination, but it was agreed that the Belgian 
note would  be  attached to the  present report 
(see Annex 3). 
(c)  Article  12,  para.  7  stipulates  that  'each 
expert  shall  be  entiled  to  obtain  all  useful 
information and documents from  the merging 
companies  and  to  undertake  any  necessary 
verification'.  This  rule  too  is  to  be  found 
in  the  draft  directive  on  internal  mergers 
(Article 5, para. 2,  2)  and in both instances it 
gives  each  expert  the  rights  defined  in  it  in 
respect  not  only  of  the  company  to  which 
he is  appointed  but of the other company  as 
well. 
38.  Article  5,  para.  2,  b)  specifies  that 
where  the  acquiring  c:ompany  holds  all  the 
shares  in  the  company  acquired,  each  expert 
report  shall  be  prepared  in  accordance  with 
Article  12,  but shall  be submitted only  to the 
shareholders of the acquiring company. 
This  provision  is  not  identical  with  the  one 
referred to earlier  (see  para. 36  above), which 
in  the  same  circumstances  waives  the  report 
of  the  company  organs  as  laid  down  in 
Article 11 in the case of the company acquired. 
The two expert reports to be drawn up under 
Article  12  by  the  acquiring company  and the 
company acquired are necessary here, since the 
shareholders  of  the  former  must  be  able  to 
satisfy  themselves  that  the  share  exchange 
terms  are  in  order  by  means  of  documents 
drawn  up  separately  in  respect  of  both com-
panies.  The purpose of the report provided for 
in Article 11  is  different,  as  we have seen-in 
this case the company organs themselves assume 
responsibility  for  the  merger  plan  whereas 
this  is  pointless  for  the  company  acquired, 
since  the  company  acquiring  it,  is  its  only 
shareholder. 
s.  13/73 But  even  though two  expert  reports  must  be 
drawn  up,  they  need  only  be  communicated 
to the shareholders of the acquiring company, 
since  the  latter,  being  the  only  shareholder 
in  the  company  acquired,  must  necessarily 
be acquainted with them. 
Paragraph 3 
Disclosure  and communication  of the  merger 
plan  and its  annexes 
39.  By  prescribing  in  the  Convention  the 
presentation  of  a  merger  plan  containing  a 
minimum  of mandatory items  and a  series  of 
annexes,  all  designed  to  explain  and  justify 
the  proposal,  and  in  particular  the  share 
exchange, the intention was to devise an initial 
means of protecting the shareholders and third 
parties in particular the companies' creditors). 
After  all,  the  shareholders  cannot  rationally 
vote on the merger unless they are acquainted 
with its basic details and the justification for it; 
similarly,  it is  on the  basis  of  a  comparative 
study  of the assets  of the companies  merging 
that the creditors  of  the one or the other will 
decide  whether  or  not  to  make  use  of  the 
safeguards available to them under Articles  18 
to 21  of  the Convention  (see  para.  52  et seq. 
below).  In the same way, shareholders having 
special  rights  and  holders  of  securities  other 
than shares must be informed, for example, of 
the  rights  guaranteed  them  by  the  acquiring 
company or the measures it is proposed to take 
in their interests. 
But the details of the particulars to be furnished 
and  the  ways  and  means  of  making  them 
known will depend on the nature of the rights 
of the various  categories  of  interested  parties 
and  their  relationship  with  the  company. 
Furthermore,  any  arrangements  for  disclosure 
must take account of the cost involved, so as to 
ensure that this is  not unduly heavy. 
40.  With  all  this  in  mind,  the  Convention 
specifies  information  at  three  levels:  actual 
publication  of  the  merger  plan  (Article  13); 
public  deposit,  accessible  without  restriction, 
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of the plan and such of its annexes as must be 
brought to the notice of all  interested persons 
and can be so  brought without difficulty  (Art-
icle  14);  and  non-public  deposit,  accessible 
only  to  the  shareholders,  of the  merger  plan 
and all  its  annexes  (Article  15),  both types  of 
deposit including the right to obtain copies. 
41.  Article  13,  para.  1  stipulates  that  in 
each  of  the  Contracting  States  to  which  the 
merging  companies  belong,  a  notice  of  the 
merger plan must be published at least a month 
prior to the date of convocation of the general 
meeting (which will be called upon to deliberate 
on the project) in the national gazette designated 
for  the  publication  of  amendments  to  the 
statutes. 
In the course  of  the  discussions  it  was  stated 
that this publication requirement was designed 
to 'draw attention' to the merger plan.  But it 
is  not  meant  merely  as  a  'flicker  light'  to 
indicate  that  such  a  plan  exists.  The notice 
must  not  only  contain  all  the  items  which 
Article 8 stipulates as  the minimum content of 
the  plan  (see  para.  31  above);  it  must  also 
(para.  2)  mention  the  deposits  made  and the 
right  to  consult  the  document  and to  obtain 
copies as stipulated in Articles 14 and 15, thus 
enabling  any interested  person  or any  share-
holder,  as  the case  may  be,  to exercise  those 
rights  effectively.  Going  even  further  than 
mere  disclosure,  the notice  must also  mention 
the  right  of  creditors  to  ask  for  security  in 
accordance with Articles 18  to 21  (see para. 52 
et seq.  below}.  Thus the experts did not rely 
on  the  knowledge  which  in  theory  creditors 
should have of the provisions of the Convention 
concerning them.  Their attention is  expressly 
drawn  to  these  provisions,  so  that  where 
appropriate  they  can  exercise  the  rights  thus 
granted to them. 
It  may  be  further  observed  in  relation  to 
Article 13 that: 
(a)  The Contracting States in which the notice 
of  the  merger  plan  must  be  published  are 
deliberately designated  as  'the states  to whose 
laws  the  merging  companies  are  subject',  an 
expression  sufficiently  vague  to  avoid  pre-
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to which the Convention applies,  as  defined in 
Article 1; 
(b)  Since  the  substantive  provisions  of  Art-
icle  13  defining  the content  of  the  disclosure 
notice  are  quite  specific,  the  object  of  the 
reference in the second sentence of paragraph 1 
of  the  Article  to  the  provisions  of  the  law 
governing  each  of  the  companies  relative  to 
the  disclosure  is  necessarily  limited-.  it  is 
concerned in particular with actually specifying 
the  national  gazette  and  determining  what 
persons  are  to  carry  out  the  disclosure  for-
malities  (see  the  Directive  of  9  March  1968, 
Article 5). 
42.  Public deposit accessible to all  is  stipu-
lated in Article 14.  This applies to the merger 
plan and its first three annexes: statutes balance 
sheets,  profit-and-loss  accounts  and  reports 
covering  the  last  three  financial  years,  and 
where  applicable,  an  interim  statement  of 
accounts  (Article  9,  (a),  (b)  and  (c).  These 
furnish  data  on the financial  situation  of  the 
companies, which all persons who have entered 
into  relations  with  them  should  be  enabled 
to ascertain so  that they  can weigh  the likely 
effect  of  the  proposed  merger  on  what  is  to 
happen to their rights. 
Deposit must take place on the day of convoca-
tion  of  the  general  meeting,  if  this  precedes 
the actual  data  of the  meeting  by  more than 
one  month,  or otherwise  at least  one  month 
before  this  data,  irrespective  of  the  legal 
provisions  applicable  to  the  company  in  this 
respect.  The deposit is made in the file opened, 
or to be opened, in the name of the company 
in  each  Contracting  State  by  virtue  of  the 
Directive of 9 March 1968  (Article 3, para. 1). 
Consideration was given to the various possible 
ways  of  organizing  this  file  in  the  different 
States,  and  it  was  specified  that  the  deposit 
should  be  made  in  respect  of  each  company 
according to the law applicable to it. 
Finally,  Article  14,  paragraph 2  provides  that 
a copy of the whole or any part of the documents 
deposited shall  be  obtainable on mere request 
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(and  hence  by  anyone  making  such  request) 
at a price not exceeding the administrative cost 
thereof. 
43.  The  reCipients  of  the  largest  amount 
of  information  are  the  shareholders,  the  idea 
being,  as  has  been  said,  to  enable  them  to 
understand  what  they  are  voting  about:  and 
Article  15  provides  that  from  the  date  of 
convocation  of  the  general  meeting,  and  in 
any case  during a  period  of  one  month prior 
to  the  date  of  the  meeting  (i.e.  for  the  same 
length  of  time  as  the  public  deposit  under 
Article  14),  any  shareholder  shall  have  the 
right  to  inspect  at  the  company's  registered 
office  the  merger  plan  and  all  its  annexes 
(i.e.  including  the  reports  of  the  company 
organs  and  of  experts,  which  it  would  have 
been  improper, if not invariably  pointless,  to 
communicate  to  third  parties)  and  to  obtain 
copies  of  the  whole  or  any  part  of  these 
documents free of charge. 
All  this  places  the  provisions  relating  to  the 
preparation  and  the  content  of  the  reports 
preliminary to a  merger, and in particular the 
reports  of  experts  (Articles  11  and  12:  see 
para. 35 et seq. above) in their proper perspective. 
They  are,  as  has  already  been  pointed  out, 
measures  designed  for  the  protection  of  the 
shareholders. 
Section 3 
Merger Decision 
44.  This  section  deals  first  and  foremost 
with  the  jurisdiction  of  general  meetings 
(Article  16, para.  1)  and the conditions under 
which  they  meet  and  deliberate  (Article  17). 
But Article 16, paragraph 2 and 16, paragraph 3 
also  add  details  found  necessary  to  cater for 
legal  provisions  or  particular  circumstances 
calling for  measures  other than action by the 
general meetings. 
We shall deal first with this action and ancillary 
measures  (para.  1),  and we shall then discuss 
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conduct of the meetings {para. 2). 
Paragraph 1 
Action  by the general  meetings 
Ancillary  measures 
45.  Under Article 16, paragraph 1, 'a merger 
shall  require  the  approval  of  the  general 
meeting of each of the merging companies'. 
Here we have a substantive rule, which confers 
this power on the general meetings irrespective 
of the provisions of the law applicable to each 
of the companies involved.  But as  we know, 
action  by  the  general  meetings  is  already 
required,  in  the  case  of  domestic  mergers,  in 
all the Contracting States embodying this point 
in their legislation.  The uniformity found here 
should  be  extended  and  consolidated  in  the 
future  by  the  draft  directive,  which  on  this 
point  used  exactly  the  same  wording  as  the 
convention  (Article  4,  para.  1).  At  the  same 
time,  it  is  in practice  not foreseeable  that in 
the case  of international  mergers  not coming 
within  the  scope  of  the  Convention  the  law 
of  a  Contracting  State  is  likely  in  the future 
to  waive the requirement  of  approval  by  the 
general meeting.  Hence we are and no doubt 
always  will  be  faced  with  a  uniform  rule 
applying to all  mergers  of  companies, whether 
domestic  or  international,  and  in  the  latter 
case, whether they come under the Convention 
or not.  Indeed, a  merger is  too important an 
operation for  anyone to think  of  undertaking 
it without consulting the whole body of share-
holders and obtaining their agreement. 
46.  Although action by the general meetings 
is  indispensable,  it  may  not  be  sufficient  to 
make  final  or  legally  perfect  the  decision  to 
merge. 
(a)  First  of  all,  the  company  may  include 
shareholders  having  special  rights  or  may 
have ties  with holders of securities  other than 
shares.  We  know  that  by  virtue  of  a  sub-
stantive rule,  Article  8,  paragraph 1,  e)  of the 
Convention  includes  among  the  items  con-
stituting  the  minimum  content  of  the  merger 
s.  13/73 
plan  that  of  the  rights  guaranteed  to  such 
persons or measures proposed for their benefit 
(see para. 32 above).  But quite apart from these 
measures  or  commitments,  which  will  take 
effect  once  the  merger  has  taken  place,  the 
protection of such share or security holders is 
generally catered for under national legislations 
by  their participation in the actual decision to 
merge.1  The way in which this operates varies, 
and will no doubt continue to do so, since the 
draft directive  on domestic  mergers  makes  no 
provision for coordination in this matter.  Nor 
was  it  deemed  necessary  to  lay  down  in  the 
Convention a uniform substantive rule making 
such  participation  mandatory  and  defining 
its  nature  and  the  conditions  governing  it. 
Hence  Article  16,  paragraph  3  merely  refers 
in this connexion, by means of a rule of conflict, 
to the provisions of the law applicable to each 
of the companies (and here we must understand 
once  again  the  provisions  governing  domestic 
mergers,  unless  any  of  the  legal  systems  to 
which  reference  is  made  embodies  provisions 
on this point relating to international mergers). 
If the law in question should require action by 
debenture-holders  (e.g.  in France  and Luxem-
bourg), it would likewise be applicable. 
(b)  Account had also to be taken of the fact 
that  under Italian  law  an  'atto di  fusione'  is 
required  subsequent  to  the  general  meetings 
(see  paras. 6 and 29 above) in order to put the 
legal seal on a merger by means of this contrac-
tual instrument.2  This is  in practice the object 
1  See  for  example,  for  Belgium:  Lois  coordonnees, 
Article 71; for France: Law of 24 July 1966, Article 156; 
for  Italy:  Codice  civile,  Article  2376;  for  Luxembourg: 
Law of 10 August 1915, Article 68. 
2  The conclusion of  an 'atto  di  fusione'  subsequent to 
the decisions  of  the general  meetings  is  justified by the 
fact that in Italian law, divisions of meetings (that is acts 
of  a  legal  person)  are  only  binding  on the  organs  of 
the companies and the members,  and do not create any 
legal  relationship  with  third  parties.  The  preparation 
of a  legal  instrument to  which the two companies  are 
parties, pursuant to the decisions of the general meetings, 
is  necessary before a company can transfer its capital to 
another.  Furthermore,  the  preparation  of  the  'atto  di 
fusione'  makes  it possible  to check  the concordance of 
the decisions  taken by  the general  meetings  of the two 
companies (see para. 75  below). 
53 of the rule of conflict in Article 16, paragraph 2 
declaring such provisions applicable. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  mention  in 
the text of the case of German law, which, as 
has  likewise  been  recalled,  stipulates  a  'Ver-
schmelzungsvertrag'  (merger  contract}  prior 
to the general meetings which have to approve 
it.  But this in no way implies that the provision 
in  question  will  not be  applicable  where  one 
of the companies merging comes under German 
law.  Indeed,  as  we  have  seen,  in  virtue  of 
Article 7,  paragraph 3, in the case  in point it 
is  this prior contract to merge that constitutes 
the merger plan prescribed by  the Convention 
(see para. 30 above}. 
Paragraph 2 
Convening and proceedings of the general meetings 
47.  While it is  true that the  approval  of a 
merger  by  the  general  meetings  is  in  practice 
prescribed, at the present time,  by  the laws of 
all  the  Contracting States,  on the  other hand 
the rules relating to the 'procedure' governing 
these meetings (convening, composition holding} 
and the  special  conditions  as  to  any  quorum 
or majority required before the approval of the 
merger can be considered as adopted, vary from 
one  legislation  to  another.  In  Germany,  for 
example,  the law  does  not require a  quorum, 
since  the representation  of the shareholders is 
amply  provided  for  by  the  banks  where  the 
securities  are  deposited.  In  Italy,  a  quorum 
is  only  indirectly  made  necessary  by  the 
establishment of a majority based on registered 
capital;1  and, in the countries where a quorum 
and  a  minimum  majority  are  both  required, 
their relative importance varies.2 
48.  In  this  situation,  the  Convention  first 
of all lays down (Article  17,  para.  1}  a  rule of 
conflict  citing  for  the  settlement  of  all  these 
issues  the provisions  of the law  applicable to 
each  of  the  companies  concerning  mergers, 
or m  default  of such  provisions,  amendments 
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to  the  statutes.  Incidentally,  this  secondary 
procedure  was  inserted  in  the  text  to  make 
allowance for the fact that in the Netherlands 
there  is  no legislation  on mergers;  but it  was 
agreed that it could be deleted if such legislation 
was  adopted there prior to the signing  of the 
Convention. 
49.  Subject to that reservation, which it may 
be hoped will be temporary, the rule of conflict 
would  amount  in  practice,  as  the  national 
legislations now stand, to the application of the 
provisions  of  the  proposed  law  relating  to 
domestic  mergers.  But  in  the first  place,  we 
should look ahead here again to the possibility 
that  in  the  future  a  Contracting  State  might 
adopt  provisions  catering  for  international 
mergers, and in that event these would normally 
be  applicable  to  mergers  coming  under  the 
Convention, which does not lay down uniform 
rules  in  this  sphere.  At  the  same  time,  and 
for  that very  reason,  it  was  necessary  to  see 
to it that such provisions relating to the company 
acquired  did  not  make  international  mergers 
unduly  difficult,  indeed  virtually  impossible. 
(This is the case at the present time, as we have 
seen,  where a  Belgian,  French or Luxembourg 
company  is  acquired  by  a  foreign  company, 
the merger being subject, at any rate in accor-
dance  with  the  prevailing  theory,  to  the 
unanimous  approval  of  the  shareholders}. 
Finally,  it  was  considered  that  even  in  the 
absence  of  provisions  with  this  object  in  the 
law governing a particular company, its statutes 
should  be  able  to define  the conditions  as  to 
quorum or majority for international mergers, 
even  though in practice such statutory clauses 
are  apparently  not known at all.  But it was 
also  necessary  to  ensure  that  companies  did 
not hamstring  the  effective  application  of  the 
Convention by applying such provisions. 
50.  These  are  the  arguments  underlying 
and  explaining  the  wording  of  Article  17, 
1  See  for Germany:  AktG, paragraph 340  (2);  for Italy: 
Codice civile, Articles 2368, 2 and 2369, 3 and 4. 
2  See  for  Belgium:  Lois  coordonnees,  Article  70;  for 
France: Law of 24 July 1966, Article 153; for Luxembourg: 
Law of 10 August 1915, Article 67. 
s.  13/73 paragraph 2 relating to the quorum and majority 
required in the general meeting of the company 
acquired.  The text first  of  all  expressly  lays 
down the right of the legislator or those drafting 
the  statutes  to  lay  down  special  majority  or 
quorum  conditions  for  mergers  governed  by 
the  present  Convention.  But  supplementing 
the  rule  of  conflict  with  a  substantive  rule, 
the text goes on to put a limit to this freedom, 
determined  differently  according  as  the  law 
governing  the  company  does  or  does  not 
require,  in  addition  to  a  specified  majority, 
a  minimum  quorum  for  the  approval  of  the 
merger: 
(i)  In the first case, the majority required may 
not  exceed  three-quarters  of  the  votes  cast, 
and the  quorum  may  not  be  more  than  half 
the shares  carrying voting rights  the first  time 
and a quarter of these shares the second time; 
(ii)  In the second case,  the majority required 
may  not be higher  than  three-quarters  of  the 
votes  cast and four-fifths  of  the capital repre-
sented  at  the  meeting  taking  the  decision, 
which  must  not  be  confused  with  the  whole 
of the registered capital.  If it were prescribed 
by law or in the statutes this second majority 
would  mean that  the three-quarters  majority, 
reckoned in numbers of votes  (and it must be 
remembered  that  certain types  of  shares  may 
carry a double or multiple vote) would likewise 
correspond  to four-fifths  of  the capital  repre-
sented by the shares having participated in the 
vote  no  account  being  taken  in  this  second 
calculation of multiple votes for a single share. 
To  go  beyond  this  second  majority  as  thus 
calculated, it would not be possible to exceed 
the four-fifths requirement. 
51.  Finally,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that 
this  alternative  limitation  applies  only  to  the 
statutory or legal provisions relating to mergers 
governed by the Convention.  In other words, 
it is  obvious that the statutes or the law could 
lay  down  stricter  conditions  for  mergers  not 
coming  within  the  scope  of  the  Convention 
(in  practice  between  companies  in  one  Con-
tracting State and those of a third State).  But 
it must be pointed out above all that if different 
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requirements  (as  for  example  under  Italian 
law, where a  quorum is  required indirectly by 
way of majority calculated on the basis of the 
whole of the registered capital), or even stricter 
requirements  (a  larger  majority  or  quorum) 
were  adopted  by  the  law  or  the  statutes  in 
the  case  of  all  mergers,  including  internal 
mergers, they would have to be met. 
This possibility cannot in theory be ruled out, 
since  the  draft  directive  on  domestic  mergers 
did  not  coordinate  the  provisions  relating  to 
quorum and majority, except to prescribe that 
the  latter  'may  not  in  any  circumstances  be 
less  than  two-thirds,  either  of  the  votes  cor-
responding to the securities represented in the 
general  meeting,  or  of  the  registered  capital 
represented in the meeting'  (Article 4, para. 1). 
But this is  a minimum figure, not a maximum. 
For  practical  purposes,  however,  it  is  hardly 
likely  that  any  domestic  law,  or statutes  will 
in  the  future  stipulate  a  majority  or  quorum 
for  internal  mergers  higher  than  the  maxima 
laid down in Article 17,  paragraph 2.  If that 
were  the case,  such  provisions  would have to 
be  applied,  for  although  the  Convention  can 
lawfully limit legal or statutory discrimination 
unfavourable  to  the  international  mergers  to 
which it applies, on the other hand it was not 
the intention of the Contracting States to grant 
more  favourable  treatment  for  such  mergers 
than that granted for domestic mergers. 
Section 4 
Protection of creditors 
52.  In combination with the rules governing 
disclosure  and  publicity  designed  to  help  the 
shareholders in casting their votes  (Chapter II, 
Section 2, Articles 7 to 15:  see para. 28  above), 
the  provisions  of  Section  3  just  discussed 
(para.  44  et  seq.  above)  safeguard  the  share-
holders  of  companies  merging  against  an 
operation which could  be  prejudicial to them 
either  because  of  a  wrong  assessment  of  the 
situation  and  prospects  of  the  companies 
i"'volved,  or more  particularly,  in the case of 
55 the  shareholders  of  the  company  acquired, 
because their rights in a company in one country 
(frequently that of their nationality or residence) 
are  exchanged  for  rights  in  a  company  in 
another country. 
Mergers  likewise  entail  risks,  for  similar 
reasons,  to the  creditors  of  the  companies  in 
question.  Insofar  as  the measures  for  disclo-
sure  and  publicity  are  aimed  at  them,  these 
also  provide  protection.  But  they  would  be 
insufficient  in  themselves,  particularly  as  far 
as  the  creditors  of the  company  acquired  are 
concerned, since  they find  themselves  saddled 
with a  new debtor who they fear  may  be  less 
solvent.  In  addition  to  this  risk,  which  is 
common to domestic mergers and international 
mergers  alike,  there  is  a  further  risk  in  the 
latter case  because  of the legal  and territorial 
ties of the new debtor with a country other than 
that of the company acquired and often foreign 
in  relation  to  the  nationality  or  residence  of 
the creditors of that company. 
Hence· the  Convention  was  obliged,  in  the 
same  way  as  domestic  law  and  even  more 
urgently, to insert provisions for the protection 
of the creditors of the company acquired-first 
and foremost the non-debenture-holding credi-
tors (Articles  18  and 19).  Provisions had like-
wise to be adopted in regard to the debenture-
holding creditors  of the  company acquired  to 
take  account  of  the  collective  exercise  and 
protection of their rights and interests embodied 
in certain legislations (Arti de 20). 
But  whether  in  respect  of  the  protection  of 
debenture-holding  creditors  or not,  or  of the 
creditors  of  the  company  acquired  or  the 
company acquiring it, it was not found possible 
to achieve unanimity among all the delegations 
on  the  application  by  all  the  Contracting 
States of all the solutions thus devised.  They 
persisted  in  opposing  the  very  concept  of 
creditor  and  hence  the  practice.  In  the  out-
come, one of the delegations stood by a system 
of  a  priori  protection,  i.e.  exercised  prior 
to the  merger's  taking effect  and holding  up, 
at least potentially, its  entry into force;  on the 
other hand, the rest of the delegations showed 
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a preference for a posteriori protection exercised 
after the merger has taken effect can be invoked 
against third parties by virtue of the disclosure 
formalities,  so  that  it  can  neither  delay  the 
effects of the merger nor challenge its validity.1 
Articles  18  and  19  of the  Convention  respec-
tively reflect these two concepts, as we shall see; 
but in  order to  make  allowance for the views 
of  delegations  which  did  subscribe  to  the 
idea  of  a  priori  protection,  the  Contracting 
States  had  to  be  granted the  option of ruling 
out  its  application  by  making  a  declaration. 
At the same time, they were given the option of 
extending  the  measures  for  the  protection  of 
the creditors of the company acquired to those 
of  the  acquiring  company.  This  is  the  two 
fold object of Article 21  of the Convention. 
Finally,  Article  22  deals  with  the  protection 
of  shareholders  having  special  rights  and 
the holders of securities other th;,m  shares. 
In the four subsections below, we shall examine 
these four groups of provisions in turn. 
Paragraph 1 
Protection  of  non-debenture-holding  creditors  of  the 
company acquired 
53.  It has  been pointed out that Articles 18 
and 19  of the  Convention reflect  the a  priori 
and a  posteriori protection respectively  of the 
creditors  of  the  company  acquired.  Let  us 
verify this by looking in turn at the machinery 
instituted under these articles. 
1  For a priori protection, see for Italy the Codice civile, 
Article 2503; for a posteriori protection see for France the 
Law of 24 July 1966, Article 2381; for Germany (AktG., 
para.  347).  At  the  present  time  there  is  no  express 
provision  on  this  point in  Belgian  law,  which  protects 
creditors by  means  of the ordinary actio pauliana rules, 
third party liability, and in some cases Article 1188 of the 
Civil Code (see VanRyn, op. cit. I, 860; Renauld, op. cit., 
p. 62).  A text organizing a priori protection for creditors 
will  be  found  in  the  Belgian  draft  law  on  societes 
anonymes. 
s.  13/73 A.  - A priori protection 
54.  Article 18  of the Convention defines the 
exclusive  rights  of  'the  creditors  other  than 
debenture  holdings  of  the  company  acquired 
whose  claims  preceed  the  publication  of  the 
notice  of  the  merger  plan  concerning  their 
company'  (for  the  notice  to  be  given  of  the 
merger  plan and its  disclosure,  see  Article  13 
of the Convention  and paragraphs 39,  40,  41 
and  seq.  above).  These  creditors  have  dealt 
with the company acquired at a time when there 
was no published document making it possible 
for  them  to  foresee  that  the  company  might 
cease to exist as  a  result of  a  merger.  Hence 
the  Convention  includes  for  their  benefit  a 
type  of  a  priori protection, the application  of 
which,  it  will  be  recalled,  the  Contracting 
States may rule out (Article 21, a): see para. 63 
et seq. below). 
55.  These  creditors  have  the  right,  within 
thirty  days  of  publication  of  the  notice  of 
the  merger  plan:  concerning  the  company 
acquired  (or  more  precisely,  as  of  that  date, 
to be acquired and in their debt, to 'require the 
granting  of  a  security'.  This  'requirement' 
must be  submitted in the form  of a  'request', 
the form of which is not specified in the Conven-
tion.  It will  therefore  be  regulated  by  each 
individual  legislation,  but  the  later  phases  of 
the  machinery  imply  first  of  all  that it  must 
from  the outset  be  brought to the  knowledge 
of  the  debtor  company,  and  that  it  may  at 
the  same  time  be  subject  to  challenge  (cf. 
'assignation'  in  French  procedure)  but  this 
second characteristic is  not mandatory. 
Article 18, 2 grants the parties a grace period of 
eight  days  reckoned  from  the  date  of  the 
receipt  of  the request by  the company, to try 
to  reach  agreement,  i.e.  in  practice,  by  with-
drawal  of  this  request  by  the  creditor  or 
consent  by  the  company  to  grant  security. 
As  will  be seen,  payment of the debt,  even  if 
not yet due, may take place without the agree-
ment  of  the  creditor  (see  para.  56  below). 
Failing agreement within this period, the court 
postpones  the  entry  into  force  of  the  merger 
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(the date of which is  determined by  Article 26: 
see  para.  81  et  seq.  below)  "until  the granting 
of  the  security  as  ordered  by  it  or  until  the 
rejection of the application'.  The Convention 
does  not specify  whether the 'request'  is  that 
made  initially  to  the  company,  and  thus 
presumably,  as  has  been  said,  subject  to 
challenge,  or  a  separate  such  request  made 
by  the  creditor  in  the  absence  of  agreement 
with the debtor company.  The decision  here 
is  left  to  the  individual  legislations,  but  the 
first  alternative would  no  doubt be  preferable 
inasmuch as  it would make for a  more speedy 
solution. 
Speed  is  of  essence,  since  it  is  here  that  the 
suspensory effect of the request by the creditor 
arises,  giving  an  a  priori  character  to  the 
protection  given  him  by  this  clause,  which 
stipulates  that  the  court  shall  withhold  the 
entry into force of the merger until the request 
is  rejected or, if it is  granted, until the decision 
is  implemented by  the granting of the security 
prescribed.  The  merger  operations  can  of 
course go  ahead,  but even  if  they  are carried 
out  prior  to  rejection  by  the  Court  or  the 
granting of  a  security,  the  entry into force  of 
the  merger,  making  its  effectiveness  inter 
partes,  remains  in  abeyance.  Thus  quite 
clearly,  it is  desirable that a solution be found 
as  speedily  as  possible,  and  this  could  come 
about  first  of  all,  as  we  have  emphasized, 
through  the  challenge  in  regard  to  the  initial 
request,  and  secondly,  through  the  institution 
of  summary  procedure  by  the  Contracting 
States not waiving the application of Article 18. 
But  the  Convention  does  not,  of  course, 
prescribe such procedure,  which is  left  to the 
individual law of each State. 
It will also have been noted that, because of the 
grace  period  granted  to  creditors  under 
Article  18  to  submit their  request,  no  merger 
can take effect  less  than thirty days following 
the  publication  of  the  notice  of  the  merger 
plan  relating  to  the  company  acquired.  But 
that would in any event be ruled out by virtue 
of Article 13, which prescribes that the publica-
tion must take place 'at least one month prior 
57 to  the  date  for  which  the  general  meeting 
is  convened' {see para. 41  above). 
56.  Substantively  speaking,  Article  18  em-
bodies two rules mandatory on all States which 
have not waived the application of this Article. 
(a)  The  second  sentence  of  paragraph  2 
provides that 'the Court shall reject the applica-
tion  if  the  creditor  already  disposes  of  an 
adequate  security  or  if  one  of  the  merging 
companies  establishes  that the acquiring com-
pany is  manifestly solvent'. 
The assessment of the 'adequacy' of the security 
already  in  the  possession  of  the  creditor  or 
· of  the  •manifest'  solvency  of  the  acquiring 
company  (which,  in virtue  of  the  merger  will 
become  the  debtor  in  place  of  the  company 
acquired)  is  naturally  a  matter for  the  Court 
dealing with the case;  but if the Court accepts 
the request, it must look into the question of the 
inadequacy of the security or lack of 'manifest' 
solvency  of  the  acquiring  company;  and  if 
it  rejects  the  request,  it  must  look  into  the 
solvency  situation  (or  at  any  rate  expressly 
establish it). 
The Article likewise specifies  that proof of the 
solvency  of  the  acquiring  company  can  be 
supplied  by  'one  of  the  merging  companies', 
i.e.  not  only  by  the  company  acquired,  but 
also  by  the  acquiring  company.  This  means 
that  the  latter  can  intervene  in  the  action 
instituted by the creditor against the company 
acquired with a view to establishing its solvency 
and,  if  necessary,  query  the  security  to  be 
supplied.  Whether this is done by the company 
acquired  before  it  ceases  to  exist,  or directly 
by  the· acquiring  company,  the  latter  will  in 
the  long  run  bear  the  financial  burden,  by 
virtue of the transfer of the assets  of the com-
pany acquired as  a  result of the merger  (Con-
vention, Article 29; see para. 91  et seq.  below). 
In  fact,  a11  the  -companies  involved  in  the 
merger  have  an interest  in removing  the pos-
sible obstacle to it arising out of the application 
of Article 18. 
(b)  The second  substantive rule  is  contained 
111  Article  18,  3,  which  provides  that  'the 
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company  shall  be  exempt  from  granting  a 
security if  the debt even if  it has not matured, 
is  repaid  either  prior  to  the  decision  of  the 
Court,  or not later  than  one  month  of  such 
decision'. 
Thus in  practice the  text grants  the company 
(whether acquired or acquiring)  a grace period 
of  one  month  to  grant  the  security  ordered. 
During that period, it can escape the obligation 
to grant a  security  by  repaying the debt,  even 
if it is not yet due.  This is a departure from the 
general  rule  which  prohibits  the  debtor from 
paying  in  advance,  at  any  rate  where  the 
maintenance  of  the term  is  or may  be  in  the 
interests of the creditor or in the joint interests 
of the creditor and the debtor (e.g. for all debts 
on which interest is  payable).  This departure 
is  necessary, since a creditor cannot be allowed 
to manifest distrust of the acquiring company 
by  calling  for  a  security  while  at  the  same 
time  refusing  payment  of the  sums  due,  even 
if these are paid in advance. 
This payment could be  made by  the company 
acquired  (or  the  acquiring  company  for  its 
account)  on receipt of the request for granting 
a  security,  without  waiting br the  court  to 
announce  its  decision;  but  it  could  also  be 
usefully  made  within  one  month  following 
the  court's  decision,  it  being  understood  that 
in this instance it takes the place of the security 
ordered,  so  that  the  merger  can  only  take 
effect when the payment has been made. 
B.  - A posteriori protection 
57.  Article  19  deals  with  the  protection  of 
creditors  other than 'debenture holders  of  the 
company  acquired  whose  claim  preceeds  the 
fulfilment of the disclosure forma lities referred 
to in Article 27' (on this Article see para. 88  et 
seq.  below).  This  wording  covers  both  the 
creditors whose claim preceeds the publication 
of  the  notice  of  the  merger  plan  and  those 
whose  claim  arose  after  the  disclosure  but 
prior to the fulfilment  of the formalities  laid 
down  in  Article  27.  However,  (Article  19, 
para.  1,  second  sentence)  the  former  cannot 
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to  invoke  Article  18,  i.e.  if  they  have  not 
forfeited  this  right  through  a  statement  made 
by  a  Contracting  State  under  Article  21  (see 
para.  63  et  seq.  below)  to  the  effect  that  it 
will  only  apply  Article  19.  In  fact,  it  is  of 
little  importance  whether  creditors  to  whom 
the benefit of Article  18  applies  have or have 
not  taken  advantage  of  it;  the  moment  they 
could have done so, they are excluded from the 
benefits of Article 19. 
58.  Like the creditors referred to in Article 18, 
those referred to in Article  19  can require the 
granting of a  security.  For this  purpose they 
have a grace period of three months reckoned 
from  the  date  of  the  disclosure  formalities 
referred to in Article 27.  This grace period is 
longer than under Article 18,  but this  is  easily 
justified,  since  the  exercise  of  the  right  thus 
granted to creditors  cannot hold up the entry 
into effect of the merger (this would moreover 
be impossible if the request were made following 
the  entry  into  effect).  More  generally, 
Article 19, para. 4 provides that the application 
of  this  article  'shall  in  no  way  prejudice  the 
effects of the merger'.  This is the fundamental 
feature  of  a  posteriori  protection,  and  it 
should  be  pointed  out  that it  will  be  found 
even  where  a  creditor has  invoked  Article  19 
prior to  the date  of the disclosure formalities 
under  Article  27,  as  he  would  be  perfectly 
entitled to do if  his  claim had already arisen. 
59.  Subject  to  this  basic  difference-which 
will also produce certain effects inherent in the 
procedure under Article 19-the machinery set 
up under this Article operates in the same way 
as that in Article 18. 
In the three month period mentioned previously, 
the creditor is entitled to require the granting of 
security.  Failing  an  agreement  within  eight 
days of receipt of such request by the company, 
the  Court  may  either  order  the  granting  of 
security  (but  with  no  question,  as  we  know, 
of holding up the effective date of the merger) 
or  it  may  reject  the  request  'if  the  creditor 
already  disposes  of  a  sufficient  security,  if  it 
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is  established  that  the  acqumng  company  Is 
manifestly  solvent'  (Article  19,  para.  2).  The 
observations  made  concerning  the  conditions 
governing  rejection  of  the  request  where  this 
is  based  on  Article  18  (see  para.  55  above) 
apply here, but it may be simply observed that 
if,  unlike the preceding article, Article 19  does 
not expressly provide that the proof of manifest 
solvency can be adduced by 'one of the merging 
companies',  this  is  because  more  often  than 
not the event referred to in Article 19 will take 
place  at  a  time  when  the  company  acquired 
has  already  ceased  to  exist.  But  the  neutral 
wording of the text ('if it is established .. .')  has 
been  deliberately  chosen  so  as  not to deprive 
the  company  acquired  of  the  option  of  pro-
ducing this proof to the Court, if  the question 
should arise before it ceases to exist. 
60.  If  the  company  should  fail  to  grant 
security  within  one  month  of  the  decision 
ordering it to do so, 'the claim shall be imme-
diately enforceable'  (Article 19, para. 2:  second 
sentence). 
This provision concerns only fixed-term credits, 
and  involves  bringing  such  terms  to  an  end. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  involved  contingent 
credits,  the  creditor  would  not  of  course  be 
deprived of the right to invoke Article 19,  any 
more than he  would  be  deprived  of the right 
to  benefit  under  Article  18  if  he  fulfilled  the 
conditions required for this and his application 
was  not  ruled  out  by  virtue  of  a  declaration 
made pursuant to Article 21; but the failure of 
the  company  to  grant  the  security  ordered 
would naturally not have the effect of making 
it  a  claim  pure  and simple,  and consequently 
payable.  It would be open to creditors to have 
the  decision  implemented  or  enforced  in 
accordance  with  court  procedure  (e.g.  under 
French  law,  by  obtaining  a  judgment  in  lieu 
of the granting of the security). 
It should  be noted finally  that as  in  the  case 
of Article 18, the company is  exempt from the 
requirement of granting a  security if  the debt, 
even  if  not due,  is  repaid either  prior  to  the 
decision  of  the  Court  or  within  a  month 
following  that  decision  at  the  latest.  Thus 
59 here  again the term is  ended to the detriment 
of the creditor, although it should be observed 
that in  the  case  of Article  19,  failure  to  pay 
within  the  prescribed  time-limit  does  not  of 
course  hold  up  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
merger.  Its  only  consequence  is  that  the 
company is  still  under  an  obligation  to grant 
the security ordered by the Court.  In practice, 
this  means  here,  as  under Article  18,  that the 
company  has  one  month  to  implement  the 
decision. 
Paragraph 2 
Protection of debenture holders of the company acquired 
61 .  The  protection  of  debenture-holding 
creditors  could raise  specific  problems  related 
in substance with the particular nature of their 
links with the debtor company, and in technique 
with the existence in the legislations of several 
of the Contracting States1 of collective organiza-
tions  and  representation  of  their  interests, 
differing from one State to another.  But care 
had  also  be  taken  that debenture  borrowing, 
which  constitutes  an  important  element  in  a 
company's  liabilities,  should  not  have  the 
effect  of  paralyzing  international  mergers  by 
conferring unduly extensive rights on debenture 
holders. 
62.  Bearing these points in mind, Article 20 
in principle brackets  the debenture holders  of 
the  company  acquired  with  non-debenture-
holding creditors of the company by extending 
the benefits  of Articles  18  and  19  of the Con-
vention  to  them  {provided,  of  course,  in  the 
case  of Article 18,  that its application has not 
been  waived  by  a  Contracting State  in  virtue 
of Article 21: see para. 63  et seq. below). 
However, if under the applicable law the rights 
of debenture holders can or must be exercised 
collectively (in  practice through representatives 
of the whole group), the rules  thus  laid down 
on the subject will  be applied.  In addition, to 
take  account  of  the  legislations  of  countries 
which provide that mergers (domestic or where 
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applicable  international)  shall  be  subject  to 
a  general  meeting  of  the  debenture  holders. 
Article 20  provides that if the merger has been 
approved  by  such  a  meeting,  the  debenture 
holders  (and  they  must  be  understood  to 
include those voting against approval)  can  no 
longer invoke Articles 18 and 19. 
Lastly,  if  the  law  governing  the  company 
acquired  does  not  mandatorily  require  a 
collective  body of debenture holders  (as  is  the 
case, for example, in German law)  or does not 
give  the  meeting  of  the  debenture  holders 
jurisdiction  to  approve  mergers,  Articles  18 
and 19 can likewise not be invoked 'unless the 
merger has been approved ...  by the debenture 
holders  individually'  (Article  20,  in  fine). 
Naturally, if  there is no collective body, approval 
by  individual  debenture  holders  (even  if they 
constitute the  majority)  is  not binding  on the 
others, but it deprives those giving the approval 
of the right to require the granting of a security 
under  Articles  18  and  19,  whereas  those 
debenture holders who have not approved the 
merger retain this right. 
Paragraph 3 
Declarations  restricting or extending the  application of 
the rules relating to the protection of creditors 
63.  It  has  already  been  pointed  out  (see 
para.  52  above)  that  the  formulation  of  a 
uniform  system  of  creditor  protection  proved 
particularly  difficult,  owing to  the differences 
in  concept  between  the  various  legislations, 
whether in regard to the siting and the effects 
of this protection in the framework of merger 
operations {a  priori or a posteriori protection), 
or in regard to its application to the creditors 
of the acquiring company. 
The compromise finally arrived at consisted in 
the organization, as we  saw in the case of the 
1  See  for  France:  Law  of  24  July  1966,  Article  380; 
for  Belgium:  Lois  coordonntfes,  Articles  91  and 93, Van 
Ryn, op. cit., I, No 860. 
s.  13/73 creditors  of  the  company  acquired,  of  two 
protective mechanisms, one a priori (Article 18), 
and the other a posteriori (Article 19), and their 
extension  to  cover  the  debenture  holders  of 
that company (Article 20),  subject to the right 
of the Contracting States to declare: 
(i)  that  they  will  apply  only  Article  19,  i.e. 
a  posteriori  protection  (Article  21,  a)  and 
consequentially  Article  20  insofar  as  it  refers 
to Article 19; 
(ii)  that they  will  extend to  the  creditors  of 
the  acquiring  company  the  same  dispositions 
as  to  the  creditors  of  the  company  acquired 
(i.e.  either Articles  18,  19  and 20,  if  the State 
in question  has  not made the former  declara-
tion,  or if  it has  done so,  Article  19  and the 
relevant part of Article 20). 
64.  These provisions call for several observa-
tions: 
(a)  Any  declarations  which  may  be  made in 
virtue  of  Article  21,  a)  or  b),  must  have 
reference  to  all  creditors,  whether  debenture 
holders or not, without distinction.  The inten-
tion was  to ensure that States did not unduly 
complicate mechanism already complex enough 
by  declaring, for example, that they will apply 
Article  19  alone  to  non-debenture-holding 
creditors,  and Articles  18  and 19  to debenture 
holders. 
(b)  Similarly, if  a  State made the declaration 
under  Article  21,  b),  the  creditors  of  the 
acquiring  company  could  not  be  treated  any 
differently  by  that  State  from  those  of  the 
company  acquired.  In  other  words,  if  that 
same  State  had  made  the  declaration  under 
Article  21,  a),  the  creditors  of  the  acquiring 
company could only invoke Article  19,  and if 
it had not done so, it could claim the benefits 
of Articles 18  and 19. 
(c)  Finally-and this  is  the  essential  point-
declarations  under  Article  21  will  affect  the 
creditors  of a  company governed  by  the laws 
of the State making them.  This point is  made 
expressly  in  Article  21,  b)  in  respect  of  the 
declaration extending protection to the creditors 
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of  the  declaration extending protection to the 
creditors of the acquiring company.  The text 
provides  that  the  State  may  declare  'that  it 
will  apply  to  the  creditors  of  the  acquiring 
company ... where  the  latter  is  subject  to  its 
I  a  ws, the same provisions as  are applied to the 
creditors of the company acquired'. 
Article  21,  a)  is  more  laconic.  It  does  not 
state  in  so  many  words  that it  refers  to  the 
creditors  of  the  company  acquired,  but  this 
goes without saying in view of the reference to 
Article  19,  which  concerns  these  creditors 
alone.  Nor does it specify that the declaration 
can only refer to the creditors of the company 
acquired  when  the  latter  comes  under  the 
legislation of the State making the declaration; 
but the same applies here, since no Contracting 
State  would  wish  to  become  involved  in  the 
relations  between  creditors  and  a  company 
where the latter does not come under its laws. 
65.  The arrangements for  making  or with-
drawing the declarations envisaged in Article 21, 
the date on which declarations or withdrawals 
of  declarations  take  effect,  and  the  exclusion 
of  any  retroactivity  in  respect  of  them,  are 
governed  by  Article  65  (see  para.  169  et  seq. 
below). 
Paragraph 4 
Protection of shareholders having special rights or bearers 
of  securities  other than shares 
66.  Mergers,  whether  internal  or  inter-
national,  inevitably  raise  the  question  of  the 
special  rights  of  certain  shareholders  (e.g. 
plural voting rights,  the right to a  preferential 
dividend or a  'superdividend'),  and holders of 
securities other than shares  (e.g.  profit-sharing 
rights,  bonus  issues;  debentures  convertible 
into shares; debentures exchangeable for shares; 
debentures  carrying preferential rights  of  sub-
scription  to  the  registered  capital  and  profit-
sharing debentures. 
The protection of  these rights  (as  indeed their 
very  nature)  is  dealt with in a variety of ways 
61 according to the different legal  systems, which 
may well be coordinated in this respect, in part 
at any rate, by the adoption of the draft directive 
on domestic mergers (see Articles 13  and 14). 
In  this  situation,  the  Convention  merely  lays 
down,  in  Article  22,  a  rule  of  conflict  under 
which  'the provisions  of  the  laws  concerning 
the  protection  of  shareholders  with  special 
rights or bearers of securities other than shares, 
to  which  each  of  the  merging  companies  is 
subject, shall be applicable'. 
The provisions  in question are as  usual  those 
which in the particular State relate to internal 
mergers,  except  where  that  State  has  rules 
governing international mergers, in which case 
they apply. 
It should  be  further  pointed  out that  by  the 
general  nature  of  its  wording,  Article  22 
covers  debenture  holders.  But  this  does  not 
thereby  contradict  Article  20,  which  grants 
debenture holders the right to call for a security, 
under the conditions  laid  down in Articles  18 
and 19,  and subject to the  reservations  made 
therein.  Thus the  reference  in  Article  22  in 
regard to debenture holders  is  to measures  of 
protection  other than this  right,  laid down in 
the  law  governing  the  company,  whether 
acquired or acquiring. 
Section 5 
The Question of  'participation' 
67.  The experts  were  not able  to propose, 
even  by  a  majority,  provisions  relating to the 
prospects for and the institution of  'participa-
tion'  in  the  event  of  international  mergers. 
The problem was therefore left to be discussed 
by  the Member States meeting in the Council, 
under  the  terms  and  in  the  circumstances 
described in the special report annexed to the 
present report.  It will be recalled, incidentally, 
that the Italian delegation continued to oppose 
the  insertion  in  the  Convention  of  clauses 
designed to regulate this:  (see  para. 9,  note 17 
above). 
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While  taking  note  of  this  stand,  the  other 
delegations  set  aside  Section  5  of  Chapter  II 
of the Convention for clauses on this subject. 
Section 6 
Control  and  disclosure  of the merger 
68.  Under  this  heading  the  Convention 
deals  with  four  questions  which  are  linked: 
the  institution  and  object  of  judicial  or 
administrative  preventive  control  of  mergers 
or the  formalities  regarded  as  the  equivalent 
of  such  control  (para.  1);  the  chronological 
order in which judicial or administrative control, 
and where applicable the equivalent formalities 
(second  para.),  must  be  carried  out  in  the 
companies  merging,  the  date  on  which  the 
merger  takes  effect  (para.  3);  and  finally, 
disclosure  of  the  merger  and  invoking  it 
against third parties (fourth para.). 
Paragraph l 
The  institution  and  object  of  preventive  control  or 
equivalent formalities 
69.  As  we  know, the legislations  of the six 
Member States  of  the European Communities 
and parties to the Convention are divided into 
two groups as  regards the machinery provided 
to  ensure  that the constitutions  of companies 
and  modifications  of  their  statutes  are  in 
keeping  with  the  law- on  the  one  side, 
Germany,  France,  Italy  and  the  Netherlands, 
where  the law  embodies  a  preventive  control 
of legality-carried out by the judicial authori-
ties  in  the  first  three  countries  and  by  the 
administration in the Netherlands; and on the 
other,  Belgium  and Luxembourg,  where there 
is  no such control.  Here mandatory action is 
taken by a notary (also required, in fact, in the 
countries of the first group with the exception 
of France), who takes service of the statutes of 
a  societe  anonyme or prepares  minutes  of the 
meetings  at which amendments to the statutes 
are adopted.  This, combined with the profes-sional responsibility  of  a  notary,  in the event 
of infringements of the law in connexion with 
his  official  duties,  is  regarded  as  in  almost all 
cases  amply sufficient to prevent irregularities. 
This  same  division  is  found  in  relation  to 
mergers, which are subject to preventive control 
of legality in the first three countries, while in 
the  last  two  they  involve  the  mandatory 
notarial  recording  of  the  proceedings  of  the 
general  meeting  deciding  on the  merger.l  In 
the Netherlands no choice has yet  been  made 
between  preventive  control  and  the  notarial 
deed.  For the time being, administrative con-
trol is carried out by reason of the amendments 
to the statutes bound up with mergers. 
70.  Because  of  the  links  connecting  each 
of the Member States of the Communities with 
its own system, the First Directive on coordina-
tion  of  safeguards  applicable  to  companies 
dated  9  March  1968  (Article  10)  maintained 
this  duality  in  regard  to  the  formation  of 
companies  and  modification  of  their  statutes. 
Article 10 of this Directive provides that 'in all 
Member States whose laws do not provide for 
preventive  control,  administrative  or  judicial; 
at  the  time  of  formation  of  a  company,  the 
instrument of constitution the company statutes 
and  any  amendments  to  those  documents 
shall  be  drawn  up  and  certified  in  due  legal 
form'; and it is envisaged that the same option 
shall be left to the Member States in regard to 
domestic mergers as far as 'decisions of general 
meetings  establishing that a  merger  has taken 
place  and  all  other  documents  establishing 
that a  merger has taken place'  (draft directive 
on domestic mergers, Article 8)  are concerned. 
71 .  The difference  between legislations that 
provide for preventive  control and those that 
require  certification  of  a  merger  by  notarial 
deed  will  thus  remain.  This  being  so,  the 
Convention  on  International  Mergers  had  in 
turn to take it into account.  Hence Article 23, 
para. 1 provides that 'if the law governing one 
of  the  merging  companies  makes  provision 
in  the  event  of  a  merger,  for  a  preventive 
control  of  legality,  judicial  or  administrative, 
the  provisions  relating  to  such  control  shall 
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apply  to  such  company  according to the law 
to which it is  subject'; but it specifies in para. 2 
that  'where  the  law  does  not  provide  for  a 
preventive  control  and  where  such  control 
does  not apply  to  all  the  legal  acts  necessary 
for the merger, then the minutes of the general 
meetings  which  decide  on  the  merger  and, 
where  applicable,  the  merger  contract  sub-
sequent  to  such  general  meetings,  shall  be 
drawn up and certified by notarial deed'. 
Technically, para. 1 is a rule of conflict, which 
leaves  it  to  the  provisions  on  mergers  (inter-
national, or failing  these,  domestic, as  already 
mentioned)  contained in the law governing the 
company,  to  decide  on  the  existence  of  the 
control, the authority entrusted to carry it out, 
and the procedure itself  (for the object of the 
control, see  para. 72  et  seq.  below).  Para. 2, 
on the other hand, is  a  substantive rule, since, 
in the absence of control, it prescribes  certifi-
cation  by  notarial  deed.  But  in  the  present 
state  of  law,  in  the  only  two  Contracting 
States  (Belgium  and Luxembourg)  where there 
is  no  judicial  or  administrative  control,  this 
requirement is as we know already met similarly. 
In  Italian  law,  which,  at  the  moment,  is  the 
only one to prescribe this, the merger contract 
subsequent  to  the  general  meetings  must  be 
drawn up and certified by notarial deed. 
72.  As in the internal law of the States which 
practise these two systems respectively, preven-
tive  control  and  certifications  by  a  notary 
relate only to the legality of the documents and 
formalities  connected  with  the  merger  (for 
controls  other  than  legality  control,  see 
Article 56,  para.  149  et seq.  below).  But the 
1  See  for  the  application  of  the  control  system  in 
Germany AktG, paragraphs 345-346;inFrance, theLaw of 
24 July  1966,  Article  6,  3  applicable to  all amendments 
to statutes; in Italy, the Codice  Civile,  Articles 2502 and 
2411;  and for the certification of resolutions by  certified 
act,  see  for  Belgium,  Lois  coordonnees,  Article  12,  1, 
which refers  to Article 4, 2;  in Luxembourg:  E.  Arendt, 
in A.N.S.A., Aperfu du regime  des  societes  par actions, 
Belgium-Luxembourg,  p.  42.  It  should  be  noted  that 
quite apart from  control, the merger  contract  must  be 
attested in Germany by a notarial act (AktG, para. 341-1). 
63 combination  in  a  single  merger  of  controls 
exercised  by  the  authorities  of  two  or  more 
countries, or controls in some and interventions 
by a notary in others, necessitated clarification 
on  the  object  of  each  type  of  control,  or of 
control on the one side and notarial certification 
on the other. 
This clarification is  given in  Article 24,  which 
distinguishes three cases: 
(a)  Where judicial or administrative control is 
prescribed for each of the companies  merging 
(e.g.  merger  between  a  German company and 
a French company); 
(b)  Where it is  not prescribed for each of the 
companies  merging,  thus  necessarily  implying 
action by a notary vis-a-vis the company where 
there  is  no  control  (e.g.  merger  between  a 
Belgian company and a German company); 
(c)  Where  the  law  governing  one  of  the 
companies  merging  prescribes  the  conclusion 
of a merger contract subsequent to the approval 
of  the  merger  by  the  companies  in  question 
(in practice, this applies to any merger involving 
an Italian company, whether the other company 
is  governed  by  a  law  prescribing  judicial  or 
administrative control, or certification by notar-
ial deed. 
On the other hand, there is no special provision 
covering cases where judicial or administrative 
control is  not prescribed for  any of the com-
panies merging (e.g.  mergers between a Belgian 
company and a  Luxembourg company).  The 
delegations  of  Belgium  and Luxembourg,  the 
only  countries  directly  concerned  here,  stated 
that such a provision was not necessary, since 
the application to each company of the rules of 
its  own law in  respect  of  mergers  would not 
raise  any difficulty  and would be sufficient to 
provide any verification that might be required. 
Nor  does  the  Convention  make  any  special 
provision  for  mergers  with  a  Netherlands 
company,  even  though  current  Netherlands 
law  does  not  embody  any  rule  relating  to 
mergers.  In  view  of the likelihood that such 
rules  will  come  into  force  in  its  country 
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in  the near· future,  the Netherlands delegation 
felt that this lacuna did not constitute a draw-
back 
73.  In the first case (Article 24, para. 1)  the 
control  applies  distributively  in  respect  of 
each company first to the legal acts and formal-
ities 'required of it' (in other words, the report of 
the  company  organs-Article 11;  the  experts' 
report-Article 12; publication of the notice of 
the merger plan, and the plan itself-Articles 13, 
14  and  15;  the  general  meetings-Articles  16 
and  17):  and  secondly,  to  the  'absence  of  a 
judical  decision  of  postponement  taken  by 
virtue  of  Article  18'  (see  para.  54  above), 
it being understood that it  will be the responsi-
bility  of  the  control  body  to  ensure  that  no 
such  decision  has  been  taken  in  respect  of 
either the company in which it operates or the 
other.  On the  other hand,  the  merger  plan, 
or the merger contract as its equivalent, when 
drawn  up  prior  to  the  general  meetings 
(Articles  7  to  10),  is  a  single  and  indivisible 
document common to the companies merging, 
and hence it involves a single control operation 
in the acquiring company (Article 24, para. l, b). 
This option is  bound up with the chronological 
order  of  the  control  operations,  which  in 
this  case  are  carried  out  first  of  all  in  the 
acquiring  company  (Article  25,  para.  1:  see 
para. 77 below). 
74.  In the second case  (Article 24,  para. 2), 
the  respective  objects  of  control  and  notarial 
certification are determined in the same manner 
in  respect  of  the  legal  acts  and  formalities 
separately  required  of  each  of the companies 
merging:  control  and  certification  in  each 
company  of  the  legal  acts  and  formalities 
required of it and of the absence  of a  judicial 
decision  to  postpone  the  merger  taken  in 
virtue  of  Article  18  (here  again  it is  specified 
that  the  notary  too  will  to  satisfy  himself 
that no decision has been taken by either of the 
companies in question).  But it is stipulated that 
the  notary  shall  'check  and  certify  . . .  the 
existence  and  legality  of  the  legal  acts  and 
formalities  required of the company for which 
he is  acting.'  This is  a substantive rule which 
s.  13/73 is in fact in keeping with the current provisions 
of Belgian and Luxembourg law relating to the 
functions  of  the  notary,  1  guaranteeing  the 
effective  equivalence  of  notarial  action  and 
judicial or administrative control. 
In the same  circumstances,  the  single  control 
of the merger  plan  (or  the equivalent  merger 
contract) is left to the notary, since chronologi-
cally  the  control  is  only  carried  out  in  the 
company  whose  law  requires  it  following 
certification by notarial deed  of the resolution 
of  the general  meeting  of  the other company 
approving  the  merger,  and  on  production  of 
the notarial deed (Article 25, para 2: see para.78 
below). 
75.  The  third  and  last  case  is  that  where 
a  contract  subsequent  to  the  approval  of  the 
merger is  prescribed by the law governing one 
of  the  companies  in  question,  Here  again, 
control or, where applicable, certification by the 
notary,  is  exercised  distributively  in  respect 
of  the  legal  acts  and  formalities  required  of 
each of the companies and of non-existence of 
a judicial decision to postpone the merger taken 
in virtue of  Article  18.  Similarly,  the control 
of certification of the merger project is  carried 
out in the State where the control and certifica-
tion formalities are performed first, the chrono-
logical  order  being  determined  here  by 
Article 25, and varying according to the circum-
stances (see para. 79 below). 
But in this instance, apart from the merger plan, 
there is a second indivisible instrument, namely 
the  merger  contract,  subsequent  to  approval 
of the merger.  But the text does not stipulate 
control of this contract in the company whose 
law requires  it  (this  is  implicit  in  para.  3,  a) 
whereas  it  does  so  stipulate in  respect  of  the 
other  company  if  the  law  applicable  to  the 
latter  provides  for  control  subsequent  to  the 
merger  contract.  In  practice,  for  example, 
in  the  event  of  a  merger  between  an  Italian 
company  and  a  German  company,  the  'sub-
sequent' merger contract will not be controlled 
in Italy but will be controlled in Germany. 
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At  first  sight,  this  seems  surpnsmg.  But  the 
decision was taken because the Italian delega-
tion,  as  a  directly  interested  party,  explained 
that  it  is  compulsory  under  Italian  law  for 
service  of an a  posteriori contract to be taken 
by  a notary, who himself checks the regularity 
of  the  general  meetings  and the concordance 
of  their  resolutions.  However,  German  law 
requires  the  control  to  be  carried  out  after 
the  contract has  been  concluded;  the German 
delegation  asked  that  this  requirement  be 
respected in the case of an a posteriori contract, 
and the Italian delegation did not oppose this. 
Paragraph 2 
Chronological order  of the  formalities 
for  control or certification  by a  notary 
76.  Article  25  determines  the  chronologi-
cal  order in  which  the  operations  of  judicial 
or  administrative  control  and  certification 
by  a  notary are to be carried out.  This was 
deemed  necessary  in order to enable the date 
on which the merger  would take effect to be 
fixed  (Article  26:  see  para.  81  et seq.  below), 
and to  ensure  that this  is  not done  until  the 
prescribed control  and  certification  have  been 
completed in each of the companies.  However, 
as in determining the object of these measures, 
the  delegations  of  Belgium  and  Luxembourg 
argued that the establishment of a chronological 
order was unnecessary when notarial certifica-
tion  alone  was  required  of  the  companies 
merging, i.e. in practice, where these companies 
come  under  Belgian  and  Luxembourg  law 
respectively. 
Hence  only  three  cases  were  specifed,  the 
first two being the same as  those in Article 24, 
and the third similar to the last case mentioned 
in that article. 
77.  In  the  first  case  (where  judicial  or 
administrative  control is  required  in  both the 
1  See,  for  example,  for  Belgium:  Raucq and Cambier, 
Traite du Notariat, 1943, II, No 3615 et seq. 
65 compames:  Article  25,  para.  1)  control  must 
be  carried  out  first  of  all  on  the  acquiring 
company,  and  cannot  be  instituted  in  the 
company  acquired  unless  proof  is  adduced 
that  it  has  been  carried  out in  the  acquiring 
company.  In view  of  the identical  nature  of 
the  control  formalities,  those  affecting  the 
company acquired were placed last here, since 
it will cease to exist as  a result of the merger; 
and it is  preferable not to hasten its disappear-
ance,  which is  not easily  reversed,  until  such 
time  as  the  merger  operations  have  been 
completed  and  checked  in  the  acquiring 
company. 
78.  In  the  second  case  (where  judicial  or 
administrative  control  is  required  in  one  of 
the companies only, and hence there is certifica-
tion  by  a  notary  in  the  other:  Article  25, 
para.  2),  the  essential  difference  between  the 
measures  of  control  and  certification  respect-
ively  made  it  seems  advisable  not  to  apply 
the same criterion.  Whether it is to be carried 
out in the acquiring company or the company 
acquired, judicial or administrative control can 
only  take  place  following  certification  by 
notarial  deed  of  the  general  meeting  of  the 
other  company  approving  the  merger,  and 
hence following  attestation  by  the notary.  It 
was felt,  in fact,  that there was no reason for 
a  check  to  be  made  by  a  notary  belonging 
to  one  country  on  judicial  or  administrative 
formalities  carried  out  in  another  when  it 
seemed  acceptable  for  an  act  certified  by  a 
notarial  deed  and filed  in  one  country  to  be 
produced  to  the  judicial  or  administrative 
authorities in another (in the same way as  the 
proof of the control formalities in the preceding 
case). 
79.  The third case is  that in which the law 
governing the company acquired prescribes the 
conclusion  of  a  merger  contract  by  the  com-
panies  involved  and  the  law  governing  the 
acquiring  company  requires  control  of  the 
merger  subsequent  to  the  conclusion  of  this 
contract (Article 25, para. 1;  in practice, this is 
the case at present where an Italian company is 
acquired by a German company).  Here para. 1 
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of Article 25  is  not applied,  since under it the 
control carried out in  the acquiring  company 
takes place before that in the company acquired 
(see  para. 77 above.  This would not meet the 
requirements of the law of the acquiring com-
pany,  which  extends  the  control  to  the  a 
posteriori contract prescribed by the law of the 
company  acquired  but is  concluded  after  the 
control formalities  instituted by this  law have 
been completed. 
On the other hand, the application of Article 25, 
para.  1  did  not  have  to  be  ruled  out in  the 
opposite  case--where  a  German  company  is 
taken over by an Italian company.  Here,  since 
the control to be  carried  out in the company 
acquired  comes  last,  in  accordance  with  the 
general  rule  laid  down  in  para  1,  it  can  be 
exercised, as is required by German law, over the 
merger  contract  concluded  following  the  ap-
proval of the merger  by the general  meetings. 
80.  Finally,  it will  be noted that Article  25 
does not define any specific  means of proof of 
the control or certification formalities.  Para. 1 
merely  provides  that  proof  shall  be  adduced 
that the control formalities  have  been  carried 
out  in  the  acquiring  company,  and  para.  2 
makes the control in the company whose law 
requires  this  subject  to  production  of  the 
notarial deed drawn up in the other company. 
Thus  it  is  the  rules  of  proof  under  private 
international  law  in  the  country  where  the 
proof has to be adduced that will determine the 
procedure. 
Paragraph 3 
Date on which  the merger  takes  effect 
81 .  Article 26 specifies the date on which the 
particular merger takes effect, without prejudice 
to any agreement fixing the date on which the 
shares of the acquiring company allocated to the 
shareholders  of  the  company  acquired  give 
entitlement to participate in profits and the date 
from  which  the  operations  of  the  company 
acquired  are to be  regarded as  performed for 
account  of  the  acquiring  company (Article  8, 
s.  13/73 para. 1, c and d: see para. 31 above).  The date 
of invoking of the merger against third parties is 
dealt with  in  Article  28  (see  para.  90  below). 
The  date  determined  in  accordance  with 
Article 26 will thus essentially be that on which 
the  complete  transfer  of  the  capital  of  the 
company acquired to the company acquiring it 
takes  place (Article  29:  see  para.  94  et  seq. 
below). 
82.  For  a  given  merger,  this  date  must 
manifestly be one and one only.  It is inconceiv-
able that the merger should take effect for one 
of the companies on one day and for the other 
on a different day.  Hence the fixing of the date 
could not be left to the jurisdiction of the laws 
applicable in the event of a merger to each of the 
companies,  since  the laws  of  the  Contracting 
States work differently here.  Thus a rule based 
on the conflict  of laws  would have  made the 
merger take effect on different dates according 
to the particular company considered, through 
the application of its proper law. 
83.  The principle of determining the uniform 
date is  in itself  very  simple.  The merger can 
only  take  effect  when  all  the  legal  acts  and 
formalities required for its accomplishment have 
been completed in respect of both the companies. 
But this is  dependent on documents or formali-
ties  differing  widely  according  to  the  laws 
applicable to each of the companies : preventive 
control of a judicial or administrative character, 
certification bv notarial deed of the resolutions 
of the general in.eetings approving the merger, or 
a merger contract concluded subsequent to the 
general meetings.  But  as  we  have  seen,  the 
Convention  makes  allowance  for  all  these 
systems,  combining  them  according  to  the 
various hypotheses that can arise (Article 23  to 
25 : see para. 69 et seq. above).  Thus there was 
no  option  but  to  take  account  also  of  this 
diversity in fixing the date on which the merger 
would take effect;  and as  a result, this date, a 
single date for any given merger, is  determined 
in several different ways according to the legal 
acts  or formalities required in individual cases 
by the laws of the companies merging.  Thus 
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while the principle is  simple, its  application is 
inevitably complex. 
84.  To  this  end,  Article  26  arranges  the 
various  hypotheses,  using  a  method  we  have 
already  seen,  into  two  groups,  which  are 
dealt with in paras. 1 and 2 respectively of the 
Article. 
85.  Article  26,  para.  1  covers  all  types  of 
mergers  excepts those in which a  merger con-
tract if prescribed by the law governing one of 
the companies merging, has been concluded sub-
sequent  to  the  deliberations  of  the  general 
meetings.  In practice, therefore, this excludes 
mergers  involving  an  Italian  company  in  all 
instances (since as we know, Italian law requires 
the conclusion of a  contract a posteriori), and 
mergers involving a German company when the 
merger contract prescribed by German law has 
been concluded (as is feasible but not obligatory 
in  German  law)  after  the  general  meetings. 
Within  these  various  hypotheses,  the  text 
distinguishes three situations:1 
(a)  The first is  that!in which 'neither of these 
companies  is  subject  to  control' (Article  26, 
para.  1,  a).  In  practice,  this  means  a  merger 
between a Belgian company and a Luxembourg 
company.  Here the merger  takes effect  on the 
date of the notarial deed recording the resolu-
tion  of  the  general  meeting  of  the  company 
approving the merger last,  since there is  then 
nothing  more  to  be  done  to  accomplish  the 
merger.  Furthermore, it matters little, and the 
text  makes  this  clear,  whether the meeting  is 
that  of  the  acquiring  company  or the  other, 
since  as  will  be  remembered,  in this  case  the 
Convention does not stipulate the chronological 
order  of  the  operations (see  para.  76  above). 
(b)  The  second  situation  is  that  in  which, 
conversely,  control  within  the  meaning  of 
Article  23,  para.  1 (i.e.  preventive  control  of 
legality, judicial or administrative) is required in 
1  Owing  to  the  particular  system  prevailing  in  the 
Netherlands  (see  para.  69  above),  no example  is  given 
of a merger involving a Netherlands company. 
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acquired.  The  mergers  involved  (bearing  in 
mind  that  mergers  with  an  Italian  company 
come  under  the  second  group),  are  those  of 
German  companies  (except  where  the  merger 
contract has been concluded subsequent to the 
general  meetings)  or French companies.  Here 
the merger takes effect on the date on which the 
control is carried out in the company acquired, 
since again this is also the control that must come 
last (Article 25, para. 77 above).1 
(c)  The  third  and  last  situation  is  where 
control (within the meaning of Article 23, para. 
1: see b above) is only required in one of the two 
companies.  This applies to mergers between a 
German  company (unless  the  merger  contract 
has  been concluded subsequent to the general 
meetings) or French company, and a Belgian or 
Luxembourg company.  Here the merger takes 
effect  on the date when this control is  carried 
out,  and we  know it  must  always  take place 
following certification in due legal form of the 
resolution of  the general meeting  of the other 
company,  approving  the  merger (Article  25, 
para.2: see para. 78 above). 
86.  Article 26, para. 2 covers the other set of 
possibilities, the essential feature of which is the 
conclusion a posteriori of the merger contract, 
prescribed (under  Italian  law)  or  permitted 
(under German law) by the law governing one of 
the companies  merging.  In  this  instance,  the 
principle is  first of all simple in its application: 
the merger takes effect on the date on which the 
merger  contract  is  concluded,  since  prior  to 
that  date  not  all  the  formalities  have  been 
completed. 
But  account had still to be  taken  of the  case 
where the law of one of the companies merging 
prescribes  a  control  which  takes  place  only 
after  the merger  contract has  been  concluded 
(this happens under German law).  The merger 
will  then  take  effect  on  the  date  when  the 
control  formalities  are  carried  out  in  the 
company-acquired or acquiring-whose law re-
quires  this.  Indeed  this  control  alone,  sub-
sequent  to  the  contract  brings  the  chain  of 
operations to an end. 
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Paragraph 4 
Disclosure  of the  merger -
invoking against third parties 
87.  The procedure for the disclosure of the 
formation and winding up of societes anonymes 
and amendments to their statutes, as well as the 
conditions governing the invoking of documents 
and information whose disclosure is mandatory, 
against third parties, were coordinated by  the 
Directive of 9 March 1968.  In fact, mergers by 
acquisition  almost  invariably  involve  some 
amendment  of  the  statutes  of  the  acquiring 
company, and in all instances, winding up of the 
company acquired.  In a  more general way, if 
Articl.e  10  of  the  draft  directive  on  domestic 
mergers  as  at  present  worded  were  adopted, 
these  mergers  would  be  directly  subject  to 
disclosure in each of the Contracting States, in 
accordance with the Directive of 9 March 1968. 
Finally,  there  is  nothing  to  suggest  that  if 
provisions  relevant  to  international  mergers 
were introduced into the laws of a Contracting 
State the requirements with regard to disclosure 
would  be  different.  That would  certainly  be 
out  of  the  question  as  far  as  increasing  the 
capital of the acquiring company and winding 
up the company acquired is concerned. 
88.  Consequently,  it  seems  reasonable  to 
assume  that  the  procedure  for  disclosure  of 
mergers  in  general,  or  where  applicable,  of 
international mergers, is  or will be identical or 
very  similar  in  all  the  Contracting  States. 
Hence it was perfectly feasible here to adopt the 
simple solution of rule of conflict.  This is  the 
object of Article 27, para. 1 of the Convention, 
which provides that the procedure for disclosure 
shall  be  determined in respect  of  each  of  the 
companies merging by  the law applicable to it. 
1  If in accordance with the Italian proposal (see Article 3 
of  the  draft  Convention)  it  was  agreed  that  a  merger 
could  take  place  by  the  acquisition  of  two  or  more 
companies, this provision  would have to be adapted to 
allow for the fact that the control would no longer be 
carried out in just one company acquired.  This is  one 
of the examples of the kind of adaptation the Convention 
would have to make if it catered for this type of merger. 
s.  13/73 It  will  be  noted  however,  that  implicitly  yet 
indisputably, this wording prescribes disclosure 
of an international merger:  the law governing 
each  company  determines  the  procedure  for 
disclosure, but it could not waive it ( this would 
in any case be unthinkable for any legislator). 
It should also be remembered that it is  the date 
of  disclosure  by  each  of  the  companies  that 
constitutes the start of the three-month period 
within which creditors of the company acquired 
(Article 19, and in certain circumstances credi-
tors of the acquiring company (Article 21,  b)) 
may  exercise  their  rights (see  para.  57  et  seq. 
and 63 et seq. above). 
89.  Article  27  likewise  contains  two  sub-
stantive rules expressly stated. 
(a)  By  virtue  of  para.  2,  disclosure  of  the 
merger  must  refer,  in  respect  of  each  of  the 
companies, to 'the place and date of performance 
of  the  disclosure  formalities  laid  down  in 
Articles  13  and 14'  (i.e.  notice  of the merger 
plan  and  deposit  of  the  plan  and  certain  of 
its annexes in the files of each of the companies 
merging:  see  para.  40  et  seq.  above).  This 
reference  will  enable any  interested  person to 
take  note,  in  particular,  of  the  accountancy 
documents  deposited  along  with  the  merger 
plan  (Article  9,  b)  and  c))  and  where  neces-
sary, if he is a creditor of one of the companies, 
to  judge  whether  he  would  be  well  advised 
to exercise the rights granted to him, according 
to the circumstances, under Articles 19  and 21. 
(b)  Article  27,  para.  3  provides  that  the 
'acquiring  company  may  itself  undertake  the 
disclosure  formalities  relating to the company 
acquired.'  This  precaution is  vital,  since  the 
effect  of  a  merger  is  to  make  the  company 
acquired  disappear  without  implementation 
of  the liquidation  procedure  so  that it  might 
have  been  feared  that  its  former  managing 
organs  would  neglect  to  undertake  the  dis-
closure formalities  relating to it  of  their  own 
accord. 
90.  The  system  thus  adopted  inevitably 
leads  to  duplication  of  the  disclosure  (by  the 
acquiring company and the company acquired). 
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But  invoking the merger  against third  parties 
depends  on  the  disclosure;  for  that  reason 
lengthy discussions  were held in the course of 
the  group's  work  concerning  the  necessity 
and the possibility  of  nevertheless  stipulating, 
by  means  of  a  uniform  rule,  a  single  date of 
such invoking, which would have been (except 
for  a  'period  of  grace'  in  certain  circum-
stances)  the date of the latest disclosure.  But 
after  further  examination  on  the  initiative 
of Professor  Gessler,  the head  of the German 
delegation  at  the  time,  who  contributed  a 
very  thorough  study  of  the  problem,  the 
experts  reached  the  conclusion  that  such  a 
course  would  have  serious  drawbacks  owing 
to the difficulty for third parties taking cogni-
zance  of  one  of  the  disclosures  to  ascertain 
whether that disclosure  was the latest or not. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  study  in  question 
revealed  that  duality  of  dates  for  invoking 
against third parties  (respectively the dates for 
each  of the companies of the disclosure  made 
in  accordance  with  its  proper  law)  involved 
virtually no practical difficulties. 
In  these  circumstances  the  rule  of  conflict  in 
Article  28  was  adopted.  This  provides  that 
'subject  to  the  application  of  Article  31'  (on 
this  point  see  para.  100  below)  'the  merger 
may  be  invoked  against  third  parties  on the 
conditions  laid down in  the provisions  of· the 
law to which each of the companies is  subject, 
on  the  invoking  of  mergers  against  third 
parties  or,  in  the  absence  of such  provisions, 
on  amendments  to  the  statutes'.  The  'con-
ditions'  envisaged  here  naturally  include  also 
the  right  of  the  company  to  prove  that  the 
third  parties  had  knowledge  of  the  merger 
even  though  it  had  not  been  made  public; 
the period of grace granted following publication 
to  third  parties  to prove  that they  could  not 
possibly  have  had  knowledge  of  it;  and  the 
right  of  third  parties  to  avail  themselves  of 
the  merger  even  though  not  made  public; 
and  all  this  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the 
law  applicable  to· the  company,  with  due 
regard  to  the  Directive  of  9  March  1968 
(Article  3,  paras.  4  to  7)  and,  where  appro-
priate,  to  the  draft  directive  on  domestic 
mergers. 
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Effects  of the merger 
91 .  The  very  definition  in  Article  4  of 
mergers  by  acquisition  as  governed  by  the 
Convention  determined  the  two  characteristic 
effects,  namely  transfer  of  the  capital  of  the 
company  acquired  to the  acquiring  company, 
and  conversely  the  allotment  to  the  share-
holders  of the  company acquired  of shares in 
the  acquiring  company,  if  necessary  sup-
plemented by a cash adjustment proportionately 
limited (see para. 25 above). 
In Chapter II, Section 7, relating to the effects 
of  the merger,  Article  29  again  lays  down  at 
the  outset  the  principle  of  transfer  of  the 
capital, and specifies the legal regime applicable. 
Since  this  transfer  covers  both  the  assets, 
including  personal  rights,  and  the  liabilities, 
i.e.  the obligations contracted by  the company 
acquired, it necessarily implies the replacement 
of  the  company  acquired  by  the  company 
acquiring  as  party  to  contracts  concluded 
by  the  former.  But  this  replacement  raises 
complex issues, first of all in regard to contracts 
made  very  difficult  or  extremely  costly  to 
execute  by  the merger or contracts which the 
company  taken  over  had  concluded  intuitu 
personae;  and secondly,  contracts  or in  more 
general terms working arrangements on which a 
merger frequently has consequences not merely 
juridical  but  social  and  human,  such  as  no 
Government would wish to ignore. 
Lastly,  from  a  more  technical  point  of  view, 
the  transfer  of  certain  property  or  rights 
included in the capital of the company acquired 
can be made subject  by  the law  applicable to 
them to special formalities designed for example 
to  protect,  for  the  benefit ·and  in  respect  of 
third parties,  public  credit and the safeguards 
governing  transactions.  Consequently  some 
means of coordination had to be found between 
the  principle  of  universal  transfer  and  these 
requirements. 
92.  All  these  problems were looked into in 
the  course  of  the  deliberations,  but  after 
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lengthy discussions the experts decided against 
including in the Convention provisions to cover 
contracts made extremely difficult or very costly 
to  execute  by  the  merger (e.g.  an  exclusive 
supply  contract  concluded  by  the  company 
acquired with a supplier other than the one with 
which the acquiring company has arrangements 
to  supply  the  same  products)  and  contracts 
intuitu persone (for  example,  a  mandate given 
or received by the company acquired).  Among 
the  legislations  of  the  Contracting  States, 
only German law at the present time embodies 
such  provisions (AktG.  para.  346,  3).  In  the 
other  contracting  States,  the  answer  to  these 
difficulties  would  be  sought  in  general  pro-
visions of law, and it may also be noted that the 
draft directive on domestic mergers lays down 
no  regulations  in  this  matter.  This  being 
so,  in the end it was not deemed advisable to 
cater  for  this  in  the  Convention,  and  the 
expert~  were  unanimous  in  holding  that  in 
each  State,  its  solution should continue to be 
sought as  hitherto in  the private international 
law rules of the forum. 
93.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Convention 
includes  a  clause  relating  to  employment 
contracts concluded by  the company  acquired 
(Article  30),  and  it  may  be  well  not only  to 
explain its substance but to specify also in what 
circumstances it is presented to the Government 
of  the  Contracting  States.  The  question  of 
invoking the transfer  of  certain  assets  against 
third persons is dealt with in Article 31. 
Under para. 1 below we shall examine Articles 
29,  30  and  31,  which  are  centred  round  the 
principle of transfer of the capital.  After that, 
para.  2  will  be  devoted  to  Article  32,  which 
deals  with  the  allotment  of  the  shares  of  the 
acquiring company and where appropriate the 
cash  adjustment,  as  the  second  characteristic 
effect of the merger. 
Paragraph 1 
Transfer of  the capital 
94.  By the terms of Article 29, 'subject to the 
provisions  of  Article  31,  a  merger  shall  auto-
s.  13/73 matically entail the universal transfer,  both as 
between the company acquired and the whole 
of  the  capital (assets  and  liabilities)  of  the 
company acquired to the acquiring company'. 
Apart  from  the  'reservation'  in  Article  31, 
which will  be discussed further (see  para.  100 
below), the main characteristics of the juridical 
regime governing the transfer of the capital as 
formulated in the text here are as follows: 
(a)  The transfer is universal in the sense that it 
relates to the whole of the capital of the com-
pany acquired regarded as  a  'juridical whole'. 
Thus it does not arise out of the juxtaposition of 
separate and distinct acts relative to the various 
components of the capital but is  carried out in 
a single lapse of time and by a single legal act 
(uno  actu),  namely  the  merger  itself.  This 
being so, it would not have been  necessary in 
stricit  logic  to specify  that a  merger  involves 
the tranfer of the capital (assets and liabilities); 
but as  in the case of the definition as  such of a 
merger  by  acquisition (Article  4:  see  para.  25 
above), it was felt to be preferable in practice to 
do so, first of all  owing to the danger of con-
fusing  the notion of  a  company's capital with 
that of its assets, and more especially, because of 
the  oddity,  vis-a-vis  the laws  of  most  of  the 
States  Members,  of  the  notion  of  transfer 
of liabilities without the consent of the creditors. 
(b)  In fact, this is  one of the consequences of 
the mechanism of the transfer of the capital: it 
operates  automatically,  i.e.  by  the  direct  and 
exclusive effect of the merger itself, without the 
necessity  for  any  separate  legal  act  by  the 
companies  in  question,  with  or  without  the 
intervention of third parties, or for any formal-
ity additional to those required by the merger. 
(c)  Thirdly, tranfer of the capital takes place in 
accordance  with  the  machinery  thus  defined, 
both  between  the  companies  merging  and  in 
respect of third parties.  By  the mere effect of 
the merger, the capital of the company acquired 
actually  merges,  erga  omnes~ into that of  the 
acquiring company.  It must merely be recalled 
here  that  the  merger  may  only  be  invoked 
against third parties by virtue of disclosure, the 
legal regime  of which is  determined in respect 
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of  each  of the  companies  in  question  by the 
law applicable to it (Article 27 and 28: see para. 
87 et seq. above).  This means that theacquiring 
company can only avail itself of the transfer of 
the capital vis-a-vis  third  parties  through this 
disclosure,  and in  such  kindred  conditions  as 
are determined by the applicable law, but this 
does not touch the substance of the law, and it 
must be pointed out also that subject to Article 
31, invoking the transfer of the capital against 
third  parties  depends  precisely  on  the  mere 
disclosure of the merger itself, i.e.  on the single 
legal act of which it is the effect. 
95.  It has already been said that the universal 
transfer  of  the  capital  embraces  that  of  the 
contracts  by  which  the  company  acquired 
was bound at the time of the merger.  Article 
30,  para. 1 (first sentence)  expressly states this 
consequence in respect of employment contracts. 
Since all that is involved is  the application of a 
general  principle,  this  provision  might  be 
thought  superfluous;  but  it  constitutes  the 
starting  point  of  special  protective  measures 
which  are  the  essential  object  of  Article  30, 
so that if only for the sake of clarity its insertion 
in  the  Convention  would  be  justified.  But 
there is  also a substantive reason: perhaps it is 
better  to  emphasize  expressly  that  a  merger 
does not in itself constitute a reason for breaking 
employment contracts in spite of the changes it 
produces in the legal  status of  business  which 
depended on the  company  acquired  and their 
staff, and can produce in their activities. 
96.  It  is  nevertheless  true  that  the  mere 
transfer  of  the  employment  contract,  i.e.  the 
individual agreement between the employee and 
tha company acquired is  not sufficient to solve 
completely,  even from a  strictly legal  point of 
view, the problems which a merger can raise in 
the  relations  between  the  acquiring  company 
and the  employees  of  the company  acquired. 
In  the  first  place,  employment  contracts  are 
governed  by  a  law  which  determines  their 
interpretation,  conditions  their  validity,  and 
pinpoints, indeed rounds off their effects.  No 
doubt this is  true of any contract; but under a 
rule  of  private  international  law  which  IS 
71 fairly  generally  followed,  the  individual  con-
tract of employment is subject to the law of the 
country  where  the  employee  works.  But  as 
a result of a merger, an employee may be called 
upon to work in  a  country other than that in 
which he was employed before the merger took 
place,  and  irrespective  of  direct  safeguards 
provided in Article 30  where the move is  not 
accepted  by  the  employee  (see  para.  98;  (b) 
and (c) below); the question could reasonably be 
asked whether this change of country of employ-
ment should or should not produce a change in 
the  law  governing  current  contracts.  After 
much argument, the experts abandoned the idea 
of  settling  this  question  as  being  too  c:losely 
bound up with the whole subject of international 
social legislation for an 'incidental' solution to 
be  found  for  it  in  a  convention  relating  to 
· mergers.  This  means  that  employment  con-
tracts passed on to the acquiring company will 
be  governed  by  the  law  applicable  to  them 
under the rules of private international law of the 
forum  and  incidentally,  the  Commission's 
representatives  reminded  the  experts  that  the 
Commission had embarked on the task of pre-
paring  the coordination  of  these  rules  in  the 
Member-States of the Communities.  The con-
tract of employment is also frequently concluded 
as part of a collective employment agreement to 
which it merely contributes certain adjustments 
in the individual relations between employer and 
employee.  Moreover, when there is a collective 
agreement,  people  talk  rather  of  employment 
relations than of an employment contract, and 
the  individual's  choice  in  many  instances  is 
limited to acceptance by the employee of work 
offered  by  the  employer.  In  fact,  it  is  very 
difficult to say whether and how far a collective 
agreement can be implemented beyond national 
frontiers.  This question has been inadequately 
explored,  and  the  answer  would  in  any  case 
vary from country to country.  Consequently, 
it  would  make  still  less  sense  to  try  to  cope 
with it in the Convention. 
97.  In spite of this change in  the 'juridical 
climate'  of the individual  contract of employ-
ment-indeed the  danger  of  its  partial  disap-
pearance-the transfer of the contract neverthe-
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less has significant consequences.  Not only is it 
an obstacle,  as  has  already been said,  preven-
ting the merger from being systematically used 
as  a  pretext  for  an  employee's  dismissal  or 
resignation,  but  it  means  that  insofar  as  the 
mutual obligations of the parties depend on the 
contract, they will  be  determined  by it.  This 
will  be  true,  for  example,  of  the level  of  pay 
and  any  additional  perquisites  in  kind,  the 
nature of the work done by the employee, the 
undertakings he has given in regard to loyalty, 
trade  secrets  or competition.  It may  also  be 
true  of  the  length  of  annual  leave  (except 
for observance  of  the  minimum prescribed by 
the law governing the contract); and with the 
same reservation, it may be true of  the length 
of notice required to terminate the contract and 
the  amount of  termination pay, if  these  ques-
tions are regulated in the individual contract of 
employment,  or even  in the collective employ-
ment agreement if under the law of the forum 
the  judge  should  find  that  the  individual 
contract  of  employment  incorporates  the  rel-
evant clauses of the collective agreement. 
In any event, these are obviously only isolated 
examples, since as  must once again be stressed, 
the question whether employment relations are 
a matter for the individual contract, the collec-
tive agreement or the relevant law will in each 
instance be a matter for the judge and the law of 
the  forum.  But  they  would  appear  to  be 
sufficient to illustrate the practical significance 
of  the transfer  to  the  acquiring  company  of 
employment  contracts  binding  upon the com-
pany acquired. 
98.  Quite apart from this implementation of 
the principle laid down in Article 29, Article 30 
C?l_ltains  a  number  of  special  safeguard  pro-
VISions. 
(a)  In  his  relations  with  the  acquiring  com-
pany, the employee keeps  the seniority he has 
reached in the service of the company acquired 
(Article  30,  para. 1,  second sentence).  It was 
useful  to state this  expressly,  since in spite of 
the  transfer  of  the  contract  it  was  not  self-
evident,  in  view  of  the  change  of  employer. 
Seniority  after  all  often  has  important  side-
s.  13/73 effects,  e.g. in relation to the amount of salary 
and allowances due in the event of termination 
of  the  contract or the length  of  notice  to  be 
given for termination of employment.  If these 
effects  are specified  by the contract,  its  terms 
will be applied; if  not, the effects will be deter-
mined  by  the  law  applicable  to  the  contract 
(Article 30, para. 1, in fine),  this being left,  in 
accordance  with  the  general  method  outlined 
above, to the rule of private international law 
of the judge of the forum. 
(b)  A  merger  may  cause  the  acquiring  com-
pany, as has already been said, to transfer to the 
country  of  its  registered  office  or  to  a  third 
country, places  of business which came under 
the company acquired and were located in the 
country of its  registered office or in a country 
other than that to which they  are transferred. 
In  this  event,  the  acquiring  company  will 
frequently offer all or a portion of  the staff of 
these establishments the opportunity to continue 
to work in them in the country where they are 
newly installed. 
This is from the human point of view one of the 
most serious consequences that can arise out of 
a  merger,  and is  particulary  marked  in inter-
national mergers.  It is  not enough to ague, in 
order to minimize its effects, that the Communi-
ty  is  bound to  become  a  territorial  economic 
unit; this does not dispose of the psychological 
and moral factors underlying the lack of man-
power  mobility  which  after  all  apply  even 
within one and the same country, as we know. 
It must therefore be assumed that in many cases 
an  employee  will  refuse  to  leave  his  home 
country, and that his refusal will result either in 
dismissal by the employer or resignation of his 
own  accord.  Para.  2  of  Article  30  therefore 
provides  that if  dismissal  or resignation  takes 
place  in  virtue  of  the  law  applicable  to  the 
contract  of  employment  prior to  the  merger, 
the contract is  regarded as  having been  termi-
nated on the initiative of the employer, and the 
employee will therefore be entitled to whatever 
compensation payable where termination is  so 
caused, as laid down in the contract and in the 
law governing it under private international law 
of the forum.  This compensation will of course 
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only be payable if the dismissal or resignation 
actually  takes  place,  otherwise  there  is  no 
termination of the contract; but the Convention, 
departing from its usual procedure here so as to 
provide more complete protection for the em-
ployee, specifies that it is  the law applicable to 
the  contract  prior  to  the  merger  that  must 
determine whether the contract is terminated or 
not.  This is  not a contingent rule of law, but 
rather a territorial rule  of conflict.  Consider-
ation will  be  given  to the whole  of  the  legal 
system proper to the contract with the company 
acquired and the choice among its  provisions, 
chronologically successive and possibly different, 
will depend on the rules of the forum relative to 
conflicts  in  relation  to  time  in  private  inter-
national law. 
(c)  Para.  3 of Article 30,  however supersedes 
para. 2 in cases where the employee has under-
taken  under  his  contract of employment with 
the company acquired in the country where he is 
being asked to work, unless this undertaking is 
rendered ineffective in virtue of the law gover-
ning  employment  contracts-this  again,  in 
acordance with the general  method, being  t.he 
law applicable in virtue of the rule of private 
international law of the forum. 
(d)  Finally, para. 4 of Article 30 declares that 
para. 2 is  likewise applicable where the merger 
entails  substantial  changes  in  the contract  of 
employment other than transfer of the place of 
work  from  one  country  to  another.  The 
experts decided against listing these substantial 
changes  on  the  grounds  that  the  list  would 
have been either incomplete or unduly long, or 
both.  Possible  examples  worth  citing  are 
changes in the nature of the employee's work or 
salary cuts. 
Para.  4  does  not  refer  to  para.  3,  since  it is 
virtually inconceivable that an employee would 
accept in advance any substantial change in his 
contract.  In  any  event,  if such  a  clause  did 
arise, it would not rule out the application of 
para. 2. 
99.  The  text  of  Article  30  analysed  above 
was the outcome of long and arduous  discus-
sions,  and it represented the common denomi-
73 nator where the delegations  were  able  to find 
common  ground,  at  least  technically.  The 
delegations of Belgium and Luxembourg never-
thelessfinally opposed maintaining it in the Con-
vention, not of course for lack of interest in the 
protection of employees in the event of an inter-
national  merger,  but on the  contrary  because 
they  felt,  as  the  Belgian  delegation  in  partic-
ular  strongly  emphasized  on  more  than  one 
occasion,  that  such  protection  should  be  far 
broader,  both in  scope  and in  content.  It is 
after all  necessary  in all  international concen-
trations of undertakings, including those brought 
about otherwise than  by  merger,  and it  must 
safeguard employees  against the  whole  gamut 
of  adverse  effects,  physical  or  human,  which 
such  operations  can  have  on  them.  For 
this  reason,  the  Commission  of  the European 
Communities  has  initiated  studies  in  this 
sphere, as  described in Joint Decleration No 1 
attached  to  the  Convention (see  para.  175  et 
seq. below); but the delegations of Belgium and 
Luxembourg felt precisely that by inserting into 
the Convention a text limited in scope there was 
a  danger  of  prejudging  the  over-all  solutions 
which these studies might produce. 
On the other hand, the rest of the delegations 
felt  that it would  be better,  by  subscribing to 
Article 30,  to  rescue at one the little that had 
been achieved at the cost of patient efforts.  In 
fact,  the  Italian  delegation  not  only  did  not 
oppose the insertion of the text in the Conven-
tion,  but  considered  that  it  should  be  sup-
plemented by other concrete measures of protec-
tion (see  the  footnote  to  Article  30);  but this 
proposal  did  not  find  favour  with  the  other 
delegations,  although the need for comprehen-
sive  protection  was  recognized  by  all  and 
affirmed in Joint Declaration No 1 (see para. 175 
et seq. below). 
100.  Likewise important, but strictly technical 
in  character,  is  the  final  adjustment  made  in 
the Convention (Article  31)  to the principle of 
universal  transfer.  Here  the  text  provides 
(para.  1)  that 'if the law applicable to certain 
assets brought in the company acquired requires 
special formalities  in  the  event of  a  merger  to 
enable the transfer to be invoked against third 
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parties, then such formalities shall be carried out 
in accordance with and their effects  as  well  as 
the  consequences  of  non-compliance  shall  be 
determined by-the said law'.  What the experts 
had in mind here, for example, were immovable 
property,  long-term leases,  stock-in-trade, and 
industrial property rights.  But the very variety 
of the laws  of the  Contracting States  led  the 
experts  to  avoid  any  enumeration,  the  rule 
being one of pure conflict of laws in regard to 
the  assets  concerned, the formalities  required, 
the sanctions applied  and the effect produced. 
On the other hand, it should be stressed that the 
requirements  of  such  formalities,  left  to  the 
laws of the Contracting States, can only affect 
invoking against third parties the transfer of the 
assets  to which they relate, whereas in respect 
both of these assets  and of all  the other com-
ponents of the capital of the company required, 
transfer as such takes place automatically, i.e. by 
the  very  fact  of  the  merger (Article  29:  see 
para.  91  et  seq.  above).  It is  also  laid down 
(Article 31, para. 2)  that the acquiring company 
may itself carry out the formalities envisaged in 
para. 1.  This precaution is vital to prevent the 
disappearance of the company, and any negli-
gence  on  the  part  of  its  former  organs  of 
management, from  making the transfer of  the 
assets in question against third persons impos-
sibles on this same point (see Article 27, para. 3, 
para. 94, (b) above). 
It  was  also  pointed  out in  the  course  of  the 
discussion of the text that the national law still 
had  the  option  of  applying,  in  the  event  of 
transfer of certain assets as a result of a merger, 
formalities other than those designed to make it 
possible to invoke such transfer as against third 
parties (e.g.  entry in a land register); but in no 
instance can formalities condition the automatic 
transfer of the capital of the company acquired 
by virtue of the merger itself. 
Paragraph 2 
Issue  o£  shares  and cash  adjustments 
101 .  In virtue of Article 32, the issue of shares, 
as  well  as  that of  share certificates,  must  be 
s.  13/73 made  in  accordance  with  the  provlSlons  on 
merg.ers  of the law  applicable to the company 
acqmred.  If  the  merger  plan  itself  contains 
provisions to this effect, these will be followed 
insofar as they are compatible with the law tlm~ 
specified. 
Section 8 
Liability  and nullity 
102.  A merger is the culmination of a series of 
a~ts which may involve irregularities in respect 
either  of  the  Convention itself,  if  it regulates 
them directly, or of the national laws, when the 
Convention refers  to them.  In strict logic  all 
such  irregularities,  or  at  any  rate  the  more 
serious ones, could render the act affected, and 
consequently, the  merger itself,  void.  But  we 
kn<;>w  that  generall~ speaking nullity  has very 
senous  drawbacks  m  company  matters  which 
~ave  led most of the national legislatures to keep 
1ts  causes  and  effects  down  to  a  minimum. 
The limitations adopted are coordinated in the 
le~isla!ions  of  the  Contracting  States  by  the 
Directive of 9 March 1968.  What is  likely  to 
have still more serious consequences is nullity of 
a merger, since this threatens an industrial and 
financial  regrouping  which it is  impossible  to 
u~scramble without causing serious harm; and 
thts would apply with even greater force to an 
international merger, which will almost invariab-
ly involve very substantial interests. 
103 . . ~or  !his  reason  the  Convention,  by 
c.ombmmg,  m  acc?rdance with its  usual  prac-
tice, rules of conflict and substantive rules, has 
devised a  legal regime to govern nullity  which 
takes  these  factors  into  account.  In  estab-
lishing this regime, the delegations had in mind 
both the  Directive  of  9  March  1968  and  the 
draft  directive  on domestic  mergers,  and they 
also took heed of the lesson to be learned from 
the limits which the authors of the latter found 
in the matter of coordination. 
104.  But  whether  or  not  they  culminate  in 
nullity,  irregularities  affecting  a  merger  can 
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cause harm to the companies involved, to their 
shareholders, and to third parties.  Thus liabil-
ities  may  be  incurred,  and  these  too  are  not 
disregarded in the Convention. 
Furthermore-as  was  realized,  for  example, 
when the  draft  directive  on domestic  mergers 
was  being  prepared1-sanctions  other  than 
nullity and third party liability can be incurred 
for  irregularities  arising  out  of  mergers;  and 
these  too  are taken  into  account in the Con-
vention. 
1  OS .  In the section  below we  shall look first 
(para.  1)  at  liability,  which  is  dealt  with  in 
Article 33, at the head of Section 8 of the Conven-
tion; we shall then go on (para. 2)  to discuss all 
the questions concerned with nullity (Articles 34, 
35 and 37 to 39, para. 2)  and finally (in para. 3) 
we  shall  consider  Article  36,  relating  to  civil 
sanctions other than nullity. 
Paragraph 1 
Liability 
10~.  Article  .33  provides  that  any  'liability 
which _may  be mcurred by reason of the merger 
operatiOns shall be governed, in respect of each 
of !h~ merging companies by the law applicable 
to It m the event of a merger.'  This is a rule of 
conflict, since it was clear from the outset that 
the Convention could not embark on a type of 
the  syst:ms  of  third  party  liability  in  the 
Contractmg  States  that  was  limited  to  one 
particular area. 
107.  It  may  be  noted,  moreover  that  if 
Articles  16  and  17  of  the  draft  dir~ctive  on 
domestic  mergers  were  adopted  as  at present 
worded,  the  legislations  of  the  Contracting 
States  would  have  to  institute  third  party 
liability  in  respect  of  the  members  of  the 
management  and  supervisory  organs  of  the 
company acquired and of the experts appointed 
1  The  draft  directive  requires  the  Member  States  to 
arrange for this type of sanctions (Article 18, para. 2). 
75 to prepare the report on the merger plan on its 
behalf in accordance with the principles or for 
the  purpose of  these  two  articles  respectively. 
But article 33  of the Convention is  deliberately 
couched in much more general terms, not only 
because  in  the  case  of  internal  mergers  these 
provisions are for the moment only proposals, 
but also because the national legislations can or 
could  impose  other  types  of  liability (on  the 
organs or experts of the acquiring company for 
example),  or liability peculiar  to international 
mergers.  It  was  therefore  deemed  advisable 
merely to give a blanket reference, for each of the 
companies merging, to the law applicable to it in 
the  event  of  a  merger.  This  means,  here  as 
everywhere else,  the prospective law on inter-
national  mergers,  or  failing  this,  the  rules 
governing  liability  incurred  in  the  event  of  a 
domestic merger, it being further specified that 
as in the case of all rules of conflict, 'law' signifies 
law  of  any  kind,  including  jurisprudence  as 
such. 
Whether  disputes  relating  to  liability  are 
regarded  as  coming  under  the  Ia w  of  the 
acquiring  company  or  that  of  the  company 
acquired will no doubt raise difficulties such as 
arise  constantly  in  private  international  law. 
These will have to be disposed of in each indi-
vidual  instance  by  the  judge  of  the forum,  in 
accordance with the particular system used for 
settling conflicts of laws. 
Paragraph 2 
Nullity 
108.  As  has  been  said,  the charge  of  irregu-
larity for which the sanction may involve nullity 
may  be  made  in  respect  of  the  various  acts 
concurring  to  bring  about  a  merger.  But 
nullity  of  the  whole  merger  itself  can  result. 
The Convention deals separately with these two 
aspects of the problem of nullity. 
A.  - Nullity in respect of the acts leading to a merger 
109.  Article 34  specifies  that 'the conditions 
for and the effects of nullity of the acts leading to 
the merger shall be  governed in respect of each 
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of the merging companies by the law applicable 
to it in  the event of  merger'.  Here again  we 
have a rule of conflict; the Convention had no 
call  to  become  involved,  except  to  stipulate 
that beyond a  certain date it cannot challenge 
the  validity  of  the  merger  itself  on  grounds 
other  than  those  accepted  by  the  Convention 
itself (Article  35:  see  para.  111  et seq.  below). 
This explains the expression: 'Without prejudice 
to  the  provisions  of  Article  35 ... '  used  at the 
beginning of Article 34. 
110.  Apart from that, this provision calls for 
little special comment.  It will be noted merely 
that the expression 'acts leading to the merger' 
is  a  all-embracing  as  possible.  It covers  both 
preparatory  acts,  such  as  the  merger  plan, 
disclosure  and  deposit  of  the plan,  reports  of 
company organs or of  experts,  and communi-
cation of these documents, and the acts crystal-
lizing  the  merger (e.g.  the  deliberations  of 
general meetings and the subsequent merger con-
tract).  But obviously each individual national 
legislation  must  decide  which  of  these  'acts' 
can  be  annulled.  Where  they  have·  to  do 
exclusively with one of the companies (e.g.  the 
reports  of  company  organs  or  experts,  and 
general meetings), nullity of these instruments is 
governed by the law applicable to that company 
in  the  event  of  a  merger (international,  or 
failing  this,  domestic).  Where  the  acts  are 
indivisible, as  in the case of a merger plan, or a 
merger contract, nullity could be pronounced by 
the presiding  judge,  by  joint or several  appli-
cation  of  the  laws  of  the  two  companies,  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  of  his  own 
system of coping with conflicts of laws. 
B.  - Nullity of the merger 
111 .  Article 35  circumscribes very closely the 
cases where nullity of a merger once completed 
can  be  established  or pronounced.  After  the 
date laid down in Article 26 (the date, as will be 
remembered, on which the merger takes effect: 
see para. 81  et seq. above), this can only occur 
'for lack of judicial or administrative control or 
certification in due legal form'; in other words, 
where neither of the steps  has  been taken that 
s.  13/73 are calculated almost invariably to prevent the 
merger if one or more of the acts required are 
found to be irregular.  Further still 'If in one of 
such  cases  the  law  governing  the  acquiring 
company excludes the nullity of the merger or 
subjects it to special conditions, such law shall 
be  applicable' (Article  35,  second  sentence). 
The rule  of conflict  only arises,  as  we  see,  to 
make the possible danger of nullity even  more 
remote; but it refers here exclusively to the law 
of the acquiring company, since it is  the latter 
that bears the main brunt of the action to annul 
the merger, and it runs the risk of being wound 
up and dissolved if  the nullity is  established or 
pronounced.  It  therefore  seemed  proper  to 
safeguard mergers against nullity not recognized 
by the law of the acquiring company, but not to 
admit this  exclusion  of  one  of  the  causes  of 
nullity if it were embodied in the law governing 
the company acquired.  It is self-evident, on the 
other hand, that the absence  of  control  or of 
certification  in  due legal  form (or  the  one  of 
these two causes  recognized  by the law of  the 
acquiring  company)  would  involve  nullity, 
whether caused by the acquiring company or by 
the company acquired. 
112.  Article  35  also  calls  for  the  following 
observations: 
(a)  It specifies that nullity may  not be  'estab-
lished  or  pronounced'  except  in  the  cases 
indicated, thus covering even the circumstances 
in  which,  under  the law applicable,  the judge 
does not decide that a merger is null but merely 
establishes nullity as  arising directly out of the 
law. 
(b)  Article  35-which  it  will  be  recalled  is 
referred to in Article 34 (see para. 109 above)-
rules  out  establishment  or  pronouncement  of 
nullity in respect of one of the acts leading to a 
merger after the date on which the merger takes 
effect.  To be more exact, it would be better to 
say that nullity could take place after that date, 
but it could not invalidate the merger.  How-
ever,  in  practice  this  is  inconceivable,  since  it 
would make the nullity of the isolated act mean-
ningless. 
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(c)  Finally, it was pointed out in the course of 
the deliberations  that the judicial  or adminis-
trative  control  in  default  of  which  nullity  is 
incurred  is  the  preventive  control  of  legality 
envisaged in Article 23, para. 1 (see para. 69  et 
seq. above; and for controls other than legality 
control, see Article 56, para. 149 et seq. below). 
113.  Even in the two sole cases admitted, the 
Convention  offers  yet  another  device  for 
avoiding  nullity,  a  device  known  to  certain 
national  legislations  in  the  case  of  nullity 
incurred by companies1 and likewise taken over 
for  domestic  mergers  by  the  draft  directive 
(Article 18, (d)).  Thus Article 37 provides that 
'nullity of the merger provided for in Article 35 
may  no  longer be established  or pronounced' 
(for this twofold stipulation, see para. 112, (a) 
above) 'where it is still possible to eliminate the 
cause thereof and where  regularization occurs 
within the time-limit fixed by the court'.  This 
implies  that the  court handling an  action for 
nullity  of  a  merger  to  which  the  Convention 
applies  must  set  a  time-limit  for  regularizing 
the  position;  but it  is  up  to  it  to  specify  the 
duration. 
114.  It will  be  noted on the other hand that 
where it can  occur,  and failing  such  regulari-
zation  within  the  time-limit  set,  nullity  of  a 
merger  is  not  subject  to  the  possibility  of  a 
'return to the status  quo'.  This condition is, 
however,  embodied  in  the  draft  directive  on 
domestic  mergers (Article  18,  (b));  but even  if 
national  legislations  have  already  adopted  it 
or  should  do  so  in  the  future  for  internal 
mergers,  it  could  not  be  extended  to  inter-
national  mergers  under the Convention,  since 
the latter determines the cases and conditions in 
which nullity of a merger can be established or 
pronounced on the  basis  of substantive rules, 
without the  additional  intervention  of  a  rule 
of conflict. 
1  See,  for example,  for  France:  Law  of  24  July,  1966, 
Article  363.  For  Germany:  formation  of  companies, 
cf.  AktG., paragraph 275, 2 and 276. 
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annulment may no longer be brought after the 
expiry of a period of six months from the date 
on which the merger may be invoked against the 
party seeking the annulment'.  Thus a  rule of 
procedure here limits the risks of nullity of the 
merger (on  this  same  point,  in  respect  of 
internal mergers, see the draft directive, Article 
18,(c)). 
The date from which the period of six months is 
reckoned will vary according as  the action for 
annulment is based on the failure of control or of 
certification in due legal form in respect of one 
or other of the companies in question, since for 
each  of  them  the  merger  may  be  invoked 
against  third  parties  in  accordance  with  the 
conditions laid down  by  the law governing it 
(Article 28: see para. 90 et seq. above). 
116.  Article  39  stipulates  disclosure  of  the 
decision establishing or pronouncing nullity in 
the  States  where  the  companies  which  have 
merged had their seat (para. 1), and in regard to 
the arrangements to be made for this disclosure 
and its effects, it cites the provisions of the law 
of  each  of  the  companies  relating  to  the  in-
voking of statutory amendments  against third 
parties (para.  2).  In para.  3,  it specifies  that 
opposition by third parties, when allowed by the 
law of the State where the decision was taken, 
shall no longer be receivable after the expiry of a 
period of six months reckoned from the com-
pletion of the disclosure formalities envisaged in 
the previous paragraphs (in this connexion, see 
Article 12, para. 1 of the Directive of 9 March 
1968  for  nullity  applied  to  companies,  and 
Article 18, para 1, (e)  of the draft directive for 
domestic mergers). 
The interpretation of these provisions does not 
seem likely to raise any difficulty.  It is  hardly 
necessary  to  point out, in  particular,  that  by 
envisaging an action for annulment (Article 38) 
and by prescribing disclosure of the decision, the 
Convention implies  that nullity  of  the merger 
can in fact only be established or pronounced by 
means  of  a  decision.  This  is  an  implicit 
substantive rule, in keeping moreover with the 
state of the law of the six contracting countries 
78 
which would be reinforced, if that were neces-
sary, in respect of domestic mergers (Article 18, 
para. 1, (a)).  Conversely, it is obvious that the 
Convention merely  specifies  the time-limit for 
third party opposition, and does  not prescribe 
regular  resort  to  this  practice,  which  in  any 
case  depends  for  its  existance  and  its  legal 
regime  on  the  law  of  the  State  where  the 
decision is taken.1 
117.  The decision establishing or pronouncing 
nullity of the merger will clearly produce effects. 
It is hardly conceivable, in particular, that it will 
not in one way or another influence what hap-
pens to the acquiring company and possibly the 
company  acquired (e.g.  either  the former  will 
be wound up or dissolved or if it is still feasible, 
the company acquired will be reconstituted and 
recover its capital, the acquiring company then 
reverting to its previous status).  But it was not 
the purpose of the Convention to regulate these 
effects,  which  will  be  determined  by  the  law 
applicable  in  accordance  with  the  private 
international law of the judge handling the case. 
On the other hand, for the protection of third 
parties,  it  was  essential  to  safeguard  any 
obligations which might arise for the acquiring 
company  during  the  period  after  the  merger 
has  become  effective.  This  is  catered  for  in 
Article 40. 
118.  Article  40  states  in  paragraph  1  that 
'the  decision  establishing  or  pronouncing  the 
nullity  of  the  merger  shall not of  itself  affect 
the  validity  of  the  commitments  entered  into 
by  the  acquiring  company  or  those  assumed 
towards  it  prior  to the  disclosure  referred  in 
Article 39'. 
The  term  'commitments'  here  must  be  taken 
to mean all obligations arising for the acquiring 
company, whatever the source (contract, quasi-
contract,  tort,  or  any  other).  At  the  same 
time, it is  obvious that the text refers  only to 
obligations  arising  subsequent to the  date  on · 
which the merger takes effect, as laid down in 
1  It may  be  recalled  here  that German law makes  no 
provision for this type of action. 
s.  13/73 Article  26  (see  para.  81  et  seq.  above)  and 
including those arising  between  that date and 
the  date  when  the  merger  can  be  invoked 
against  the creditors  (Article  28:  see  para.  90 
et  seq.  above),  at  any  rate  if  under  the  law 
applicable,  third  parties  are  entitled  to  avail 
themselves  of the  merger  even  before  it  may 
be invoked against them (see  para. 90  above). 
Furthermore,  the  obligations  in  question  are 
the ones arising before the decision establishing 
or pronouncing nullity  of the  merger  may  be 
invoked against the creditors, in accordance with 
the national law envisaged in Article 39, para. 2 
-see para. 116 above-and implicitly referred 
to in Article 40, para. 1. 
119.  To strengthen creditor protection, para-
graph 2  of Article  40  provides  that 'the com-
panies which have taken part in the merger shall 
bear joint and several liability for the commit-
ments of the acquiring company referred to in 
the previous paragraph'.  The text here would 
be  effectively  implemented  where  nullity  of 
the merger did not involve the winding up and 
the  dissolution  of  the  acquiring  company 
(since in this case it is  the capital of the latter, 
incorporating  that  of  the  company  acquired, 
that would incur liability for the commitments 
in question) but reconstitution of the companies 
which had merged. 
Paragraph 3 
Civil  sanctions  other than nullity 
120.  The provisions on nullity just discussed 
will  undoubtedly  have  the  effect  of  making 
cases  where  it  is  effectively  established  or 
pronounced quite exceptional.  While this aim 
is  desirable  in  view  of  the  drawbacks  of  in-
validating. an international merger  once it has 
taken place, the conclusion must not be drawn 
that  short  of  nullity,  irregularities  affecting 
merger  operations  will  escape  with impunity; 
if that were so they would be likely to proliferate 
to  the detriment  of the legitimate  interests  of 
the members and of third parties. 
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The  liability  incurred  by  those  causing  such 
irregularities  is  of  course  already  a  sanction 
additional to nullity, and it can arise even when 
nullity  can  no  longer  be  established  or  pro-
nounced.  But  as  may  be  well  imagined,  in 
addition to liability, national laws provide other 
measures  involving sanctions  or compensation 
Some of these measures may be civil.  Examples 
would  be-as  was  pointed  out  by  Professor 
van  Ommerslaghe  in  his  report  on  the  draft 
directive  on domestic  mergers-an adjustment 
of  the  share  exchange  terms,  or  compulsory 
repurchase  of  the  shares  of  the  minority  by 
the majority. 
121 .  Article  36  provides  for  such  sanctions, 
which could arise if nullity of the merger could 
no longer be established or pronounced but for 
the determination of such sanctions it stipulates 
in principle the law applicable to the acquiring 
company  in  the  event  of  a  merger.  This  is 
justified  by  the  fact  that  in  practice,  and 
precisely because nullity of the merger is  out of 
the question, it is in the acquiring company that 
such  sanctions  could  be  applied.  But  the 
Article  adds that where the action designed to 
impose such sanctions is  brought by the share-
holders, the creditors, or the co-contractors of 
the company acquired, these sanctions shall  be 
determined by the law of the company acquired 
relating  to  mergers.  In  fact,  it  may  be  felt 
that  the  persons  envisaged  will  have  quite 
rightly counted on being protected by that law. 
122.  Article  36  calls  for  two  further  obser-
vations: 
(a)  Although it refers in very general terms to 
civil sanctions, it is not concerned with liability, 
which is  dealt with in Article 33  (see  para. 106 
et seq.  above).  In fact,  the latter  is  a  special 
case  taking  precedence  within  this  orbit  over 
the  general  rule  of  Article  36  (specialia 
generalibus derogant).  In practice, this  means 
that  liability  would  be  regulated  by  the  law 
governing the company against which the action 
is  brought,  or  the  company  with  which  the 
acts laid against the individual defending such 
action  are  linked.  For  example,  the  liability 
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be  governed  by  the  latter's  law,  that  of  the 
expert  by  the  law  of  the  company  to  which 
he  was  appointed.  In  all  these  cases,  ob-
viously,  the law in question is  that applicable 
in the event of a merger. 
(b)  Article  36  relates  only to  civil  sanctions, 
but  this  does  not  prevent  the  Contracting 
States  from  applying  penal  or  administrative 
sanctions in the event of irregularity in merger 
operations.  Such  sanctions  naturally  come 
under the law of each State, and will be applied 
by the  authorities  just as  they  will  not apply 
those of the law of another State;  and they can 
perfectly well be applied, if the law from which 
they  derive  so  decides,  even  where the nullity 
of the merger can be established or pronounced 
in virtue of the Convention.  But the Conven-
tion had n·o  call to become involved here, even 
by  crystallizing  the  principles  just  recalled  in 
a text. 
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Chapter  III 
Merger  by formation  of a  new company 
123.  Like  Chapter II  relating to  mergers  by 
acquisition,  Chapter  III  of  the  Convention, 
dealing  with  mergers  by  formation  of  a  new 
company,  begins  with  a  definition  of  this 
operation (Section 1),  borrowing with virtually 
no  substantive  change  the  wording  of  the 
corresponding section at the head of Chapter IL 
Once this had been done, it was not necessary 
to repeat, for  mergers  by  formation of a  new 
company, all the provisions relating to mergers 
by acquisition, since it was found that most of 
these  provisions  would  apply  to  this  second 
type  of  merger  as  they  stood,  subject  to 
adaptation of the terminology and one or two 
very  slight  substantive  adjustments,  Section  2 
of  Chapter  III  sets  out  the  provisions  thus 
adapted and adjusted. 
However,  on  a  number  of points,  provisions 
peculair  to  mergers  by  formation  of  a  new 
company had to be devised.  These are grouped 
together in Section 3 of Chapter III. 
Section 1 
Definition of merger  by formation 
of  a  new company 
124.  Article 41  contains the actual definition 
of  merger  by  formation  of  a  new  company. 
The  characteristics  of  this  operation,  as  set 
forth  in  the  Article,  correspond  feature  for 
feature to those already seen in the definition 
of merger  by take-over in Article 4,  except of 
course that here two companies at least transfer 
their  capital  to  the  new  company  set  up  by 
them,  whereas  in  the  case  of  a  merger  by 
acquisition  of  the  enquiring  company  to 
which  the  transfer  is  made,  existed  prior  to 
the operation. 
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icle  41  to  the  observations  made  in  regard 
to  Article  4  (see  para.  25  above),  with  the 
additional point that the definition  of  merger 
by  formation  of  a  new  company  is  couched 
in virtually  identical terms  in  the  Convention 
and  in  the  draft  directive  on  draft  mergers 
(Article 2, para. 3). 
125.  Article  42  is  parallel  to  Article  5  (see 
para.  26  above).  It provides  in  para.  1  that 
the provisions relating to mergers by formation 
of a  new company shall likewise  apply where 
one of the companies holds  all  or part of  the 
shares  of  the  other.  Para.  2  takes  over  and 
simply  adapts  to  cover  this  operation-which 
does  not involve  one acquiring company, and 
one  company  acquired,  but  two  or  more 
companies  which  disappear  to  form  a  new 
company-the provisions of Article 5, paras. 2, 
(a)  and  (b)  on the  application  of  Articles  11 
and  12  in the event  of  one  of  the  companies 
merging  being  the  holder  of  all  the  shares 
in another. 
It  was  felt  that  in  international  relations, 
mergers  by  formation  of  a  new  company 
could  be  of interest  and could  therefore  find 
themselves  in  this  situation.  Such  would  be 
the case, for example, if the organs of manage-
ment  of  the  parent  company  considered  it 
worth while  (e.g.  for tax reasons)  to establish 
the  registered  office  of  the  company,  after 
merging  with  its  subsidiary  in  a  country 
other than that in which  the registered  office 
of  either  was  located.  For  this  it  would  be 
necessary,  if  the  merger  was  by  acquisition, 
subsequently  to  transfer  the  registered  office 
of  the  acquiring  company  to  the  country 
selected.  In  the  present  state  of  the  general 
and  contract  law  of  the  Contracting  States, 
international  transfer  of  the  registered  office 
of  a  company  in  this  way  would  meet  with 
obstacles  in  many  cases  insurmountable;  and 
even  if the  obstacles  were  to  disappear  one 
day by virtue of a  convention on the transfer 
of  the  registered  office  of  a  company  from 
country  to  country-for  which  negotiations 
are  envisaged  likewise  in  Article  220  of  the 
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Treaty  of  Rome-a  merger  by  acqulSltion 
followed by transfer of the company's registered 
office  would  be  more  complicated  than  the 
direct  formation  of  a  new  company  in  the 
country  where  companies  merging  with  that 
end  in  view  would  like  to  establish  their 
registered  office.  These  difficulties  do  not 
arise  within  one  and  the  same country,  since 
there is no particular obstacle to the transfer of 
registered offices.  This is  the reason why the 
case  was  not considered in the draft directive 
on domestic mergers. 
126.  In the same way  (in  contrast with what 
is laid down in Article 5, para. 2, first sentence, 
in  respect  of  mergers  by  acquisition  of  a 
subsidiary  by the parent company holding  all 
its  shares),  Article  42  does  not  rule  out  the 
application  of  Article  8,  para.  1,  (b)  and (c). 
These,  it  will  be  remembered,  are  texts  pre-
cribing  that  the  merger  plan  shall  mention 
the share exchange  terms,  the amount of  any 
cash  adjustment,  the  arrangements  for  allot-
ment of the shares  of the acquiring company, 
and the date on which the shares give  entitle-
ment  to  participate  in  profits.  As  was 
explained  above  (para.  31),  in  the  event  of  a 
merger  by  acquisition,  these  points  did  not 
need to be mentioned in the merger plan where 
the  acquiring  company  was  the  holder  of  all 
the  shares  in  the company  acquired,  since  in 
that  case  there  would  be  no  shareholders 
outside the acquiring company to be protected 
by  means  of this information.  The acquiring 
company  being  the  only  shareholder  in  the 
company  acquired  would  allocate  to itself  its 
own  shares,  created  in  lieu  of  the  capital 
contributed by the company acquired. 
The  situation  is  different  in  the  case  of  a 
merger  by  formation  of  a  new  company, 
since in this case it is  the latter's shares which 
will  be  distributed to the  shareholders  of  the 
companies  which  cease  to  exist,  including 
the  shareholders  of  the  company  holding  all 
the  shares  in  the  other,  or  another.  Con-
sequently,  these  shareholders  are  entitled  to 
receive the particulars which are to be mentioned 
pursuant to Article 8, para. 1, (b) and (c). 
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(see  para.  27  above),  but the reference to the 
law  of  the  company  acquired  to  allow  the 
merger  to  take  place  when  the  latter  is  in 
liquidation is  in  this  case  necessarily  replaced 
by a reference to the respective laws applicable. 
It should be emphasized that the pertinent law 
is  in  each  instance  that  of  the  company  in 
liquidation.  If  this  allows  for  mergers,  it 
makes  little  difference  whether  the  law  of 
another company  which  is  not in  liquidation 
forbids  mergers  in  the  case  of  companies  in 
liquidation. 
Section 2 
Provisions  relating  to  mergers  by  acqulSltton 
applicable  to mergers  by formation 
of a  new company 
128.  Article  44  para.  1  lists  the  prov1s1ons 
of  Chapter  II  which  apply  to  mergers  by 
formation  of  a  new  company.  It  does  not 
refer  to  Articles  1  and  2  dealing  with  the 
.  field  of  application  of  the  Convention  as  a 
whole  (see  para.  11  et  seq.  above)  and  at 
present  common  to  the  two  types  of  merger 
mentioned in Article 3 (see para. 22 above). 
For the application  of  the provisions  relative 
to mergers by acquisition to mergers by forma-
tion of a  new company, the terms 'companies 
merging'  or 'company acquired'  designate  the 
companies which  cease  to exist,  and the term 
'acquiring company' refers to the new company, 
the point being that it is  only  the companies 
ceasing  to exist  which  'merge',  since  the  new 
company will  only come into existence by the 
effect of the merger.  Similarly, the companies 
which cease to exist are wound up and transfer 
their capital, whereas the new company receives 
it,  so  that  both  the  former  and  the  latter 
are  respectively  in  parallel  legal  situations  to 
that of the company acquired and the acquiring 
company. 
129.  The essential  om1sswns  in  the  enumer-
ation in Article 44 are first of all the provisions 
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in Chapter II, Section 1 (Articles 4 to 6:  defin-
ition  of  merger  by  acquisition  and  Section  8 
liability and nullity).  The former,  as  we have 
seen, are taken over and adapted in Chapter III 
by Articles 41 to 43  (see para. 124 et seq. above); 
the latter could not be adapted as  they stand 
to  cover  the  type  of  merger  envisaged  in 
Chapter III, for the very  good reason that this 
type involves the formation of a new company, 
and in the main, liability and nullity are handled 
at the level of this new company. 
Nor do the following appear in the enumeration: 
- Article  21,  (b)  (see  para.  63  above)  and 
Article  14,  para.  1,  (b)  (see  para.  73  above), 
since  both these  Articles  presuppose the  exis-
tence of an acquiring company, but the control 
of  the  merger  plan  prescribed  in  Article  24, 
para.  1,  (b)  in  the  acquiring  company  must 
take  place  here  in  each  of  the  companies 
disappearing whose law provides for preventive 
control of legality; 
- Article  25,  which  specifies  in  the  event 
of  a  merger  by  acquisition  the  chronological 
order  of  control,  or  control  and  notarial 
certification, since  in the mergers  governed by 
Chapter III  control or certification by  notarial 
act of the formation of the new company must 
necessarily come last, so that the chronological 
order  of  the  formalities  in  the  companies 
which cease to exist does not matter; 
- Article 26 (date on which the merger takes 
effect:  see  para.  81  et seq.  above),  Articles  27 
and  28  (disclosure  and  invoking  the  merger 
against  third  parties-see  para.  87  et  seq. 
above), since the formation of a new company 
necessitates  special  provisions  in  respect  of 
these  matters  (Articles  47 to 49;  see para. 135 
et seq. below). 
It  is  further  stipulated,  in  a  footnote  to 
Article  44,  para.  1,  that  the  enumeration 
will  have to be  completed in  the  light of  the 
texts inserted in Chapter II, Section 5 (question 
of participation: see para. 67 above). 
Various adjustments are also made to some of 
the provisions relating to mergers by acquisition 
s.  13173 applicable to  mergers  by  formation  of  a  new 
company. 
(a)  Article 8,  para. 1, (a)  is  equally applicable 
to the  new company  (Article  44,  para.  2}.  It 
is  the  A!ticle  that  prescribes  that  the  merger 
plan  shall  mention  the  name,  legal  form  and 
registered  office  of  companies  merging,  and 
it obviously had to be specified that in the case 
of Chapter III  these particulars would be given 
not only for the companies ceasing to exist but 
for the new company as well. 
(b)  Similarly, for the application of Article 9, 
(which  mentions  among  the  annexes  which 
must mandatorily accompany the merger plan 
the  Statutes  of  the  companies  merging:  see 
para. 32  et seq.  above)  and Articles  14 and 15 
(which  require  the  deposit  of  the  statutes 
together  with  the  merger  plan  and  communi-
cation of these to all  shareholders: see para. 42 
et  seq.  above),  the  draft  statutes  of  the  new 
company  are  attached  to  the  statutes  of  the 
companies merging (Article 44, para. 3).  This 
document  is  necessary  to  provide  complete 
information for shareholders and third parties. 
(c)  Finally,  Article  44,  para.  4  provides  that 
for  the  application  of  Article  19  (relating  to 
the  'a  posteriori'  protection  of  creditors:  see 
para.  57  above)  the  reference  to  Article  27 
(relating to disclosure of mergers by acquisition: 
see  para.  87  et  seq.  above)  is  replaced  by  a 
reference to Article 48, the Article dealing with 
disclosure in the case of mergers  by formation 
of a new company (see para. 136 below). 
Section 3 
Special  provisions 
130.  These  provisions  relate  to  the  merger 
plan and the draft statutes of the new company 
(para.  1);  the formation  of the new  company 
(para.  2);  the date on which the merger takes 
effect  and  disclosure  of  the  merger  (para.  3); 
and  liability  and  nullity  (para.  4).  Mention 
will also be made of certain provisions discussed 
in  the  course  of  the  deliberations  but finally 
discarded (para. 5). 
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Paragraph 1 
The  merger  plan  and draft statutes 
of the new  company 
131.  As  we  know,  Articles  7  to  10,  relating 
to  the  merger  plan  and  its  annexes,  and 
Articles  14  and  15,  concerning  deposit  and 
communication  of  these  instruments,  are  ap-
plicable  in  virtue  of  Article  44  to  mergers  by 
formation  of  a  new  company.  The  same 
applies  to  Article  16,  concerning  approval  of 
the  merger  by  the  general  meetings  of  the 
companies  merging,  the  post-merger  contract, 
and  action  by  shareholders  having  special 
rights  and  holders  of  securities  other  than 
shares  (see  para. 45  et seq.  above). 
But in the case of Chapter III, these provisions 
had to be supplemented to take account of the 
establishment of  a new company.  This is  the 
object of Article 45. 
132.  Paragraph  1  of  the  Article  provides 
that 'the merger plan or the draft statutes of the 
new  company  shall  state  the  names  of  the 
members  of  the  organs  of  the  new  company 
whose appointment according to the law of the 
country  of  the  registered  office  of  such 
company is  to be divided either by the general 
meeting  or  the  companies  which  themselves 
cease to exist'. 
This  means  that  the  appointment  of  the 
members of the organs of the new company will 
be  subject  to , the  approval  of  the  general 
meetings  of each  of  the companies ceasing to 
exist (Article 45, para. 2, see para. 133  below). 
It is  specified that the particulars  must appear 
either  in  the  merger  or  in  the  draft  statutes 
since  one  or  other  of  these  alternatives  is 
adopted for domestic mergers by the laws of the 
Member States.  On  the other hand the members 
whose  names  must  thus  be  mentioned  (and 
hence  whose  appointment  is  subject  to  the 
approval specified) are those who under the law 
of  the  country  where  the  new  company 
establishes its registered office must be appointed 
either by the general meeting of that company or 
by  the  companies  which  cease  to  exist. 
83 Deliberate  use  was  made,  in  expressing  this 
second alternative, of the very general formula 
'appointment  ... is to be divided by the companies 
which themselves cease to exist  ... ', so as not to 
prejudge the provisions  of the  applicable  law 
which  determine  which  of  the  organs  of  a 
company  ceasing  to  exist  must  make  the 
appointments. 
133.  Article  45,  para.  2  stipulates  that  'the 
merger plan and the draft statutes of the new 
company  shall  be  approved  by  the  general 
meetings of each of the companies which cease 
to exist'. 
Inasmuch  as  it  stipulates  approval  of  the 
merger plan this Article is parallel to Article 16, 
para.  1  (see  para. 45  et seq.  above),  which is 
already referred to in Article 44  (see  para. 128 
above),  and  which  stipulates  that  a  merger 
(by  acquisition)  requires  the  approval  of  the 
general  meetings  of  each  of  the  companies 
merging.  But in  this  case  it was  desirable  to 
stipulate in addition the approval of the draft 
statutes  of  the  new  company,  since  this  is 
formed by the companies which cease to exist 
(Article  41:  see  para.  124  above,  and  on the 
same point in the case of domestic mergers, the 
draft directive, Article 19, para. 2). 
Paragraph 2 
Formation of  the  new  company 
134.  Apart  from  the  substantive  rule  in 
Article  45,  para.  2,  which  prescribes  the 
approval of the statutes by the general meetings 
of the companies which cease to exist, Article 46 
specifies in all matters concerning the formation 
of the new company and the disclosure thereof 
the provisions of the law of the country of its 
registered  office  relating  to  the  formation  of 
companies  arising  out of  a  merger,  or failing 
such  provisions,  the  general  law  governing 
company  formation.  The  final  part  of  the 
Article takes account of those legislations which 
have  no  rules  governing  the  formation  of 
companies as  a result of mergers. 
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Paragraph 3 
Date  on  which  the  merger  takes  effect 
and disclosure  of  the merger 
135.  The principle  determining  the  date  on 
which the merger takes effect is  the same here 
as  in  the  case  of  a  merger  by  acquisition. 
The date is that on which all the documents and 
formalities  required  for  the  crystallization  of 
the merger have been completed (see  para. 83 
above).  But  whereas  for  a  merger  by  acqui-
sition the application of this principle results in 
different  dates  according  as  the  merger  is 
subject  to  legality  control in  both companies 
or only in one of them,  and bearing in  mind 
also  the  post-merger  contract  (Article  26: 
see  para.  81  et seq.  above)  it was found pos-
sible to avoid these distinctions in the case  of 
mergers  by  formation  of  a  new  company. 
Here the  merger is  not entirely effective  until 
the new company comes into existence in law, 
since the formation of the company is  the final 
step  in  the  merg(':r  as  such,  as  defined  in 
Article  41  (see  para.  124  above).  In practice, 
on  the  other  hand  the  discussions  revealed 
that in all the Contracting States, whether they 
belong to the judicial or administrative control 
system  or to that of notarial certification, the 
new  company  only  acquires  legal  personality 
after all  the documents  and all the formalities 
required for the merger to take effect have been 
completed. 
In this situation, Article 47 states a very simple 
uniform rule: the merger takes effect on the date 
on  which  the  new  company  acquires  legal 
personality. 
136.  Articles  48  and  49  embody  provlSlons 
in  respect  of  disclosure  of  the  merger  and 
invoking it against third parties very similar to 
those  for  mergers  by  acquisition  we  saw  in 
Articles 27 and 28  (see para. 87 et seq. above). 
(a)  Under Article 48, para. 1, the arrangements 
for disclosure of the merger are determined in 
respect  of  each  of the companies which cease 
to  exist  by  the  law  applicable  to  it  (see 
s.  13/73 disclosure  of  the  formation  of  the  new 
company, which as we have seen is  dealt with 
in Article 46 (see  para. 134 above). 
But as in the case of mergers by acquisition it is 
specified  {Article  48,  para.  2)  by  means  of  a 
substantive  rule  supplementing  the  rule  of 
conflict that disclosure shall include mention of 
the place and date where the disclosure formal-
ities  laid  down in  Articles  13  and  14  were 
carried out (publication of the merger plan and 
deposit of the plan and certain of its  annexes 
-see Article  27,  para.  2).  This  stipulation 
extends to disclosure of the new company, since 
those taking cognizance  of  the  merger  in  the 
country of the new company must know where 
they  can  obtain  the  information  on  the 
subject. 
Finally,  like  the  acqmnng  company  under 
Article 27, para. 3 (see  para. 89  above)  and for 
the same reasons, the new company can itself 
carry out the disclosure formalities  relating to 
the companies which cease to exist (Article 48, 
para. 3). 
(b)  Article  49  regulates  the  invoking  of 
mergers against third parties in the same way as 
Article  28  does  in  respect  of  mergers  by 
acquisition  (see  para.  90  above).  The  legal 
provisions for determining the conditions sub-
ject  to  which  this  can  take  place  are  those 
governing  each of the companies  which cease 
to exist,  as  well of course as  those of the Ia w 
governing  the  new  company.  Hence  there 
will be several dates on which the merger may 
be  relied  on  or  against  third  parties.  The 
reasons  why  this  arrangement  was  finally 
preferred  to  that  of  a  single  date  were 
explained above in connexion with mergers by 
acquisition. 
It should  also  be  noted  that  like  Article  28, 
Article  49  is  subject  to  the  application  of 
Article  31,  concerning  the  special  formalities 
required  by  the  law  governing  certain  assets, 
as regards invoking their transfer against third 
parties (see  para. 100 above). 
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Paragraph 4 
Liability  and  nullity 
137.  Article 50, concerning liability, is  strictly 
parallel  to  Article  33  relating  to  the  same 
subject  in  the  case  of  mergers  by  acquisition 
(see  para.  106  et  seq.  above).  It indicates  in 
respect  of  each  of  the  companies  ceasing  to 
exist the law applicable to it in the event of a 
merger,  and  for  the  new  company  the  law 
applicable in the event  of  the formation  of  a 
company  in  the  country  of  its  registered 
office. 
138.  Similarly,  Article  51,  on nullity  of  acts 
leading  to  a  merger,  is  parallel  to  Article  34 
(see  para.  109  et  seq.  above).  For  the  con-
ditions and effects of such nullity it indicates the 
law applicable in the event of a merger to each 
of the companies which cease to exist. 
However, Article 51  does  not adopt the reser-
vation in regard to Article 34, which as  will be 
remembered limits  the grounds on which  nul-
lity  of  a  merger  by  acquisition  may  be 
established  or  pronounced  after  the  date  on 
which the merger takes effect (see  para. 111  et 
seq. above).  But the question of nullity of the 
merger  does  not strictly  arise  here;  nullity  in 
this case is  closely  connected with that of the 
new  company,  so  that  Article  52  makes  the 
former subordinate to the latter (see  para. 140 
below).  But it was not necessary in Article 51 
to  make a  reservation  in  respect  of  the appli-
cation of Article 35, for the simple reason that its 
effect is to make nullity of acts leading up to the 
merger  insufficient to  cause the nullity  of the 
merger; this could only be  at best a secondary 
consequence brought about by nullity incurred 
by the new company. 
139.  Nullity of the new company is governed, 
in accordance with Article 52,  para. 1,  by the 
law applicable in the event  of  formation of a 
company in the country of its registered office. 
The  term  'nullity'  here  is  comprehensive:  it 
refers  to the causes  of nullity  (a  complete list 
85 of these  is  given  in Article  11,  para. 2  of the 
Directive  of  9  March  1968;  but  it  should  be 
pointed out that the Member States of the EEC 
had the option of not accepting, and that some 
of them in fact did not accept, all the causes of 
nullity thus 'authorized'), to the requirement of 
a  judicial  decision  to  pronounce  nullity,  and 
to  the invoking  of this  decision  against  third 
parties and the effects  of nullity.  All  of these 
are  matters  on  which  the  legislations  of  the 
Contracting  States  have  been  or  will  be 
coordinated in implementation of the Directive 
of 9 March 1968. 
140.  Furthermore,  Article  52,  para.  2  stipu-
lates that nullity of a merger may not take place 
unless  there  is  nullity  of  the  new  company. 
We  have  indicated  above  the  impact  of  this 
provision  on  the  regulation  of  nullity  of  acts 
leading to a  merger (see  para.  138  above). 
Paragraph 5 
'Provisions  discarded 
141.  It was  envisaged  in  the  course  of  the 
discussions  that  two  provisions  might  be 
inserted  into  the  Convention  to  cater  for 
certain effects  of nullity pronounced in respect 
of  a  new  company set  up  by  way  of  merger: 
one  by  which  all  the  companies  which  had 
taken part in the merger would be responsible 
jointly  and  severally  with  their  capital  for 
commitments  underwritten  by  the  company 
born of the  merger;  and  the  other  by  which 
these companies would again take over, retro-
actively  and  automatically,  the  rights  and 
obligations transferred to the company wound 
up, except that the court  pronouncing nullity 
would determine how this  should be  done. 
But  is  was  found  that  in  this  way  the 
Convention  would  regulate  the  effects  of 
nullity in respect of a company, whereas under 
the law of the Contracting States, these effects 
should  be  determined  in  accordance  with  the 
Directive of 9 March 1968.  Indeed, Article 12, 
para.  3  of  the  Directive  lays  down  that 
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nullity  shall  not  affect  the  validity  of  any 
commitments  entered  into  by  or  with  the 
compi:my,  . which  means  that  national  legis-
lations could not provide that the company born 
of a merger could evade· honouring its commit-
ments  on  the  grounds  that  nullity  had  been 
pronounced  in  respect  of  it.  Such  commit-
ments must in fact be honoured in respect of the 
whole of the capital of the company, comprising 
all  the  assets  contributed  by  the  companies 
which have ceased to exist. 
With  regard  to  the  reconstitution  of  these 
companies,  apart from  the fact  that it  might 
seem  at  variance  with  the  principle  of  non-
retroactivity  of  nullity  pronounced  in  respect 
of  a  company,  the  essential  consequences  of 
which  are  mentioned  in  Article  12,  paras.  2 
and 3 of the Directive of 9 March 1968, it was 
estimated that this would more often than not 
meet  with considerable practical  difficulties. 
142.  The  outcome  of  all  this  is  that  by 
application of Article 52, para. 1 (see  para. 139 
above), the effects of nullity pronounced against 
a  company  born  of  a  merger  are  regulated 
exclusively  by  the  law  applicable  to  the  for-
mation  of  a  company  in  the  country  of  its 
registered  office.  In  practice,  these  effects 
should conform to the provisions of the Direc-
tive of 9 March 1968. 
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General  prov1s1ons 
14 3.  The general  provisions  deal  first  of  all 
with  judicial  or  administrative  decisions  and 
notarial  deeds  relating  to  mergers  (section  I), 
and secondly with the rules relating to control 
of  mergers  other  than  preventive  control  of 
legality  (section II).  After that details  will  be 
given  of  provisions  envisaged  in  the  course 
of  the  deliberations  but  finally  abandoned 
(section III). 
Section 1 
Judicial  and  administrative  decisions  -
Notarial Deeds 
Paragraph 1 
Recognition  of decisions 
144.  Under  Article  53,  decisions  taken  by 
the  judicial  or administrative  authorities  of  a 
Contracting State in the exercise of the preven-
tive control of legality laid down in Articles 23 
and  24  (see  para.  68  et  seq.  above)  are  rec-
ognized  in  the  other  Contracting  States  in 
accordance with the provisions of the Conven-
tion on Jurisdiction. 
It  was  felt  that  in  the  absence  of  such  a 
provision, doubts might have arisen in respect 
of the application  of the  Convention to such 
judgments,  or  some  of  them.  It  might  have 
been  true,  for  example,  of  judgments  by 
administrative  authorities;  furthermore,  the 
·designation  of  certain  authorities  (e.g.  the 
registrar  of  the  tribunal  de  commerce  in 
France)  as  judicial  or administrative  agencies 
might have been queried.  Similarly, even where 
it is  exercised  by  a  judge, as  in  Germany and 
Italy,  preventive  control  of  legality  involves 
acts (e.g.  authorization of entry in the register) 
whose status as 'judgments' within the meaning 
of Article 25  of the Convention on Jurisdiction 
is  open to question. 
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Article  53  forestalls  such  doubts,  whether 
justified or not.  The experts naturally assumed 
when they inserted the Article in the Conven-
tion  on  Mergers  that the  Convention  would 
not enter into force earlier than the Convention 
on Jurisdiction. 
Paragraph 2 
Power to draw up notarial  deeds 
145.  It will be recalled that in the absence of 
preventive control of legality bearing on all the 
acts  required  for  a  merger,  the  Convention 
prescribes certification in due legal form of the 
minutes  of the general  meetings  at which the 
merger  is  decided,  and  where  applicable,  the 
contract  subsequent  to  such  general  meetings 
(Article 23, para. 2:  see para. 68  et seq. above). 
It will also be recalled that by virtue of Article 7, 
para.  2  (see  para.  30  above)  the merger  plan 
must also be drawn up in due legal form if the 
law  of  one  of  the  companies  merging  so 
requires.  Mergers  coming  under the Conven-
tion  necessarily  involve  companies  belonging 
to  different  Contracting  States;  hence  it  was 
essential  to  provide  for  international  com-
petence to draw up such notarial deeds. 
146.  Such is the purpose of Article 54,  which 
first of all embodies (para. 1)  a point recognized 
in  private  international  law  in  all  the  Con-
tracting States by granting competence for this 
purpose  to  'persons  authorized  to  draw  up 
such acts in the territory of the State to whose 
laws  the  company  to  which  they  relate  is 
subject.  Thus in the event of a merger between 
a Belgian company and a Luxembourg company, 
the  number  of  the  general  meetings  of  each 
of the companies approving the merger will be 
drawn  up  by  Belgian  notaries  in  the  former 
case and by Luxembourg notaries in the latter. 
But there are notarial deeds relating to mergers 
which are not linked to one of the companies 
individually.  This  is  true  of  the merger  plan 
if it takes this form, and of the merger contract 
subsequent to the general meetings.  The case 
87 is  dealt  with  in  Article  54,  para.  2,  which 
states  that 'acts relating  to  several  companies 
jointly  may  be  drawn  up  by  the  persons 
authorized in  one of the States to whose laws 
such  are  respectively  subject'.  For  example, 
in  the  case  of  a  merger  between  a  Belgian 
company and an Italian company, the notarial 
deeds attesting the 'a posteriori' merger contract 
(which must be established in  accordance with 
Article 16, para. 2:  see para. 45  above)  may be 
handled  by  either  an  Italian  notary  or  a 
Belgian notary. 
147.  As  has been said, these provisions relate 
only  to  the  international  competence  of  the 
persons  called  upon  to  prepare  the  deeds 
envisaged  by  the  Convention.  They  are  not 
designed  to  regulate,  within  any  Contracting 
State,  the  way  in  which  the  competence  is 
granted  to  this  or  that  person  in  that  State 
qualified to prepare such acts, this being solely 
a matter for the domestic Ia w. 
Paragraph 3  of  Article  54  expressly  confirms 
this when it states that 'the national provisions 
relating to the  territorial  authority  of  persons 
instructed  to  prepare  notarial  deeds  shall  be 
respected'.  For  example,  Belgian  law  alone 
will  decide  whether the documents relating to 
a  merger involving  a  Belgian company having 
its  seat in Brussels  and a  company in another 
Contracting  State  must  be  drawn  up  by  a 
notary  residing  in  Brussels  or may  be  drawn 
up equally well by any notary residing anywhere 
in  Belgium,  or  only  by  certain  such  notaries. 
Similarly, each country has  the right to decide 
whether  or not to  allow  its  notaries  to  draw 
up  instruments  abroad  and  to  allow  foreign 
notaries to do the  same  within its  territory. 
Paragraph 3 
Waiver  of  authentication 
148.  Following  the  example  of  The  Hague 
Convention  of  5  October  1961  waiving  the 
requirement of authentication of foreign public 
documents,  and the Convention of Brussels  of 
27  September  1968  (Articles  49  and  50,  third 
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paragraph),  Article  55  waives  authentication 
and all  other similar formalities  in  respect  of 
'notarial deeds' and documents of a judicial or 
administrative authority drawn up in connexion 
with a merger. 
The expression 'notarial deeds' here relates  to 
documents attested by a notary.  Furthermore, 
any  enumeration  of the  documents  for  which 
authentication  was  waived  was  studiously 
avoided.  The  very  comprehensive  wording 
of the Article covers  all instruments connected 
with  mergers,  including  those  which  the 
Convention  does  not  expressly  regulate  (e.g. 
attestation  by  a  notary to serve  as  proof that 
he has certified the legality of the merger oper-
ations, if  the law of  the company with which 
he is  concerned requires such a document). 
Similarly, the Article waives not merely authen-
tication but any other formality of the kind in 
respect  of  such  acts,  which  must  be  taken  to 
include  the  apostil  to The Hague Convention 
of  5  October  1961  and  any  other  formality 
whose  object  is  to  attest  the  regularity  or 
authenticity  of  the  instrument  or  merely  to 
certify physically the signature of its  author. 
Section 2 
Controls  other  than  preventive  control  of 
legality 
149.  In  the  Contracting  States,  mergers  are 
subject, or could in the future become subject, 
to controls laid down by law and even arising 
out of professional practice, other than preven-
tive  control of legality  of the merger  vis-a-vis 
company  law  as  it  exists  in  some  of  these 
States.  This type  of  control is  of course also 
additional  to  certification  of  the  legality  of 
the  merger  by  a  notary in those  States  where 
there  is  no  judicial  or  administrative  control 
for  this  purpose.  Such  as  for  example  (the 
list  does  not  pretend  to  be  exhaustive)  the 
control  exercised  in  Belgium  by  the  Banking 
Commission over the information given to the 
public  when  securities  created  by  the  merger 
are quoted on the stock exchange.  This control 
s.  13/73 is  exercised frequently,  but only de facto,  over 
the  reports  made  to  general  meetings  which 
have to decide on a  merger,  and it is  of great 
practical  efficacy,  even though it cannot have 
the effect either of arresting or of nullifying the 
merger.  Mention  may  also  be  made  of  the 
control  exercised  in  Germany  over  mergers, 
regarded  from  the  economic  point of view  of 
the  concentration  of  undertakings,  by  the 
cartels  authorities  (GWB  of  27  July  1957),  a 
device  which  may  well  develop  in  the  near 
future;  the same type of control which can be 
exercised in France in respect of certain mergers 
(for example if they appear as  the result of an 
abuse  of  dominant  positions),  in  virtue  of 
Article 59bis of the amended Order of 30 June 
1945, and control by the French Stock Exchange 
Operations  Commission  where  a  merger  in-
volves  a  company whose securities  are quoted 
on  the  stock  exchange;  the  requirement  in 
Italy of a  ministerial  authorization to increase 
the capital of the acquiring company the granting 
of which furnishes an opportunity for assessing 
the  economic  desirability  of  the  merger;  the 
control exercised in Luxembourg by the Banking 
Control Commissioner if there is offer or public 
sale of securities; and in the Netherlands, refusal 
of dealings in securities  by  the Association for 
Trade in Transferable Securities, which involves 
intervention by the Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
in the event of  failure  to observe the 'merger 
.  code'  set  up by  a  regulation  of  the Economic 
and Social Council (the Code contains measures 
for  the  protection  of  shareholders  and  em-
ployees). 
In ECSC, mergers only occur in practice for the 
time  being  between  undertakings  within  a 
single  Member  State,  but  where  they  involve 
coal or steel firms,  they are subject to control 
by  the Commission (ECSC  Treaty, Article 66). 
This  same  control  would  of  course  also  be 
exercised  in  regard  to  mergers  between  com-
panies  of  different  Member States.  Again,  as 
we  know, the EEC Commission exercises  con-
trol over concentrations affecting trade between 
Member States  where the operations  involved 
seem  to it to constitute an abuse of dominant 
positions  (see  the  Continental  Can  Company 
decision  of 9  December  1971:  OJ  No  L  7  of 
s.  13/73 
8  January  1972).  If the  Commission  should 
exercise  such  control  over  an  international 
merger, the Convention would not stand in the 
way. 
150.  Obviously in deciding in Article 23  that 
if  the  law  governing  one  of  the  companies 
merging  provides  for  preventive  control  of 
legality of the merger the provisions governing 
such control apply to that company (see para. 71 
above), the Convention was not ruling out the 
various  national  controls  other  than  legality 
control  (and  more  specifically,  here  again, 
other  than  legality  vis-a-vis  company  law) 
existing in the Contracting States-of which we 
have  just  given  several  examples.  Nor did it 
rule out any controls of that nature which may 
be  instituted  in  those  States  in  the  future. 
Nor again, of course, can exclusion result from 
Article  23,  para.  2,  which  prescribes,  in  the 
absence  of  such  control,  certification  in  due 
legal  form  of the  general  meetings  where  the 
merger  is  decided  and the merger  contract, if 
any, subsequent to those meetings (see  para. 71 
above). 
151.  But in  the  end it  seemed  preferable  to 
embody  this  in  a  text,  and  it  was  done  in 
Article 56,  which provides  (first  sentence)  that 
'the present Convention shall not affect national 
and Community merger control provisions other 
than  the  preventive  control  of  legality  laid 
down in Articles 23  and 24'.  These provisions 
will therefore be applied to a  merger governed 
by  the  Convention  as  to  any  other;  but  the 
second  sentence  of  Article  56  specifies-and 
this is  no doubt the main point of the Article-
that 'nullity of a  merger,  even  if  provided for 
by the law under which such control has taken 
place,  can be certified or pronounced only in 
accordance  with  Articles  35  and 52,  para.  2'. 
Nullity in such  circumstances,  if  provided for 
by,  say,  the law  of competition can  therefore 
not  take  place  in  the  case  of  a  merger  by 
acquisition after the date when this  has taken 
effect  (Article 35:  see  para. 111  et seq.  above;) 
and in the case  of a merger by formation of a 
new company,  unless  nullity is  pronounced in 
respect  of  this  company  itself  (Article  52, 
89 para. 2:  see para.  139  et seq.  above);  and this 
can not happen  in the  Contracting States,  as 
we know, outside the cases  exhaustively listed 
in  the Directive  of 9  March 1968  (Article  11, 
para. 2). 
152.  But  ruling  out  nullity  of  the  merger 
would  not  prevent  the  controls  envisaged  in 
Article  56 from  generating  other  sanctions  to 
be  determined and regulated  by the law insti-
tuting such controls.  To mention one or two 
examples  only:  third  party  liability  incurred 
by  those  attempting  to  evade  control  or  not 
obeying the orders  of  the authority exercising 
it;  fines  (e.g.  those laid down in Article 66 of 
the ECSC Treaty and Article  15  of Regulation 
No 17/62/EEC); transfers of shares or division 
of  assets  (ECSC  Treaty,  Article  66:  cf.  the 
Continental Can Company decision cited above 
para.  149),  provided  such  measures  do  not 
imply nullity of the merger in circumstances at 
variance with Articles 35 and 52, para. 2 of the 
Convention; penal sanctions, etc. 
Section 3 
General  provtstons  discarded 
153.  These  provisions  related  either  to  the 
conclusive  force  of  certified  acts  drawn  up in 
connexion  with  a  merger  (para.  1),  or  to 
public policy (para. 2). 
Paragraph 1 
Conclusive  force  of  certified  acts 
154.  Under the law of the various Contracting 
States,  excepting  that  of  Germany,  the  con-
clusive force of  a  certified  act cannot be  chal-
lenged in respect of the particulars entered by 
the notary in the instrument ex propriis sensibus, 
except through the forgery plea procedure. 
But  a  certified  act  relating  to  a  merger  may 
have  to  be  produced  to  the  authorities  in  a 
country  other than  that  where  it  was  drawn 
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up.  This would be  true, for example, of the 
post-merger  contract  required  by  the  law  of 
one of the companies but subject to control in 
the country of the other company (Article  24, 
para. 3, (a))  see para. 75  above).  How would 
the conclusive force of the act be treated in the 
host  country?  And  by  what  procedure  and 
before  what court could it be  challenged, for 
example if the challenge referred to particulars 
protected in the country of origin  by the plea 
of forgery requirement? 
155.  The experts agreed that conclusive force 
would  be  determined,  in  accordance  with  a 
rule of private international law followed very 
generally, by the law of  the country where the 
act  was  drawn up;  but it seemed  unnecessary 
to corroborate this in a text, for the very good 
reason that it arises under general law, which is 
virtually uniform on this point in the Contracting 
States. 
With  regard  to  the  plea  of forgery  (which  is 
necessary the moment the judge in the country 
where  the  act  is  produced  gives  it  the  con-
clusive  force  it  had  in  the country  of  origin, 
and  that  the  act  is  valid  in  that  country 
subject to  this  procedure), the feeling  of  most 
of the experts was that the plea should be made 
before  the  competent  court  in  -the  country 
where the act was drawn up.  But recourse to 
a  plea  of  forgery  seemed  too  exceptional  to 
warrant an explicit provision in the Convention. 
156.  It will  be  noted finally  that in the case 
of acts of judicial or administrative authorities 
relating to mergers,  the problem of conclusive 
force  does  not  appear  necessarily  to  arise, 
since it derives  from the recognition which as 
we  know must  be  granted to them  under the 
provisions of the Convention of 27  September 
1968  (Article 53:  see para. 144 above). 
Paragraph 2 
Public  policy 
157.  The  idea  had  been  mooted  in  the 
course  of the deliberations  of  inserting in  the 
s.  13/73 Convention  a  provlSlon  relating  to  public 
policy, closely based on Article 9,  para. 1, and 
Article  10  of the  Convention on Recognition. 
But here again it was found-as in the course 
of  the work  on  the formulation  of  the  latter 
Convention and the Convention on Jurisdiction 
Article  27,  para.  1  of  which  also  makes  a 
reservation  on grounds  of  public  policy-that 
such a  provision  would be  extremely  unusual 
in the relations between the Contracting States, 
whose  moral  concepts  and fundamental  prin-
ciples  of  laws  are  similar,  and  whose  laws  in 
relation to companies and mergers are likely to 
be  progressively coordinated.  Furthermore, it 
was pointed out that Article  1,  para. 2 of the 
Convention already referred in both its variants 
to  the  case  where  one  of  the  companies 
merging  was  not recognized  in  a  Contracting 
State, for example, pursuant to Article 9 of the 
Convention  of  29  February  1968  (i.e.  for 
reasons  of public policy within the framework 
of  that  Article)  and  the  consequences  were 
drawn  in  relation  to  mergers.  It  therefore 
seemed unnecessary to make an express reserva-
tion,  by  means  of  a  general  provision,  in 
respect  of public  policy,  since  it is  difficult  to 
imagine  what  other  practical  effects  there 
might be. 
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Chapter  V 
Interpretation  of  the  Convention 
by  the  Court  of  Justice 
of  the  European  Communities 
158.  The heed to ensure as far as  possible the 
uniform  interpretation  in  all  the  Contracting 
States  of  conventions  concluded  pursuant  to 
Article  220  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  had 
already been realized when work began on the 
Convention on Recognition and the Convention 
on Jurisdiction.  This uniformity of interpreta-
tion is  indeed  a  condition for the real  unifor-
mity  of  decisions  taken  in  virtue  of  the 
Conventions in  all the Contracting States,  and 
hence  for  their  effective  implementation. 
This  explains  why  joint  declarations  were 
annexed  to the first  two  Conventions  signed, 
by  which the Governments of the Contracting 
States  in  essence  declared themselves  ready  to 
examine the possibility  of avoiding  differences 
of interpretation by  granting jurisdiction to the 
Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Com-
munities, and to negotiate an agreement to this 
effect if  necessary. 
159.  Hence  two  protocols  were  signed  in 
Brussels  on 3  June 1971  concerning the inter-
pretation  by  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
Conventions of 29  February and 27 September 
1968  respectively  .1 
There are two  main  differences  between  these 
two agreements: 
(a)  Article  1  of  the  Protocol  concerning  the 
Convention on Recognition, like Article 177  of 
the Treaty of Rome, provides that courts in the 
Contracting  States  have  the  option  or  the 
obligation  to  bring  any  request  for  a  pre-
liminary  ruling  on  interpretation  before  the 
Court of  Justice,  according to  whether or not 
there  is  a  possibility  of  appeal  from  their 
decisions  under internal law; whereas Article 3 
1  Supplement 4/71-Bull. EC. 
91 of the Protocol concerning the Convention on 
Jurisdiction,  which  is  much  more  complex in 
its drafting, implies essentially that the right to 
request a ruling from the Court is not granted, 
unless  the  circumstances  are  exceptional,  to 
courts of first instance. 
(b)  Again,  Article  4  of  the  Protocol  con-
cerning the Convention on Jurisdiction provides 
for  a  request  for  a  ruling  on  interpretation 
which  the  competent  authority  in  a  Con-
tracting  State  may  make  of  the  Court  of 
Justice  along  the  lines  of  the  'pourvoi  dans 
l'interet de Ia loi' ('appeal in the interests of the 
law')  found  in  several  of  the  Contracting 
States.1 
160.  The  Articles  relating  to  interpretation 
by  the Court of Justice, which in this instance 
it  was  found  possible  to  incorporate  in  the 
Convention on Mergers too, are based on these 
two sources. 
(a)  After laying down in Article 57 the prin-
ciple  of  the  jurisdiction  ·of  the  Court  of 
Justice  of the Communities  to  decide  matters 
relating  to  its  interpretation,  the  Convention 
in Article 58  separates the jurisdiction between 
the  courts  which  must request this  interpreta-
tion and those which have the option of doing 
so,  in  the  same  way  as  Article  1  of  the 
Protocol concerning the Convention on Recog-
nition and Article 177 of the EEC Treaty.  The 
obligation  to  request . a  ruling  of  the  Court 
applies  only  to  courts  or  tribunals  in  Con-
tr(lcting  _  St(ltes  whose  decisions  cannot  be 
appealed  under  internal  law,  but  all  other 
courts have the option of so doing. 
There are two reasons explaining and justifying 
this differentiation.  First of all, the Convention 
on mergers  relates  to  companies,  as  does  the 
Convention  on  Recognition;  it  was  therefore 
natural that the former  should  take over  the 
latter's  procedure  in  regard  to  the  division 
between  courts  entitled  to  request  a  ruling  of 
the Court of Justice and courts required to do 
so.  Furthermore, the reason why the Protocol 
concerning  the  Convention  on  Jurisdiction 
grants  the option  of requesting  a  preliminary 
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ruling  on  interpretation  to  courts  of  appeal 
only  is  that it was felt  that disputes  over the 
recognition  and  implementation  of  decisions 
would be very frequent, so that the Court might 
well  have  been  swamped  by  an  unduly 
large number of requests for interpretation if the 
latter could have been made by  any court; on 
the  other hand there  is  little  to  be feared  in 
regard  to  the  Convention  on  International 
Mergers, since it is  unlikely that these  will· be 
very numerous. 
(b)  However, Article 60  takes  over in almost 
identical terms the provisions of Article 4 of the 
Protocol  concerning  the  interpretation  of  the 
Convention  on  Jurisdiction  which  has  no 
counterpart  in  the  other  Protocol.  Thus  we 
find  in  the  sphere  of  the  Convention  on 
Mergers  a  sort  of  'appeal in  the interests  of 
the law',  or more precisely,  a  type  of  appeal 
which  can  be made by  the Procureur General 
with  the  Courts  of  Cassation  of  the  Con-
tracting States,  or any other authorities  desig-
nated by a Contracting State (Article 60, para. 3),. 
to require the Court of Jmtice to give a ruling 
on a question of interpretation of the Conven-
tion,  if  the  judgment handed down by  courts 
in the State whose competent authorities make 
the appeal are at variance with the interpreta-
tion given either by the Court of Justice or by a 
court in another Contracting State  (subject  to 
difficulties,  to  which  we shall  refer  below,  in 
determining the courts of another Contracting 
State  whose  judgments  are subject  to  appeal: 
see para. 162, (c) below). 
This  procedure  is  not  designed  to  alter  the 
judgment to which it applies; hence paragraph 2 
of  Article  60  specifies  that  the  interpretation 
given by the Court of Justice following such a 
request shall have no effect on those judgments. 
It is  a  'supreme  appeal'  to  prevent  divergent 
interpretations from becoming crystallized, and 
1  See for example, in French law, the Law of 3 July 1967, 
journal Officiel de La  Republique fran(:aise  o£ 4 July 1967, 
Article  17;  D.  67-1210,  22  December  1967,  Journal 
Officiel de  la  Republique fran(:aise  o£ 30 December 1967, 
Article 20. 
s.  13173 it can only be made if duly argued decisions by 
national  courts  have  the  force  of  law  (Arti-
cle  60,  para.  1  in  fine);  otherwise,  the  court 
dealing  with  an  appeal  under  internal  law 
against  such  a  judgment  may  or  should, 
according  to  the  circumstances,  call  for  a 
preliminary ruling on interpretation. 
This same device of an 'appeal in the interests 
of the law' also explains paragraphs 4 and 5 of 
Article 60.  The former lays down a procedure 
by  which  any Contracting State,  or the  Com-
mission or the Council of the European Commu-
nities, may submit statements of case or written 
observations  to  the  Court  of  Justice;  under 
the  second,  the  procedure  may  not  involve 
either  the  levying  or  refund  of  costs  or 
expenses. 
161.  To round off the list of provisions under 
Chapter V,  we  need  only  mention Article 59, 
under which 'insofar as the present Convention 
does not provide otherwise, the provisions of the 
Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic 
Community and those of the annexed Protocol 
on the Statute of  the Court of  Justice  which 
are applicable where the Court is  called upon 
to give preliminary rulings, shall likewise apply 
to  the  interpretation  procedure  under  the 
present  Convention'.  The  wording  at  the 
beginning of the text is  explained by  the fact 
that the machinery for preliminary ruling con-
cerning  interpretation  here  does  not  derive 
from  Article  177  of the Treaty of  Rome  but 
from provisions in the Convention itself, which 
in fact are not identical, in particular in respect 
of  all  matters  relating  to  request  under 
Article 60,  these  being  unknown in EEC  law. 
Taking  these  differences  into  account,  Arti-
cle  59,  para.  2,  provides  moreover  that  'the 
rules of procedure of the Court of Justice shall 
be adapted  and supplemented  if  necessary  in 
accordance  with  Article  188  of  the  Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Economic  Com-
munity'. 
162.  It  remains  to  recall  reservations  or 
misgivings  which arose in connexion with the 
adoption of the wording of Chapter V. 
s.  13/73 
(a)  None of the delegations raised any objec-
tion to Articles 57, 58 and 59, i.e. to texts other 
than  that  instituting  appeals  similar  to  the 
'appeal  in  the  interests  of  law'.  But  the 
delegation of the Grand Duchy recalled that it 
had always  been and continued to be  anxious 
that  the  widest  possible  powers  to  rule  on 
interpretation should be conferred on the Court 
of  Justice  by  means  of  a  comprehensive 
convention  covering  the  interpretation  of  all 
the conventions concluded or to be concluded 
pursuant to Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome. 
(b)  The German delegation, while not opposing 
the insertion of  Article  60  in the Convention, 
reserved  the  right  to  revert  to  it  when  the 
matter came up  for  discussion in the Council, 
and emphasized that in any event its adoption 
should  not  prejudge  any  solution  that  might 
be found in future conventions. 
(c)  Lastly,  the  scope  of  request  under  Arti-
cle 60  gave rise to differences of opinion. 
The  delegations  agreed  unanimously  that  a 
request  would  in  any  event  be  in  order if  a 
judgment  handed  down  in  the  Contracting 
State whose  competent  authorities  lodged  the 
request was at variance with an interpretation 
given by the Court of Justice. 
But  beyond this,  under  one  system  (preferred 
by  the  French,  Luxembourg  and Netherlands 
delegations)  a  request  would  be  in  order  in 
the event of a disputed judgment of any court 
whatever  in  another  Contracting  State.  A 
second  more  restrictive  system  would  make 
this possible only if the challenge referred to the 
interpretation given by a court whose judgment 
were  not  subject  to  appeal  under  municipal 
law,  or an appeal court.  This second system 
(identical  with  that  of  the  Protocol  on  the 
interpretation  of  the  Convention  on  J urisdic-
tion)  is  favoured  by  the German, Belgian  and 
Italian  delegations;  while  the  Netherlands 
delegation, although indicating its preference for 
the first  system,  stated its  readiness  to fall  in 
with the decision of the majority. 
It  was  this  divergence  which  prompted  the 
wording  'referred  to  Article  58,  para.  2,  or 
93 which has decided on appeal'  gtven  m  square 
brackets in Article 60, para. 1. 
163.  The  concern  of  the  Contracting  States 
to ensure that the application of the Convention 
is as effective as possible likewise prompted the 
adoption  of  Joint  Declaration  No  2  (see 
para. 178 et seq.  below). 
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Chapter  VI 
Final  provisions 
164.  The final provisions relate to the follow-
ing questions: 
- Relationship  between  the  Convention  on 
the  one  hand  and  other  conventions  and  the 
rules  of  domestic law on the other (Section I); 
- Territorial  field  of  application  of  the 
Convention (Section II); 
- Ratifications  and entry into force (Section 
III); 
- Declarations provided for  in Article 21  of 
the Convention (Section IV); 
Deposit and notifications (Section V); 
Duration and revision (Section VI); 
Authentic texts (Section VII); 
On all these points the Convention follows very 
closely, with minor adaptations, the correspond-
ing  provisions  of  the  two  Conventions  con-
cluded  pursuant  to  Article  220  of  the  EEC 
Treaty  and  already  signed  and  in  the  course 
of  ratification (Convention  on  Recognition, 
Convention  on  Jurisdiction),  account  being 
taken in  some  instances  of  clarifications  fur-
nished by the Protocols of 3 June 1971 concern-
ing the interpretation of these conventions. 
Section 1 
Relationship  between  the  Convention,  other 
conventions  and the rules  of domestic  law 
165.  Under Article 61,  para. 1,  preference is 
given to the Convention in the event of discrep-
ancy  within  its  field  of  application  (i.e.  in 
respect of mergers of societes anonymes coming 
under  different  national  legislations),  between 
its provisions and those of other conventions to 
which the Contracting States are or may become 
parties. 
s.  13/73 However (Article  61,  para.  2)  the  Convention 
does  not  affect  such  provisions,  nor rules  of 
domestic law, present or future, which provide 
in  other instances  for the  possibility  of  inter-
national mergers.  In other words, the Contrac-
ting States  are at liberty,  through other inter-
national  commitments  or  in  virtue  of  their 
domestic law, to go further than the Convention, 
but may not restrict its scope. 
Such treaty provisions or rules of domestic law 
should  also  be  compatible  with  the  Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Economic  Commu-
nity.  This  means  that  neither  bilateral  con-
ventions  nor rules  of domestic law  may  allow 
companies belonging to certain Member States 
alone  the  possibility  of  merging  in  cases  not 
laid down in the Convention binding them all, 
since this would be at variance with the principle 
of non-discrimination between individuals  and 
legal  persons  nationals  of  those  States (EEC 
Treaty, Article 7). 
Section 2 
Territorial field  of application 
166.  According to Article 62,  the Convention 
'shall  apply  to  the  European  territory  of  the 
Contracting  States,  to  the  French  Overseas 
Departments  and  to  the  French  Overseas 
Territories'.  Furthermore the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands  may,  at  the  time  of  signing  or 
of  ratifying  the  present  Convention  or  at 
any time thereafter, by notice to the Secretary-
General of the Council of the European Com-
munities, declare that the . . .  Convention shall 
apply to Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles'. 
It will  be noted first  of all that this  wording, 
which is more concrete in respect of the Nether-
lands  than that in  the Convention  on Recog-
nition  (Article  12)  is  taken verbatim from  the 
Protocols of 3 June 1971  (Protocol concerning 
the interpretation of the Convention on Recog-
nition,  Article  4,  and  Protocol  concerning 
the interpretation of the Convention on Juris-
diction,  Article  6).  No  objection  could  be 
raised,  moreover,  to  its  introduction  into 
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the  Convention,  since  both  for  the  French 
Overseas  Territories  and for Surinam and the 
Netherlands  Antilles  the  French  and  Nether-
lands  delegations  had  declared  respectively 
during the deliberations leading to the conclu-
sion of the Convention on Recognition that the 
company law applied there is, and is to remain, 
identical with or substantially similar to that of 
the  European  territories  of  France  and  the 
Netherlands.  This means that as applied to the 
law  in  force  in  the  overseas  territories  and 
countries in question, the many references in the 
Convention  to  the  provisions  of  the  national 
legislations concerning mergers or amendments 
to  statutes  will  produce  virtually  identical 
results  with those  arising out of their applica-
tion  to the legislations  of  the European terri-
tories of those two States. 
Section 3 
Ratifications  and  entry  into force 
167.  Article 63  provides that the Convention 
shall  be  ratified by the signatory States.  The 
duty  of  depositary  of  the  instruments  of 
ratification  is  entrusted  to  the  Secretary-
General of  the Council of  the European Com-
munities,  since  the  Convention  is  after  all 
concluded within the framework  of  the Com-
munities. 
168.  According to Article 64, the Convention 
'shall  enter into force  on the first  day of the 
third month following the deposit of the instru-
ment of ratification by the last signatory State 
to undertake this formality'.  This means that 
before it can enter into force,  the Convention 
must  have  been  ratified  by  all  the  signatory 
States. 
Section 4 
Declarations  provided for  in  Article  21 
169.  It will be recalled that under Article 21 
(see  para.  63  et  seq.  above),  any  Contracting 
State may declare that: 
95 (a)  It will apply to creditors, whether deben-
ture  holders  or  otherwise,  only  Article  19 
(i.e.  a posteriori protection, as opposed to the a 
priori protection provided for in Article 18:  see 
para. 53 et seq. above); 
(b)  It will apply to creditors, whether deben-
ture holders or not, of the acquiring company 
where the latter is  subject to its law, the same 
provisions  as  to  creditors  of  the  company 
acquired. 
Article 65, para. 1, states that these declarations 
may  be  made on the date of  signature of the 
Convention  or  at  any  subsequent  date.  The 
possibility of making one or other declaration 
following signature of the Convention, and even 
after  its  entry  into  force,  certainly  presents 
drawbacks.  But they  are  minor,  since  as  we 
shall  see,  Article  66  provides (see  para.  171 
below)  that  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
European  Communities shall  notify  the  signa-
tory States, among others, of the declarations in 
question,  so that any State can  be  adequately 
informed in accordance with the provisions it 
lays  down.  This  information  should  give 
interested  persons  timely  warning,  for  while 
declarations made not later than at the time of 
deposit  of  the  instrument  of  ratification  take 
effect  on  the  day  of  entry  into  force  of  the 
Convention,  those  made  later  will  only  take 
effect on the first day of the third month follow-
ing receipt of that notification.  Lastly, in vir-
tue of Article 65, para. 3, declarations have no 
effect  on mergers  where  the  merger  plan  has 
been  disclosed  previously  in  accordance  with 
Article 13 (see para. 41  above).  In practice this 
provision  only  affects  declarations  made  after 
the  entry  into  force  of  the  Convention,  and 
prevents these from modifying the legal status of 
mergers, whether already completed or still in 
progress at the time when the declarations are 
made. 
In  view  of  these  precautions,  a  'last-minute' 
declaration  presents  little  danger,  and  the 
experts considered it useful to authorize this so 
as  to enable a  Contracting State which had in 
the first instance observed the general law of the 
Convention, i.e. protection both a priori and a 
posteriori  but confined to the creditors  of  the 
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company taken over, to revert in the light  of 
experience to merely a posteriori protection (in 
conformity with the domestic law of most of the 
Contracting States), or to extend protection to 
the creditors of the acquiring company (or both). 
170.  Conversely, and likewise for the sake of 
flexibility,  Article  65,  para. 2,  allows  any 
Contracting State to withdraw its declarations, 
or  one  of  them,  whether  made  prior to  the 
deposit of the instrument of ratification, at the 
time of deposit, or subsequently.  Like declara-
tions  made  subsequent  to  the  deposit  of  the 
instrument  of  ratification,  and  for  the  same 
reasons  of  publicity  and  security,  the  with-
drawal must be communicated to the Secretary-
General of the Council of the European Com-
munities, who must in turn bring it to the notice 
of the signatory States (Article 66, (c)): see para. 
171 below).  It takes effect only on the first day 
of  the  third  month  following  receipt  of  the 
notification (Article  65,  para.  2,  second  sub-
paragraph),  and  it  has  no  effect  on  mergers 
where  the· merger  plan  has  been  published 
previously (Article 65, para. 3). 
Lastly,  withdrawal  of  a  declaration  is  final 
(Article  65,  para.  2,  second  sub-paragraph  in 
fine).  It was decided that allow a declaration to 
be remade once it had been withdrawn, or even 
to allow it to be  withdrawn at a  later date  ... 
would have made the application of  the Con-
vention not so much flexible as  unwarrantably 
unstable. 
Sections 
Deposit and modifications 
171.  Under the terms of Article 69, the Con-
vention shall be deposited in the archives of the 
Secretariat  of  the  Council  of  the  European 
Communities,  and the  Secretary-General  shall 
transmit a certified true copy to the Government 
of each signatory State.  Furthermore,  Article 
66 instructs the Secretary-General to notify the 
signatory  States  of  the following  legal  instru-
ments  and  facts  of  which  they  have  to  be 
s.  13/73 informed  if  they  are  to  be  apprised  of  the 
applicability  of  the  Convention  and  of  any 
changes made in its application. 
(a)  The deposit of  every instrument of  ratifi-
cation; 
(b)  The date of entry into force of the Conven-
tion (Article 64: see para. 168 above); 
(c)  The declarations and notifications received 
in pursuance of Articles 21  (see para. 63  et seq. 
above), 62 (see para. 166 above) and 65 (see para. 
169 et seq. above); 
(d)  The  dates  when  these  declarations  and 
notifications  take  effect (established,  as  we 
know, in Article 65: see para. 169 et seq. above). 
Section 6 
Duration  and  revision 
172.  Article  67  states  that  the  Convention 
'is concluded for  an unlimited period', a stipu-
lation logically borrowed, in this Convention as 
in the previous ones (see  Convention on Recog-
nition,  Article  17;  Convention on Jurisdiction, 
Article  26;  and the Protocols  of  3  June  1971, 
Articles  8  and  12)  from  Article  240  of  the 
Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic 
Community. 
Consequentially,  Article  68  specifies  that  any 
Contracting State may request the revision of the 
Convention.  In  this  event,  a  revision  confer-
ence shall be convened by  the President of the 
Council of the European Communities (similar 
wording appears in the Convention on Recog-
nition, Article  18;  the Convention on Jurisdic-
tion,  Article  67;  and the Protocols  of 3  June 
1971, Articles 9 and 13). 
Section 7 
Authentic  texts 
173.  In virtue of Article 69,  the Convention is 
drawn  up  in  a  single  original,  in  the  Dutch, 
s.  13/73 
French, German and Italian languages, all four 
texts  being  equally  authentic (similar  wording 
appears  in  the  EEC  Treaty,  Article  248;  the 
Convention  on  Recognition,  Article  19;  the 
Convention on Jurisdiction, Article 68;  and the 
Protocol  of  3 June 1971,  Articles  10  and  14). 
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Joint  declarations 
174.  Three  joint  declarations  are  annexed 
to the Convention, the first for special reasons 
which will be  explained (see  para. 177 below). 
They are concerned respectively with: 
- The  protection  of  the  rights  of  workers 
(Section I); 
- The  exchange  of  information  concerning 
certain  decisions  taken  in  application  of  the 
Convention (Section II); 
- The tax treatment of international company 
mergers (Section III). 
Section 1 
Joint Declaration No  1 
(Protection  of  the  rights  of workers) 
175.  Comments were made (para. 95  et seq.) 
on Article 30  of the Convention, which makes 
the general principle of transfer of a company's 
capital  applicable to contracts  of employment 
binding  on  the  company  acquired  and  sup-
plements this by measures for the protection of 
employees, for example where they are offered 
work  in  a  country  other than that in  which 
they  were  employed  prior  to  the  merger,  or 
where  the  merger  involves  other  substantial 
changes  in  the  contract  of  employment.  But 
it was pointed out at the same time that although 
agreement,  at  any  rate  at the  technical  level, 
had only been reached in regard to this limited 
text,  all  the  delegations  were  perfectly  aware 
of  the  far  greater  social  problems  which 
mergers,  and  in  a  more  general  way,  inter-
national concentrations would bring about, and 
of  the  need  to  find  and  promote  over-all 
solutions to these  problems.  This  in fact  led 
two  delegations,  as  will  be  remembered,  to 
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oppose the insertion of  Article 30 in the Con-
vention (see para. 99  above). 
176.  With  this  in  mind,  the  experts  en-
deavoured  throughout the discussions  to find 
ways and means of expressing this concern and 
more  precisely  the  serious  concern  of  their 
Governments  for  the  social  aspects  of  inter-
national  mergers.  This is  the object of Joint 
Declaration No 1, which affirms the concern of 
the  Governments  for  the  protection  of  the 
rights  of  employees,  not  only  in  the  event 
of  international  mergers  of  companies  but in 
all  international  concentration  operations  of 
whatever  kind.  It  should  also  be  observed 
at once that as  far as  concentration operations 
other than  mergers  are  concerned,  protection 
under this  heading is  outside the scope of the 
Convention. 
The declaration also expresses the desire of the 
Governments to provide employees with effec-
tive  protection without prejudice to  any  more 
favourable  provisions  they  enjoy  in  virtue  of 
the  law  applicable  to  them.  The  idea  here 
was  to  reflect  the  concern  felt  by  several 
delegations  that since  international  agreement 
was only feasible in respect of certain protective 
measures,  their  adoption  might  seem  in  cases 
of  international  mergers  to prevail  over  more 
f<:1vourable  provisions made by national legisla-
tions.  In  view of that, the experts deliberately 
gave very full treatment to any more favourable 
provisions  which  workers would enjoy  'under 
the law applicable to them', without prejudice 
either to the title  of  that law  (which  may  be 
that of the individual contract of employment, 
the employment legislation mandatorily applic-
able,  a  collective  agreement,  or  any  other 
legal  system  under  the  body  of  rules  which 
the judge of  the forum  might feel  constrained 
to apply),  or its  source  (law,  regulation,  care 
law, or other). 
Lastly,  by this declaration the Governments of 
the signatory States 'note with satisfaction that 
the Commission of the European Communities 
has  decided  to  set  up'  (for  the protection  of 
employees)  'a  working  group  to  study  the 
questions  raised  in  this  area  by  international 
s.  Bn3 concentration  operations  with  a  view  to 
drawing  up  a  legal  unstrument  to  regulate 
these  matters.'  In  fact,  in  the  course  of  the 
deliberations the representative of the Director-
ate-General  of  the  internal  market  and  the 
approximation  of  laws  of  the  Commission 
informed the experts that this  working group 
had  been  set  up.  In  the  final  paragraph  of 
the  declaration,  the  Governments  would  be 
expressing their satisfaction at this decision, at 
the same  time implicitly renewing their hopes 
that  the  study  in  question  would  effectively 
extend,  as  was intended, to all forms  of inter-
national  concentration,  while  avoiding  pre-
judging  also  the  nature  of  whatever  legal 
instrument  (inter-State  convention,  Council 
regulation  or  directive)  which  might  be 
drawn up. 
177.  The  delegations  of  Belgium,  France, 
Italy  and  Luxembourg  approved  this  text 
(whereas  it  will  be  remembered  that the  del-
egations  of  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  were 
opposed to  the  insertion  of  Article  30  in  the 
Convention on the grounds that it was unduly 
narrow in scope).  The delegations of Germany 
and  Netherlands  opposed  it,  not  of  course 
because  they  did  not  share  the  unanimous 
concern  for  the  protection  of  the  rights  of 
workers,  but because they  considered that the 
initiative  taken  by  the  Cimmossion  made 
the  proposed  declaration  superfluous,  and 
that  the  Memeber  States  should  steer  clear 
of  any  involvement  in  the  future  outcome  of 
that  initiative  by  means  of  a  simple  wish 
expressed in a document with no immediate and 
direct legal force. 
Section 2 
Joint Declaration No 2 
(Exchange  of information) 
178.  The  Governments  of  the  signatory 
States,  adopting  the  essential  wording  of  the 
joint  declarations  attached  the  Protocol  con-
cerning  the  interpretation  of  the  Convention 
on  Recognition  and  the  Protocol  concerning 
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the interpretation of  the Convention on Juris-
diction respectively, expressed in Joint Declara-
tion No 2 their desire to ensure that the pro-
visions of the Convention are applied as  effec-
tively  and uniformly  as  possible  and  declared 
their readiness to organize to this end, in coop-
eration with the Court of Justice, an exchange of 
information on the decisions made in application 
of the Convention by the courts and tribunals 
mentioned  in  Article  58,  para.  2.  These  are 
of  course the national courts whose judgments 
do  not  admit  of  appeal  under  domestic  law 
and  which  are  therefore  required  to  ask  the 
Court  of  Justice  for  a  preliminary  ruling  on 
questions  of  interpretation  of  the  Convention 
(see para. 160 above). 
179.  There  is  not  need  to  dwell  on  the 
importance  of  this  exchange  of  information. 
In the  first  place,  there  is  no  guarantee  that 
a  national  supreme  court  will  at  all  times 
request  an  interpretation  of  the  Court  of 
Justice, either because it feels that the particular 
provision  is  perfectly  clear,  or  because  in 
its view the point has already been the subject 
of  an interpretation,  and all  that is  needed  is 
to  apply  it.  On  the  other  hand,  since  the 
interpretation  of  the  Court  of  Justice  is  by 
its  nature  abstract,  the  inferences  which  will 
be  drawn  from  it  by  national  courts  may 
involve  more  than  subtleties,  even  in  very 
similar  types  of  cases.  This  like  Article  177 
of  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  Article  58,  para.  2, 
of  the  Convention  does  not  entirely  dispose 
of this danger of different interpretations, even 
at  the  level  of  the  highest  national  courts. 
The  exchange  of  information  laid  down  in 
Joint  Declaration  No  2  will  draw  attention 
to  these  discrepancies,  and  will  thus  make 
a  very  useful  contribution to a  uniform inter-
pretation of the Convention. 
Section 3 
Joint Declaration No 3 
(Tax  treatment of international mergers) 
180.  When  they  began  their  work,  as  will 
be remembered (see  para. 8 above)  the experts 
99 considered  it  pointless  to  make  international 
mergers  legally  possible  unless  the  tax  ob-
stacles  existing  at  the  present  stage  of  the 
law  of  the  ~ontracting States  and  very  fre-
quently  makmg  mergers  virtually  impossible 
were removed at the same time.  But it was to 
be  remembered  that  in  view  of  their  limited 
terms  of reference,  they  had felt  it  preferable 
from  the outset to leave  it to the tax experts 
meeting  within  the  framework  of  the  Com-
mission  to  produce  the  draft  directive  which 
was  subsequently  to  be  submitted  to  the 
Council on 18 March 1969. 
181.  On  the  initiative  of  the  Italian  delega-
tion,  the  link  between  tax  problems  and  the 
legal  regulation  of  international  mergers  was 
again brought up in the final phase of the work. 
The  relative  slowness  of  the  Council  of  the 
Communities  to  adopt  the  draft  directive  on 
taxation  was  not  the  only  reason  for  this 
initiative.  The Italian delegation  made a  very 
thorough study of  all  the tax questions  which 
could  arise  out of international  mergers,  and 
expressed  the  opinion  that  unless  the  Com-
munity replied to these questions such mergers, 
although  legally  feasible  by  virtue  of  the 
Convention, might not always come about for 
e:cclusively  economic  reasons  of  an  objective 
kmd, but m order to enable companies belonging 
to  one country to  place  themselves  under the 
tax  regime  of  another  which  seemed  likely 
to  be  more  advantageous;  or  converselv 
there might be a 'flight' from mergers with  th~ 
co~panies  of  a  particular  country  because 
their consequences  seemed likely  to be  fiscally 
disadvantageous. 
With  this  in  mind,  the  Italian  delegation 
raised,  in  addition  to  the  question  of  the 
tax  treatment  of  international  mergers  as 
such, those of the taxation of company profits 
and  the  movement  of  transferable  securities 
indi~ating also  from  this  latter point of view: 
possible consequences of an obligatory nominal 
value of company shares. 
182.  Without  contesting  the  importance  of 
these  various  questions,  the  other  delegations 
felt  that their  solution  was  not  be  souo-ht  in 
b  ' 
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general, within the framework of the Conven-
tion on International Mergers. 
However,  they  appreciated  the  concern  ex-
pressed  by  the  Italian  delegation,  and  they 
reached  unanimous  agreement  on the  text  of 
Joint Declaration No 3. 
Althoug~  al?parently  limited  in  scope,  this 
d.ecl~:atiOn  Is  nevertheless  of  great  practical 
sigmftcance.  The  Governments  of  the  signa-
tory  States  recall  in  it  first  of  all  that  'the 
pr?blem of international mergers of companies 
raises  not  only  strictly  legal  questions  but 
also  questions  concerning  the  tax  treatment 
of  _me~gers'.  By  thus  refraining  from 
ment10mng  the  other  tax  issues  referred  to 
above,  the  Governments  on  the  other  hand 
express  their  conviction  that  the  lack  of  a 
solution  in  regard  to  the  tax  treatment  of 
international  mergers  may prevent them from 
taking  place_  'and  consequently  may  prevent 
the  ConventiOn  from  attaining  its  objectives' 
so that this is  an indispensable prerequisite fo; 
the  effective  application  of  the  Convention. 
They  therefore  undertake  to  help  to  expedite 
the  adoption  within  the  framework  of  the 
European  Communities  of  the  measures 
required.  This  undertaking makes the declar-
ation  a  very  concrete  one,  since  the represen-
tatives  of  these  same  Governments  make  up 
the  membership  of  the  Council  of  the  Com-
munities,  which  at  present  has  before  it  the 
draft directive  concerning the common regime 
of  mergers  between  companies  of  different 
Member States  (and hence Contracting States). 
Brussels, 27 September 1972. 
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Special  report  on  the  situation 
of  certain  companies 
vis-a-vis  the  Convention 
on  the  international  merger 
of societes  anonymes 
1 .  The report concerning the draft Conven-
tion  on  the  international  merger  of  societes 
anonymes  states  (paras.  12,  13,  20)  that while 
the  link  between  companies  to  which  the 
Convention applies, and the Contracting States 
is  necessarily  first  and  foremost  juridical,  it 
can  also  be  regarded  from  an  economic  and 
indeed  a  political  point  of  view.  It  further 
points out that while the experts designated by 
the Member States  succeeded-though obliged 
to leave the choice between two variants open in 
some respects-in presenting to their  Govern-
ments in  Article 1 of the draft a text defining 
the  link  in  law  between  the  companies  to 
which  the  Convention  would  be  applicable, 
they felt that a decision on the need for, and in 
some cases the definition of,  an economic link 
between  such  companies  and the  Contracting 
States was dependent on political options which 
could only  be exercised by the representatives 
of  the  Member States  of  the European  Com-
munities meeting in the Council. 
But  in  the  course  of  their  deliberations  the 
experts  found  that  the  adoption,  if  any,  of  a 
specifically  economic  criterion  for  the  links 
binding companies  (which most of the delega-
tions  did  not  favour),  and  particularly  that 
suggested,  as  we  shall  see,  by  the  French 
delegation,  would raise  technical  issues  which 
would have to be  solved  before that criterion 
could  be  applied;  and even  though it did  not 
seem to them advisable, precisely because of the 
political  implications  of  the  problem  as  a 
whole,  to  try  to  settle  those  issues,  they 
nevertheless  agreed  that the  attention  of their 
Governments  should  be  drawn  to  them  by 
way  of  a  special  report  to  be  annexed to the 
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report  on  the  draft  Convention.  Hence  to 
present document. 
2.  From  the  outset,  the French  delegation 
emphasized the importance  it  attached  to the 
links  between the companies involved  and the 
Contracting  States,  especially  because  of  the 
legal and fiscal  benefits  which the Convention 
would bring such companies by easing the way 
for  international  mergers  and  making  them 
practically feasible  by  liberal  tax reliefs.  The 
French delegation considered that such benefits 
should  only  be  granted  to  'genuinely  Com-
munity'  companies,  thus  stressing  what  the 
Contracting  States  had  already  recognized, 
namely that the exclusively  juridical and quite 
abstract  criterion  in  Article  58  of  the  Treaty 
of Rome was not 'automatically' applicable in 
conventions  to  be  concluded  pursuant  to 
Article 220.  Nor would this criterion of link-
age,  which  differed  from  that  in  Article  58, 
necessarily  be  uniform  in  all  those  conven-
tions. 
3.  From  the very  outset  the  other  delega-
tions expressed serious reservations, not to say 
decided  opposition, to seeking in  the Conven-
tion  on  International  Mergers  a  criterion  on 
linkage  more  restrictive  than the one  adopted 
in  the  Convention  on  Recognition;  but  they 
asked  the  French  delegation. to  crystallize  its 
views  in a draft text which could be discussed 
on a subsequent occasion. 
4.  This draft was submitted by the French 
delegation at the meetings of 2 to 6 June 1969. 
The  draft  text,  which  with  drafting  changes 
would  have  formed  Article  1  of the  Conven-
tion, reads as follows: 
'Article  1.  The Contracting States shall recog-
nize  mergers  taking  place  in  accordance  with 
the provisions set out below between companies 
formed under the law of one of the States and 
having their registered  office  in  the  territories 
to which the present Convention applies. 
However,  the  previous  paragraph  shall  not 
apply  if  one  of  the  companies  merging 
belongs to an international group of companies 
101 and  decisions  relating  to  its  industrial,  com-
mercial, financial or social policy are taken on 
the  instructions  or  recommendations  of  a 
company having  its  effective  seat  outside  the 
territories  to  which  the  present  Convention 
applies.' 
In  the  'explanatory  note'  accompanying  its 
proposal, the French delegation  again  recalled 
that 'without prejudice to any benefits confer-
red  by  other instruments,  the  Convention  on 
International Mergers  shall  permit  such  oper-
ations-at present impossible in practice because 
of the current rules  of law in the six Member 
States',  and it drew conclusion that 'the legal 
possibilities  thus  offered  to  enterprises  for 
concentration  and  restructuring  within  the 
framework of the Common Market seem to ... 
warrant  confining  them  to  companies  having 
substantial  links  with  the  Member  States  of 
the Communities'. 
This, it was explained, was  why after the first 
paragraph  has  given  a  definition  of  the 
nationality of companies closely  based on that 
in  the  Convention  of  29  February  1968,  the 
second paragraph of the proposed text, envis-
aging  the  cases  where  one  of  the  companies 
merging  belongs  to an international group  of 
companies,  withholds  the  benefits  of  the 
Convention unless the 'decision-making centre' 
of the group  is  inside  the  Community.  This 
'decision-making  centre'  would  be  the  place 
where  'decisions  are  taken  concerning  invest-
ments,  financing,  manufacturing  programmes, 
patent and licence  policy,  employment  policy, 
and competition and markets'  (but the French 
delegation  pointed  out orally in the course of 
the  debate  that  this  was  not  an  exhaustive 
list of  examples).  Where the decision-making 
centre  as  thus defined  is  in a  country outside 
the Communities, the French delegation's argu-
ment  is  that  the  enterprises  dependent  on it, 
even  if  legally  attached  to  a  Member  State, 
cannot  be  considered  'genuine  Community' 
companies. 
5.  The  first  paragraph  of  the  French 
proposal  has  to  do  with  the  strictly  juridical 
linkage of companies.  This is  at present dealt 
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with in Article 1 of the draft Convention, with 
its two variants, and there is  a commentary on 
it in the report (para. 12 et seq.).  . 
The  second  paragraph,  concerning  economic 
linkage,  gave  rise  to  lengthy  exchanges  of 
views.  Quite  apart  from  the  objections  of 
principle  already  mentioned  (although  the 
experts  refrained  from  discussing  them  at 
length  on the grounds  that such  a  discussion 
could  only  usefully  be  held  at  the  political 
level),  several  legal  and  practical  questions 
were raised. 
(a)  One of the delegations expressed the view 
that the text could be regarded as  incompatible 
with Articles 7, 58  and 220 of the EEC Treaty. 
The  French  delegation  again  observed,  in 
connexion with the possible incompatibility of 
its proposal with Article 58  of the Treaty, that 
it  appeared  to  have  been  agreed  during  the 
preceding  discussions,  relating  both  to  the 
Convention on Mergers and to the Convention 
on Recognition,  and in the latter case  during 
the discussions in the Council, that the criteria 
of linkage of companies could differ according 
as  the  basis  of  discussion  was  Article  58  or 
220, and also according to which of the various 
conventions was referred to in the latter. 
(b)  The question was  also  raised  whether, if 
the  requirement  of  economic  linkage  was 
accepted, it would be in its proper place in the 
Convention, or whether it would not be more 
appropriate  among  Community provisions  on 
taxation in  relation  to International  Mergers. 
In the latter case,  the  companies  meeting  not 
only  the  legal  criterion  but·  the  economic 
criterion of linkage as  well would be given the 
tax advantages granted to international mergers 
between  companies  belonging  to  different 
Member  States,  but  the  applicability  of  the 
Convention,  and  hence  the  legal  possibilities 
it offers,  would  be  subject  only  to their links 
in law. 
During  the  experts'  deliberations,  the  French 
delegation  did  not  entirely  rule  out the  pos-
sibility  of  its  proposal  being  inserted  in  the 
tax provisions alone. 
s.  13/73 (c)  It was pointed out by several  delegations 
that  if  the  principle  of  economic  link  were 
adopted in the Convention, the text embodying 
it would have to be very carefully drafted. 
In that connexion, most of the delegations felt 
on  first  sight  that  the  notion  of  'decision-
making centres' was too vague and might well 
give  rise to differences of interpretation on the 
part  of  national  authorities.  But  the  French 
delegation pointed out first  of all  that in fact, 
in business  practice,  dependency  status within 
a group of companies was more often than not 
easily  ascertained  or  revealed;  and  secondly, 
that  preliminary  rulings  on  interpretation  by 
the Court of Justice should make it possible to 
avoid  any  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the 
general  meaning  of  the  notion  of  'decision-
making centres'. 
All  the  same,  the  French  delegation  did  not 
present  the  criterion  proposed  as  one  not 
open to discussion.  It pointed out in particular 
that  a  different  approach  had  been  suggested 
in July  1967 in a  report of  the  Committee of 
Permanent  Representatives  on  Community 
policy in regard to petroleum and natural gas, 
accepted by the Council as  a starting-point for 
subsequent work.  The report indicated that the 
expression  'Community  undertakings'  as  used 
in  the  particular  context,  'designates  under-
takings  whose  base  interest  coincide  by  their 
nature  permanently  with  those  of  the  Com-
munity  and  which  do  not  qualify  for  the 
benefits  reserved  by  their  countries  of  origin 
for  the  subsidiaries  of  undertakings  from 
third  countries  established  within  the  Com-
munity'.  'It might be said', the report went on, 
'that this coinciding of interests exists when the 
undertaking  is  controlled  by  nationals  or 
Governments of Member States and its decision-
making centre is  located in one of the countries 
of  the  Community'.  Without  proposing  the 
adoption  of  such  text,  the  French  delegation 
felt  that  it  gave  food  for  thought  about  the 
problem of economic links. 
(d)  In any event, the other delegations strongly 
emphasized,-and  the  French  delegation  did 
not  demur-that  if  the  requirement  of  an 
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economic link was  laid  down in the Conven-
tion,  in  particular  the  link  involving  the 
whereabouts  of  the  'decision-making  centre', 
it would be essential  to look into the method 
of verifying,  in connexion with any particular 
merger, whether the requirement was effectively 
met. 
In  that connexion  it was  pointed  out that in 
companies  which  were  subject,  in  regard  to 
mergers  in particular, to preventive control of 
legality, judiCial or administrative, it would no 
doubt be  the authority exercising control that 
would have to ascertain whether the company 
involved  did  or  did  not  belong  to  an  inter-
national group, and if so, whether the 'decision-
making centre' of the group was situated inside 
or  outside  the  Community.  But  it  was  also 
pointed  out  that  when  in  the  absence  of 
judicial  or administrative  control,  the attesta-
tion  of legality  was  placed  in the  hands  of  a 
notary, it might seem  more difficult to expect 
the  latter  to  undertake  such  a  search.  In 
that  case,  would  it  not  be  better  to  entrust 
that  aspect  of  control,  even  in  a  company 
whose law merely  provided for the services  of 
a notary, to an authority other than a notary? 
This  question  was  of  course  simply  raised, 
but it was not examined, let alone answered. 
(e)  One  vital  question  remained  to  be  con-
sidered,  namely  that  of  sanctions  attached to 
the  requirements  of  economic  linkage.  In 
other words, what would happen if  a company 
belonging  to  an  international  group  whose 
'decision-making centre' was outside the Com-
munity nevertheless  merged, and indeed in the 
manner consistent with the Convention, with a 
company  belonging  to  another  Contracting 
State? 
Under  the  French  proposal  (which  it  must 
again be pointed out was not submitted as the 
last word on the subject}, in such circumstances 
the Convention would be inapplicable in such 
a  case,  and  hence  the  merger  would  be  a 
nullity,  or more  precisely,  would not produce 
the  effects  laid  down  in  the  Convention. 
Article 35  (which,  as  we  know, stipulates that 
after the date on which a  merger takes effect, 
103 nullity  can  no  longer  be  established  or  pro-
nounced unless in default of judicial or admin-
istrative  control  or  in  the  absence  of  a 
certified  act  presupposes  that  the  merger 
which  is  being  challenged  comes  within  the 
field  of  application  of  the  Convention,  other-
wise it is  alien to the Convention and to all its 
other provisions. 
In  the  course  of  the  discussion,  the  French 
experts, while not in any way committing their 
Government, nevertheless  did not rule  out the 
possibility of the whereabouts of the 'decision-
making  centre'  in  the  Community  being  con-
sidered  not  as  a  condition  of  applicability  of 
the  Convention,  but merely  as  a  condition of 
the validity of the merger. 
If this  were  so,  it  would  of  course,  always 
mean ascertaining,  by  means  either of  judicial 
or administrative control or of notarial certifica-
tion  (or  some  control  replacing  this  on  the 
particular point)  that the  condition  was  met. 
But once the control or certification had been 
carried out, the merger would be safe from the 
possibility  of  nullity  under Article  35,  even  if 
it should  be  subsequently proved that one or 
more  companies  which  had  taken  part  in  it 
belonged  to  an  international  group  whose 
decision-making centre was situated outside the 
Community. 
Without further committing their Governments, 
most  of  the  other  delegations  expressed  the 
view that such a notion (which would naturally 
be  reflected in wording different from  that of 
the French  proposal)  might  inake it  easier  to 
incorporate  in  the  Convention  an  economic 
criterion for the linkage between the companies 
merging and the Contracting States. 
Brussels, 27 September 1972. 
104  s.  13/73 Annex 2 
Special  Report  on  the  question 
of  'Participation' 
1.  Mergers between societes anonymes com-
ing  under  the  legislation  of  different  nations 
necessarily raise the question of representation 
of the employees  in the organs  of  those  com-
panies, or of some of them.  This representation 
-which will be referred to below as 'participa-
tion' according to current usage, even though its 
organization  and  functioning  by  no  means 
always  involve  employee  participation  in  the 
actual management of the particular company-
is in fact catered for in some of the legislations of 
the Member States, but in ways that differ from 
one  to  another,  while  other  legislations  have 
no such  arrangements,  but have provision for 
collective  action  by  the  employees  at  the 
company's  places  of  business.  But  in  effect 
international  mergers  cause  one  or  more 
companies to cease to exist, and their businesses 
are  from  then  onwards  run  by  the  acquiring 
company or by the new company, governed by a 
~lifferent law.  Thus normally the consequence, 
m  the  present  state  of  company  law  in  the 
Contracting States, tends to be a drastic change 
in  the  representation  of  the  employees  in  the 
company's  organs,  if  not  its  disappearance. 
2.  Hence participation was singled out from 
the outset as one of the problems to be discussed 
by the experts.  After a preliminary exchange of 
views  of  a  general  nature,  three  approaches 
emerged  within  the  group  which  may  be 
outlined as  follows:  The delegation from  Italy 
was quick to argue that this problem could only 
be  solved  by  coordination  of  the  national 
legislations,  which  the  Council  of  the  Com-
munities alone was competent to carry out; so 
that  in  its  opinion,  participation  was  not  a 
subject  for  negotiations  between  the  Member 
States or for provisions in a convention conclu-
ded  pursuant to  Article  220  of the  Treaty  of 
Rome; 
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- the  delegation  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany, on the other hand, urged vigorously 
and unceasingly  the capital importance of  the 
problem as  Germany saw it and the overriding 
necessity for coping with it in the Convention, 
not only  to  ensure  that international  mergers 
did  not  become  a  means  by  which  certain 
companies  could  'evade'  participation (which 
we know looms large in German legislation) but 
also to enable the type of international concen-
tration operations which the Convention would 
promote  to  provide  an  opportunity  for  the 
development of participation as a factor making 
for peace and social progress; 
- the  other  delegations,  while  sharing  the 
German delegation's view that the question of 
participation  in  the  context  of  international 
mergers  could  be  settled  in  a  convention 
concluded pursuant to Article 220, expressed the 
view-some of  them  vehemently,  others  in  a 
less  downright way-that precisely  because  of 
its social and hence its political importance, the 
problem could only be solved at the level of the 
representatives of the Member States meeting in 
the  Council;  but they nevertheless  hoped, like 
the  German  delegation,  that  the  group  of 
experts would give it serious consideration so as 
to be able to provide the Council with as broad a 
view as possible of its legal aspects. 
3.  Hence the Chairman placed  before  the 
group  of  experts  a  draft  text  which  forms 
Annex 2 A of this special report. 
The suggestions  put forward  in  this  proposal 
(which  of  course  would  involve  editorial  and 
drafting changes if  it were to be  accepted as  a 
basis for discussion) are based on the following 
factors: 
(a)  In principle, the laws  on participation are 
territorial  in  their  application.  This  means 
that in the event of an international men:rer  the  •  0  ., 
representatiOn  of  the  employees  company  or-
gans. ~hould be  governed  by  the  law  of  the 
acqumng company. 
This is the point made in para. 1 of the proposal, · 
and it would naturally apply  also  to the new 
company created as  the result  of  a  merger  as 
105 envisaged in the provisions of Chapter III of the 
Convention. 
(b)  Likewise territorial in their application are 
the laws relating to staff representation in the 
places  of  business  of  the  acquiring  company 
(or  the  new  company),  including  of  course 
those which before the merger belonged to the 
company acquired (or ceasing to exist).  Para. 2 
of the proposal deals with this point. 
(c)  But to take account, as far as is compatible 
with  this  principle  of  territoriality,  of  the 
rights granted to the employees of the country 
of the company acquired (or ceasing to exist) by 
the law which governed the latter, these rights 
would  be  transferred (subject  to  such  adjust-
ments as  were necessary) to the places of busi-
ness  maintained  by  the  acquiring  company 
{or the new company) in the countries where the 
registered office of  the company acquired was 
located.  This is  the object of  para.  3  of the 
proposal. 
4.  The experts held ::t  preliminary exchange 
of  views  on this  proposal at their  November 
1970 meeting, and later ()n  the German delega-
tion  did  what  it  had  wished  to  do  at  that 
meeting  and  on  1  June  1971  submitted  a 
proposal {Annex  2 B)  which  was  discussed 
thoroughly  during  the  meeting  of  July  1971. 
Ar that July meeting, in the face of the oppo-
sition of  all  the delegations at any rate to the 
institution of participation in cases where none 
of  the  companies  concerned  had  had  such  a 
system prior to the merger the German delega-
tion submitted on a  purely provisional basis  a 
'contingent'  proposal  waiving  participation in 
such cases (see Annex 2 C). 
In accordance with the decision taken at the end 
of that meeting, on 7 August 1971 the Chairman 
of the group prepared a note setting out the pros 
and cons of the problem as they emerged from 
the discussions up to that time (see Annex 2 D). 
This  note  summarizes  in  particular the  argu-
ments put forward by the German delegation in 
support  of  its  initial  proposal,  and  reference 
should be made to it. 
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5 .  In this context the experts again exam-
ined the problem at their meetings  of Decem-
ber 1971 and April1972. 
The stand taken by the delegations in the course 
of this examination may be defined as follows: 
(a)  The Italian  delegation,  while  agreeing to 
submit  strictly  technical  comments  on  the 
proposals made by the German delegation and 
the  Chairman  of  the  group,  maintained  the 
'plea  of  non-admissibility'  it  had  previously 
lodged in respect of any settlement of the pro-
blem  of  participation  in  the  Convention  on 
International Mergers. 
The  arguments  in support of  this  stand were 
stated  in  a  note  dated  20  December  1971, 
(Annex E)  which at the same time replied to the 
opposing submitted by the Chairman in his note 
of 7 August 1971 already mentioned (Annex 2 D) 
in favour of the insertion of provisions on par-
ticipation in the Convention. 
There is no point in pursuing the debate on this 
point in the present report, whose sole aim is to 
inform  the  representatives  of  the  Member 
States of the Communities meeting in the Coun-
cil  as  to the State of the work on participation 
now  that  they  have  before  them  the  draft 
Convention  on  International  Mergers.  The 
writer  would  like  to  point  out  however-to 
reply very  briefly to the arguments urged with 
particular force by the Italian delegation in the 
above-mentioned  note-that  in  his  view  the 
jurisdiction given by the Treaty of Rome to the 
organs of the EEC in regard to the coordination 
of laws  does  not  prevent  the  Member  States 
from  introducing  into  a  convention  uniform 
provisions  of  substantive  law  to  regulate 
questions  coming  within  the  sphere  of  the 
Convention;  and he persists  in the  belief that 
this is  precisely the case of participation which 
under the legislations of three of the Contrac-
ting States affects the very structure of organs of 
one or more of the companies merging. 
But the fact remains, of course, that the Mem-
ber States  of  the  Communities  meeting in the 
Council at the moment are only dealing with the 
problem of participation subject to the express 
s.  13/73 reservation  of  the  plea  of  non-admissibility 
raised by the Italian delegation. 
(b)  While  not  asking  for  its  'contingent' 
proposal (Annex 2 C) to be withdrawn from the 
file transmitted to the States' representatives, the 
German  delegations  maintains  its  original 
proposal (Annex 2 B), which it will be remem-
bered provides for the institution of participation 
in the acquiring company (or the new company), 
even if none of the companies had such a system 
prior  to  the  merger.  The  other  delegations 
unanimously maintain their opposition to this 
broadening of the scope of participation. 
The Netherlands delegation would be prepared 
to  accept  the  German  'contingent'  proposal 
provided  the  equivalence  of  the  German 
and Netherlands systems of participation which 
it  accepts,  were  also  accepted  by  the  other 
delegations (and  in  particular  by  the  German 
delegation  in  the  case  of  an  acquisition  of  a 
German company by a Netherlands company). 
This  attitude  on  the part  of  the  Netherlands 
would have the following consequences: 
(i)  When the acquiring company is  a Nether-
lands company, the Netherlands law relating to 
participation would apply (even if the company 
acquired were German); 
(ii)  When the company acquired is  a  Nether-
lands  company,  the  special  rules  on  partici-
pation  contained  in  the  German  'contingent' 
proposal would apply to the acquiring company, 
unless  that  company  were  German  in  which 
case  the  German  law  on  participation  would 
apply to it. 
(c)  The  Belgian  delegation,  while  signifying 
its  agreement in  principle with the Chairman's 
proposal (Annex  2 A)  submitted  two  amend-
ments to this text: 
(i)  Under the first  amendment, para. 2 of the 
Chairman's  proposal  would  read  as  follows: 
'Staff representation and the jurisdiction of the 
organs  of that representation in  the places  of 
business  of  the  acquiring  company  shall  be 
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governed,  in  respect  of  each  such  place  of 
business, by the law and the collective employ-
ment  agreements  of  the  Contracting  State  in 
which it is situated.' 
The Belgian  delegation  explained this  amend-
ment by saying that in Belgium, staff represen-
tation  was  governed  by  the  law  concerning 
company boards and safety and health commit-
tees,  and trade union representation by collec-
tive employment agreements. 
(ii)  The second amendment, which was not put 
in  writing,  would  set  up  at  company  level  a 
consultative  organ  designed  to  examine  the 
decisions  of  the  management  affecting  the 
activities of places of business situated in two or 
more Contracting States, and to give advice and 
make recommendations on the subject of those 
decisions. 
Such a consultative organ would be set up in all 
cases where the acquiring company (or the new 
company)  maintained a  place of busines$  in  a 
Contracting State other than that in which it had 
its  registered  office,  even  though  none  of the 
companies merging had a  participation system 
(e.g.  in the case of a merger between a Belgian 
company and an Italian company more places of 
business were kept in Belgium and Italy: It was 
specified  also  that this  amendment  would  be 
added  to  the  present  text  of  the  Chairman's 
proposal  without  involving,  in  particular,  the 
suppression of para. 3 of that text. 
(d)  The delegations of France and the Grand 
Duchy supported the Chairman's proposal and 
the  amendments  submitted  by  the  Belgian 
delegation.  The Italian delegation agreed,  be-
fore the amendments were submitted but with 
the  express  reservation  of  its  plea  of  non-
admissibility,  that  from  a  strictly  technical 
point of view the Chairman's proposal could be 
taken  as  a  basis  for  discussion.  It  took  no 
explicit  decision  on  the  Belgian  amendments. 
Brussels, 27 September 1972 
107 P.S.:  This report was drawn up  and approved 
prior  to  the  publictaion  of  the  draft  fifth 
directive on the structure of societes anonymes 
transmitted by the Commission to the Council 
of  the  European  Communities  on  9  October 
1972.1 
The author of this report feels that a proposal is 
a  document  which  the  Contracting  States 
might  well  have  to  take  into  consideration. 
Paris, 29 November 1972 
1  Supplement 10/72-Bull. EC. 
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Article 201 
Preliminary  Draft Text 
prepared by  the  Chairman 
1 .  Staff  representation  and  powers  in  the 
management  and  supervisory  organs  of  the 
acquiring  company  shall  be  governed  by  the 
law applicable to that company. 
2.  Staff representation and the jurisdiction 
of the organs entrusted therewith at the places 
of  the  acquiring  company  shall  be  governed, 
in  respect  of each  such place  of  business,  by 
the law of the Contracting State in  which it is 
situated. 
3.  In addition, if  the supervisory organ of 
the company acquired included staff representa-
tion,  and if  the acquiring  company  maintains 
one or more places of business in the territory 
of  the  Contracting  State  where  the  registered 
office  of  the company  acquired  was  situated, 
the following  provisions shall  be  applied: 
(a)  The reports which the management organ 
of  the  company  acquired  was  required  to 
submit to the supervisory  organ shall  be sub-
mitted to the boards  of  each  of  the places  of 
business  situated  in  the  territory  of  the  State 
where  the company  acquired  had its  seat  but 
such  reports  shall  comprise  only  particulars 
concerning the operation and prospects of the 
place of business in question, decisions relating 
to  it,  and  the  situation  in  regard  to  such 
portion of the company's  assets  as  is  allotted 
to it; 
(b)  The powers  of  control of  the company's 
accounts,  previously  exercised  by  the  super-
visory  body,  shall  be  exercised  by  the  board 
of  each  place of  business  over  its  operational 
accounts; 
(c)  If certain company operations were subject 
to  approval  by  the  supervisory  organ  of  the 
company acquired the board or boards of the 
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places  of  business  situated within the territory 
of  the State where that company had  its  seat 
shall be consulted in regard to these operations 
before  they  are finally  approved  by  the  com-
petent  organs  of  the  company under  the  law 
applicable to the acquiring company. 
4.  Subject  to  the  limitations  specified  in 
regard  to  their  object,  the  reports  and  the 
control  laid  down  in  paragraph  3  (a)  and 
3  (b)  shall  be  established  in  accordance  with 
the  provisions  of the  law of the State  whose 
territory the seat of the company acquired was 
situated governing the jurisdiction of the super-
visory organ of companies to which the present 
Convention applies. 
1  To be  inserted, if approved, in  Chapter II,  section 5 
of  the  Convention,  the  articles  being  renumbered 
accordingly. 
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Proposal  by the  German delegation 
on the  Regulation 
of Employee Participation 
With  a  view  to  regulating  the  matter  of 
employee participation, the German delegation 
proposes  that the  draft  Convention  on Inter-
national  Mergers  of  companies  be  amended 
and supplemented as follows: 
1 .  The following provisions shall be inserted 
in  the  Convention  as  Article  20  to  Article 
20 quater. 
Article 201 
1.  Participation  by  representatives  of  the 
employees in the organs of the acquiring com-
pany  shall  be  governed  by the  application  of 
the provisions  of  the international convention 
concluded  between  the  Member States  of  the 
European Communities on the formation of  a 
European  societe  anonyme  or  by  the  Com-
munity regulation  on that same  subject  based 
on the Treaty of Rome.  The same shall apply 
to  the  structure  of  the  acquiring  company 
insofar as this is  necessary for the implementa-
tion of the preceding sentence. 
2.  However,  where  the  law  applicable  to 
the acquiring company provides for participa-
tion in its organs by a number of representatives 
of  the  employees  exceeding  that  provided  in 
the  international  convention  or  the  Com-
munity  regulations  referred  to in the previous 
paragraph, participation by  the representatives 
of the employees in the organs of the acquiring 
company  shall  be  determined  by  the  law 
applicable to that company. 
Article 20 his 
Until such time as  the international convention 
or  the  Community  regulation  referred  to  in 
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Article 20  enters into force, Articles 20 ter and 
20 quater shall be applied. 
Article 20 ter 
Participation  by  the  representatives  of  the 
employees in the management and supervisory 
organs  of  the  acquiring  company  and  the 
rights and duties of those representatives, shall 
be  determined  by  the  law  applicable  to  the 
company,  unless  Article  20  quater  provides 
otherwise. 
Article 20 quater 
Where the company acquired has a supervisory 
board which under the law applicable to that 
company  must  include  representatives  of  the 
employees having the right to attend meetings 
and to vote,  the following  provisions  shall  be 
applied to the acquiring company as of the date 
on which the merger takes· effect  (Article  23). 
1.  Where the law applicable to the acquiring 
company  does  not  mandatorily  prescribe  the 
formation  of  a  supervisory  board,  the  pro-
visions  applied to that company shall be those 
relative  to the structure  of  societes  anonymes 
which  have  chosen  the system  of  supervision 
of  the  management  and  representation  of 
the  company  by  a  supervisory  board.2  The 
supervisory  board shall consist of three mem-
bers,  unless  the  statutes  stipulate  a  larger 
number divisible by three. 
2.  One third of the members of the super-
visory  board  shall  be  representatives  of  the 
employees.  The statutes  may  specify  propor-
1  To be inserted, if approved, in Chapter II, section 5 
of  the  Convention.  The numbering  of  all  the  articles 
mentioned  in  the  text  would  have  to  be  changed  to 
coincide with the final numbering of the articles. 
2  This  provision  presupposes  that the  Member States 
shall be required, in virtue of the directive on harmoniza-
tion of the provisions relating to the structure of societes 
anonymes  to  give  companies  at  least  the  option  of 
selecting the so-called 'dualist' system. 
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of representatives of the employees. 
3.  The  representatives  of  the  employees 
shall be elected for the term of office laid down 
by  law or in the statutes for the members  of 
the  supervisory  board  to  be  elected  by  the 
general meeting. 
The  mandate  of  the  representatives  of  the 
employees on the supervisory board shall come 
to an end on the expiry of the mandate of the 
other  members  of  the  supervisory  board  in 
accordance with  the  law  and  the  statutes  as 
well  as  through loss  of eligibility  or removal. 
Voting rights, eligibility, the statutory majorities 
and  procedure  for  electing  and  removing 
representatives  of  the  employees,  and for  the 
withdrawal of their mandate and annulment of 
elections  and removals, shall be  determined in 
accordance with Annex X to the present Con-
vention.1  Annex X shall constitute an integral 
part of the Convention. 
4.  The representatives of the employees on 
the  supervisory  board  shall  have  the  same 
rights  and  duties  (obligations)  as  the  other 
members of the supervisory board. 
5.  The  representatives  of  the  employees 
on the supervisory  board shall  be  first elected 
not later than two months after the merger has 
come into effect (Article 23).  If the supervisory 
board does  not include representatives  of the 
employees, or includes fewer than the number 
prescribed by  the present Convention, the law 
applicable,  and  the  statutes  or  the  number 
needed  for  a  quorum,  the  legal  consequences 
shall be determined by  Annex X to the present 
Convention. 
6.  The  provisions  of  the  law  applicable, 
even  mandatorily,  shall not be  applied  to the 
acquiring company where they are at variance 
with  the  provisions  of  paragraphs  1-5  above. 
2.  Article 42,  para.  1 shall be  amended as 
follows: 
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(a)  In paragraph 1, first  sentence, replace the 
refe.rence  (at  present  in  square  brackets)  to 
Article  20,  by  a  reference  to  Articles  20  to 
20 quater. 
(b)  In  paragraph  1,  add  a  third  sentence 
reading as follows: 
'Article  20  quat~r shall .apply  even if one only 
of  the  compames  ceasmg  to  exist  fulfils  the 
conditions laid down in this provision'. 
3.  To  cater  for  the  questions  raised  in 
Article  20 quater  (para.  3,  third sentence,  and 
para.  5,  second  sentence),  an  Annex  X  shall 
be  added  to  the  Convention.  The  German 
delegation  may  wish  to  make  proposals  at a 
later date regarding the content of this Annex· 
since these proposals are more or less technical 
in  character,  and  it  would  be  useful  to  hold 
discussions beforehand and to reach agreement 
on  the  principles  underlying  the  German 
proposal. 
1  See also Articles 139, 140 and 143 of the Commission's 
draft regulation governing European societes  anonymes. 
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Contingent proposal1  by  the German 
delegation  on the  Regulation 
of Employee  Participation 
1 .  The  following  provisions  shall  be  in-
serted in the Convention  under Articles  20  to 
20 ter.2 
Article 20 
Text the same as  that of Article 20  ter of the 
main  proposal  (with  amendment of  the refer-
ence). 
Article  20 his 
Where the company acquired has a supervisory 
board which under the law applicable to that 
company  must  include  representatives  of  the 
employees  having the right to attend meetings 
and  to  vote,  participation  by  representatives 
of the employees in the organs of the acquiring 
company shall  be governed by  the application 
of the provisions  of the international conven-
tion concluded between the Member States  of 
the European Communities  . . .  (the  rest as  in 
Article 20, para. 1, of the main proposal). 
Article  20 ter 
Until such time as  the international convention 
or  the  Community  regulation  referred  to  in 
Article  20 his  enters  into  force,  the following 
provisions  shall  be applied provided the com-
pany acquired fulfils  the conditions  of Article 
20 his: 
(Paragraphs  1  to  6:  text  the same  as  that of 
Article 20 quater of the main proposal). 
2.  Same  as  paragraph  2  of  the  main 
proposal (with  amendment of the reference to 
Article 20 et seq.). 
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3.  Same  as  paragraph  3  of  the  main 
proposal  (with  amendment  of  the  reference 
to Article 20 et seq.). 
1  See Annex 2 B. 
2  See Annex 2 B, footnote 1,  p. 110. 
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Note by  the  Chairman on the representation 
of  employees  in  the  organs  of  the  acquiring 
company or the  new company 
1  .  Following the discussion of the problem 
of  representation  of  the  employees  in  the 
organs  of  the  acquired  company  or the  new 
company  (referred  to  below  for  short  as  the 
problem of participation at the last session of 
the  group  of  experts  held  in  Brussels  on 
7  July  1971,  the  Chairman  proposed  that  a 
note  might  be  drafted  briefly  outlining  the 
background to the problem as  emerging from 
that  discussion  and  from  the  exchanges  of 
vie~s  which  had  taken  place  at  previous 
sessiOns. 
This  is  the purpose of the present  document, 
which the delegations agreed should be placed 
before  them  so  that  they  could  consult  their 
Governments  and  receive  instructions  from 
them in time for the next session of the group. 
A.  Gist  of the earlier  discussions  -
Draft text submitted by the  Chairman 
2.  Prior  to  the  session  of  July  1971,  the 
problem  of  participation  had  figured  several 
times  on  the  agenda  of  the  meetings  of  the 
group. 
The  delegation  of  the  Italian  Republic  had, 
however,  from  the  outset  expressed  the  view 
that  this  problem  was  outside  the  group's 
jurisdiction,  since  in  its  view  the  solution 
could not be found in a convention on mergers; 
but while  maintaining  this  stand,  which  was 
placed on record at the session of July 1971, the 
Italian delegation did not oppose the discussion 
of the problem, and agreed to contribute to it 
on  a  purely  subsidiary  basis,  by  making  a 
thorough commentary on the substance. 
At the same time, the delegation of the Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  even  though  from  the 
outset it had expressed  a  keen  desire that the 
problem  should  be  examined  and  a  solution 
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put forward by the group to the representatives 
of  the  Governments  of  the  Member  States 
meeting  in  the  Council,  for  some  time  stated 
that  it  could  not  see  its  way  to  formulating 
a proposal or taking an active part in a discus-
sion on the substance of the matter.  Later on, 
it  declared  its  willingness  to  look  into  any 
proposals  submitted  by  other  delegations, 
but none  of  them  saw  fit  to  meet  this  wish. 
In  particular,  the  delegation  of  the  French 
Republic  expressed  the  view  that  because 
of  its  political,  social  and  economic  implica-
tions,  the  problem  of  participation  in  the 
event  of  an  international  merger  (which  in 
its  view,  unlike that of the Italian  delegation, 
should be effectively settled by the Convention) 
could only be usefully discussed in the Council. 
But  the  French  delegation  and  others  which 
shared its view with various slight differences, 
declared  their  readiness  to  examine  any  pro-
posals that might be put forward. 
3.  In these  circumstances,  with  a  view  to 
providing a  basis for discussion, the Chairman 
of  the  group  prepared  a  preliminary  draft 
text  which  now  appears  as  Article  20  in 
Annex 2 A. 
Basically,  this  text lays  down the principle of 
the  territoriality  of  the  law  relating  to  staff 
representation,  either  in  the  management  and 
supervisory  organs  of the  acquiring  company 
(para.  1),  or in  the  places  of  business  set  up 
by it (para.  2).  This  would mean in practice 
that participation  at the company organ level 
would  only  exist  if the  law  of  the  acquiring 
company so  prescribed,  and that it would be 
organized, if  the occasion arose, in accordance 
with that law.  On the other hand, at the level 
of the places of business set up, staff representa-
tion  would  be  organized  in  each  instance  in 
accordance with the law of the country where 
it was located. 
But these proposals  (which  would conform to 
the principles generally accepted for the settle-
ment of conflicts of law in the field of company 
law and employment law are supplemented by 
the Chairman's proposal (para. 3): the principle 
involved is  that where the supervisory body of 
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tion in accordance with the law of that company, 
the  powers  of  the  staff  representatives  will 
be transferred to the places  of  business  main-
tained by the acquiring company in the country 
of the company acquired but will be confined to 
those  places  of  business.  This  would  be  an 
attempt as  far  as  possible to reconcile respect 
for the acquired rights of  the employees of the 
country  of  the  company  acquired  with  the 
principle  of  territoriality  of the  rules  relating 
to participation. 
4.  This  text  gave  rise  to a  single  general 
exchange of views,  in the course  of a  session 
before  that  of  July  1971.  Subject  to  the 
stand taken by the Italian and German delega-
tions,  as  referred  to  above,  the  experts  were 
unable  to  do  more  on  that  occasion,  in  the 
absence of instruction from their Governments, 
than express their immediate reactions, personal 
and provisional.  It should be noted however, 
that in the  opinion  of  the  French  delegation, 
which  was  similar,  the  principles  reflected  in 
the  Chairman's  proposal  seerned  to  warrant 
being taken into consideration. 
5.  During  the  session  of  July  1971  the 
Chairman's proposal was not discussed  again, 
but it was  agreed  that the  delegations  would 
ask their Governments before the next session 
for instructions to enable them to take a stand 
on the subject. 
B.  The German  proposal  of  1  June 1971 
6.  In  accordance  with  the  hope  it  had 
expressed  at  the  penultimate  session  of  the 
group,  the  German  delegation  was  able  to 
submit on 1 June 1971 a 'proposal on employee 
participation'  which  is  again  reproduced  in 
the original German text and in  a  provisional 
French translation (p.  261)  in Annex B. 
The background, the rationale and the content 
of  this  proposal  were  thoroughly  and lucidly 
expounded  by  the  German  delegation  in  the 
course  of  the  session  of  July  1971;  and  the 
other  delegations  were  asked  to  consult  in 
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that connexion the draft minutes of the session 
produced  by  the  services  of  the  Commission 
and approved by the Chairman. 
7.  However,  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
simplifying  the  use  of  the  present  note,  the 
principles  and  the  general  outlines  of  the 
German  proposal  will  be  recalled  below,  on 
the  responsibility  of  the  Chairman  alone. 
Obviously  this  presentation  does  not commit 
the German delegation. 
(  i)  The  German  proposal  is  based  on  a 
twofold premise: 
- The EEC  is  due to establish  by  way  of a 
convention  between  the  Member  States,or  a 
Council regulation, a European societe anonyme 
which will embody a uniform system of partici-
pation. 
- The  introduction  into  the  legislations  of 
all  the Member States, at least on an optional 
basis,  of  the  so-called  'dualist'  system  of 
organization  of  societe  anonyme  (comprising 
an  organ  of  management  and  a  supervisory 
organ) will be prescribed by a Council directive. 
(ii)  In  this  context,  participation  will  be 
regulated,  in  the  acquiring  company,2  by 
application  of the  pertinent provisions  of  the 
statutes of the European societe anonyme once 
they have been adopted. 
However,  under  this  definitive  system,  if  the 
1aw  of  the  acquiring  company  provided  for 
representation  of  the  workers  numericaHy 
exeeding that prescribed  by the satutes of  the 
1  The translation was made by the Chairman, who was 
anxious  to  remain  as  close  as  possible  to  the  original 
German text, though this  means that it was not always 
possible  to  meet  the  standards  of  a  polished  French 
version. 
2  The  German  proposal  starts  out  from  the  premise 
that the merger is  by  acquisition and the same principle 
will  be  adopted in the remainder  of  the  present  note. 
But obviously it also  covers  mergers  by  formation  of  a 
new company.  Here, what has been said of the acquisi-
tion  and  the  company  acquired  will  apply  mutatis 
mutandis  to  the  new  company  and  to  the  companies 
wich cease to esist. 
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The  German  delegation  explained  that  this 
reservation  was  made  in  particular  in  the 
light of a possible development of German law 
having  the  effect  of  extending  the  field  of 
application of participation on a parity basis or 
of  instituting  a  general  rule  of  law  requiring 
representation  of  the  employees  to  be  more 
·than one third. 
(iii)  Until  such  time  as  the  statutes  of  the 
European  societe  anonyme  enter  into  force, 
participation  will  be  governed,  in  principle, 
by the law of the acquiring company. 
However,  where  the  company  acquired  had 
a supervisory board including employees' repre-
sentatives,  the  acquiring  company  will  adopt 
the  ~dualist' system, and one-third of its super-
visory board will have to be  made up of such 
representatives. 
(  iv)  To  cover  the  same  transitional  period, 
the  German  proposal  includes  provisions 
relating to the length of the term of office and 
the rights and duties of the employees' represen-
tatives on the supervisory board; and it specifies 
the preparation of an annex to the Convention 
regulating 'voting rights, eligibility, the statutory 
majorities and procedure for electing represen-
tatives of the employees and for the withdrawal 
of  their  mandate,  and  annulment  of  elections 
and  removals'.  The  German  delegation  con-
siders  in  fact  that  to  achieve  uniformity  of 
participation forthwith  (this  will  of  course be 
the result  of  applying  the rules  governing the 
European  societe  anonyme)  these  various 
questions  should  be  settled  by  common  sub-
stantive ·  provisions  applicable  during  the 
transitional phase. 
C.  Discussion  of the  German proposal -
The German delegations  'contingent' proposal 
of 8  July  1971 
8.  Following the preliminary statements by 
the  German  delegation  mentioned  above,  its 
proposal  was  fully  discussed  on 7  July  1971, 
and  the  summary  records  of  that  discussion 
will  be  found  in  the  draft  minutes  already 
mentioned.  Delegations  are  asked  to  consult 
these. 
s.  13173 
In  the  course  of  the  discussion,  the  experts 
were only able to express personal views, since 
in  spite  of  the  efforts  made  by  the  German 
delegation  to  formulate  its  proposal  before 
the session  began,  Governments  did  not have 
the  time  to  study  the  matter  sufficiently  to 
be  able  to  issue  instructions.  However,  the 
exchange of views  which took place suggested 
that  those  instructions  would  be  likely  to 
cover in particular the following points: 
- Powers  of  the  group  and  inclusion  of  a 
regulation governing participation in the Con-
vention; 
Field of application of participation; 
Immediate adoption of a permanent system 
of  participation,  or  a  transitional  system 
distinct  from  a  permanent  system,  as  in  the 
German proposal; 
- Institution, on a permanent basis or for an 
initial phase, of a uniform system of participa-
tion,  or  recourse  to  a  rule  of  conflict,  or  a 
combination  of  both  methods  (and  how  it 
would operate); 
- Even under a uniform system of participa-
tion,  adoption  or  otherwise  of  more. or  less 
detailed substantive rules governing the appoint-
ment  of  employees'  representatives  and  the 
duration,  performance  and  termination  of 
their  duties.  The  substance  of  these  various 
questions will be outlined below. 
(a)  Powers of the group 
9.  Mention  has  been  made  above  of  the 
stand taken  by  the Italian  delegation  on this 
subject.  This did not find favour with the other 
delegations;  nor can the  Chairman accept the 
view for the following reasons: 
(i)  Even  if  it  were  felt  that  the  terms  of 
Article  220  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  limit  the 
sphere  of  negotiations,  it  seems  clear  that  it 
does  extend  to  participation.  The  very  fea-
sibility of international mergers, which are the 
object of the Convention envisaged by the text, 
does  after all depend on the settlement of this 
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alien to company law, since on the contrary it 
provides  for  representation  of  the  employees 
m company organs. 
(ii)  In  any event, Article 220  is  indicative but 
not exhaustive.  It provides that Governments 
shall as  far as  necessary enter into negotiations 
as  specified,  but there is  of  course nothing to 
prevent  them  from  extending  the  scope  of 
those  negotiations  (as  they  did,  moreover,  in 
the case of the Convention on Jurisdiction and 
the Enforcement of Judgements. 
(iii)  Lastly,  while  it is  true that the solution 
of  the  problem  of  participation  may  involve 
coordination of the legal systems  of the Mem-
ber  States  by  means  of  uniform  substantive 
rules,  this  is  in  no  way  precluded  in  an 
international convention, and indeed it is  used 
both in the Convention on Jurisdiction referred 
to above and in many of the provisions, already 
approved  by  the  experts,  of  the  preliminary 
draft  convention  on  international  mergers. 
It  is  advisable,  no  doubt,  to  maintain  this 
coordination in the sphere of the Convention, 
in  the  case  in  point,  the  sphere  of  inter-
national mergers; but subject to that reservation, 
it is  perfectly appropriate there. 
In any case, the group of experts will be called 
upon  to  express  a  definitive  opinion  on  this 
question at the next session. 
(b)  Field of application of participation 
10.  Under the German proposal,  partiCipa-
tion  would  apply  in  acquiring  company even 
if it was not laid down either by the law of that 
company  or  by  the  law  of  the  company 
acquired. 
This suggestion elicited very serious objections 
from several  of the experts,  and their opinion 
is  shared by  the  Chairman.  It is  not easy to 
see why a Belgian company, for example, taking 
over  an  Italian  company,  should  institute 
participation  when  neither  company  had  it 
prior  to  the  merger.  In  such  a  case  there 
could  be  no  question  either  of  'evading' 
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participation or of ignoring the acquired rights 
of employees.  To impose participation in such 
a case would be tantamount to trying to make 
the institution  universally  applicable  by  using 
the  expedient  of  an  international  convention 
whose  primary  purpose  is  · different.  This 
would  seem  to  be  going  beyond  the  natural 
sphere of the rules  proper to this  Convention. 
11 .  The  German  delegation,  appreciating 
these  objections,  intimated  its  willingness  to 
consider restricting  the field  of  application  of 
participation so  as  to  exclude it where it was 
not incorporated in  any  of the laws governing 
the companies merging. 
At the meeting of 8 July 1971, it formulated a 
contingent proposal to this end.  A provisional 
French translation of this is given in annex 2 C.l 
The  German  delegation  nevertheless  made  it 
clear at that same meeting that it still preferred 
its  initial  proposal.  The  German  delegation 
is  asked, as  are the other delegations  as  well, 
to  seek  government instructions on this  point 
before the next session. 
(c)  A  permanent system of participation forthwith or a 
transitional  system  followed  by  a  permanent  system 
(namely that of the European societe anonyme). 
12.  .  Several  experts  pointed  out  in  this 
connexion that it was difficult both technically 
and  substantively,  to  refer in the  Convention 
to the system of participation of the European 
societe anonyme since  theoretically its  statutes 
were not yet adopted. 
According  to them-and  that  constituted  the 
technical  objection-it  would·  mean  a  blind 
reference,  since  there was  nothing  to indicate 
at the present time  what these statutes would 
look like or how participation would be organ-
ized in them.  With regard to the substance, it 
was  equally  uncertain  that  the  system  of 
participation of the European societe anonyme 
would be suitable for a  company which, even 
1  See page 114, footnote 2• 
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be  a  company  of  a  particular  State  coming 
under the law of that State. 
It is  to  be  hoped  that  the  Governments  can 
instruct  the  experts  which  of  these  two 
methods  to  choose:  a  permanent  system  im-
mediately, or a transitional system followed by 
the  system  of  participation  of  the  European 
societe anonyme on a permanent basis. 
(d)  Uniform  system  or  rule  of  conflict-combination 
of both methods. 
13.  In  the  initial  German  proposal,  the 
combination of  a  rule  of  conflict  (application 
of the law governing the acquiring  company) 
an& substantive  rules  (mandatory  representa-
tion  of  the  employees  comprising  one-third 
of  the  members  of  the  supervisory  board 
where  the  acquiring  company  has  such  a 
system of participation) only appears under the 
transitional alternative.  Under the permanent 
arrangement the system of participation of the 
European  company,  namely  uniform,  will  be 
applied an all instances. 
This  uniform  system  would  apply  likewise 
under  the  'contingent'  proposal  where  the 
company acquired had staff representation on 
its  supervisory  board;  but  in  the  other  cases 
it  would  again  be  the  law  of  the  acquiring 
company that would be applied. 
On  the  other  hand,  any  permanent  system 
that  did  not  refer  to  the  statutes  of  the 
European company would seem  necessarily  to 
combine  a  rule  of  conflict  with  substantive 
rules. 
(i)  A priori, none of the experts was opposed 
personally to the principle of regulating partici-
pation  by  applying  the  law  governing  the 
acquiring company. 
This  principle  should  not  in  fact  meet  with 
serious objections where the acquiring company 
has  a  system  of  participation at the company 
organ level whereas the company acquired had 
none (e.g. where a Belgian company is taken over 
by  a  German company);  but this  initial point 
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calls  for  confirmation  in  instructions  from 
Governments. 
(ii)  The difficulty  emerges  at once  when the 
two companies both have participation, but the 
systems are different (e.g.  where a Netherlands 
company is  acquired by a German company or 
vice versa). 
The application here of the law governing the 
acquiring company presupposes that the Con-
tracting States  accept the basic equivalence  of 
the different  national systems  of  participation 
which  is  of  course  by  no  means  necessarily 
true. 
Meanwhile, in the course of  the discussion  of 
July 1971 the Netherlands expert, expressing_a 
strictly personal opinion, argued that it would 
not be impossible in the case of an acquisition 
of  a  Netherlands  company  by  a  German 
company for  the German system of  participa-
tion to be applied in the acquiring company  .. 
But  the  German  delegation  did not feel  able 
to  take  a  favourable  view  of  the  reverse 
situation  (i.e.  application  of  the  Netherlands 
system  in  the  event  of  an  acquisition  of  a 
German company by a Netherlands company). 
It is  therefore to be hoped that the delegations 
will  receive  instructions  from  their  Govern-
ments on the question whether the law of the 
acquiring  company  shall  or  shall  not  apply 
even  when  the  company  acquired  had  a  dif-
ferent system of participation under its own law. 
(iii)  If the  reply  to  the  above  question  was 
negative, it would still  have to be determined 
how  participation  should  be regulated  at the 
level of the acquiring company. 
It does  not seem  possible  here to  be satisfied 
with  a  rule  of  conflict  pure  and  simple, 
declaring the law of the company acquired to 
be applicable.  In the first  place, theoretically 
nothing  would  justify  the preference  given  to 
the latter when jurisdiction given to the law of 
the  acquiring  company  is  on the  contrary in 
keeping  with  the general  principles  of  private 
international  company  law  and of  labour re-
lations.  In practice, moreover, the application 
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country  of  the  acquiring  company  could 
encounter  insurmountable  difficulties  (espec-
ially  when this  presupposes,  as  is  the case  in 
Netherlands law, action by the authorities of the 
State which has laid it down). 
It is therefore desirable, if we wish to ensure that 
the  law  of  the  acquiring  company  does  not 
apply in all instances, to devise a conventional 
system  of  participation  based  on  substantive 
rules,  to deal  with this  situation.  This is  the 
approach  adopted  technically  in  the  German 
proposal; but several  experts pointed out that 
in  actual  fact  what was  advocated  would  be 
precisely the answer found in German law; this 
would  amount  to  'exporting'  German  law, 
without recourse to a rule of conflict. 
It would be most helpful if the experts could be 
given instrucions, at any rate in regard to the 
general  lines  of  a  conventional  system  of 
participation which would apply where the two 
companies have different systems  of participa-
tion (failing  application  of  the  law  governing 
the acquiring company). 
(iv)  The  institution  of  such  a  conventional 
system will probably in any event be necessary 
where the law of the acquiring company has no 
system  of  participation  whatever  and  where 
there  is  one  under  the  law  of  the  company 
acquired (e.g.  where  a  German  company  is 
acquired  by  a  Belgian  company).  This  is 
indeed  the  typical  situtation  where  some 
Governments  might  fear  'evasion'  of  partici-
pation and the end-result would be disregard of 
the  acquired  rights  of  the  employees  of  the 
company acquired. 
Hence the Governments should make up  their 
minds  whether the conventional system (other 
than the rule of conflict) should be instituted for 
this case alone-unless of course they consider 
that it should be discarded entirely.  But at the 
present stage of the discussion, it seems unlikely 
that this  last approach could  muster a  unani-
mous vote. 
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(e)  More  or  less  detailed  uniform  regulation  of  the 
designation  of the  employees'  representatives,  the con-
ditions  governing  the  performance  and  termination  of 
their duties. 
14.  Several experts argued that this substan-
tive regulation should not and could not enter 
into  details.  At  the  most,  they  felt,  general 
principles (e.g.  on fair representation of minori-
ties)  could  be  laid  down  in  the  Convention. 
The  German  delegation  did  not rule  out the 
possibility of a solution in this direction. 
The Chairman would like to point out that if in 
the outcome a system of employees' representa-
tion in the supervisory organ were adopted, the 
functioning  of  that  organ  would  presumably 
have been the subject of legislative coordination 
by directive.  A simple principle of placing the 
employees' representatives on the same footing 
as the other members of the supervisory board 
would  thus  seem  calculated  to  avoid  unduly 
great divergencies from one country to another. 
It is  to be  hoped that the experts  can obtain 
instructions  from  their  Governments  on  this 
point also. 
In  conclusion,  it  may  be  recalled  that  the 
series  of  questions  raised  in the  present  note 
cannot in any way  be  regarded as  exhaustive. 
The Chairman will put forward for discussion 
any other questions or proposals which delega-
tions may formulate  on instruction from their 
Governments. 
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Note by the Italian  delegation 
on the  representation of employees 
in the  organs of the  acquiring  company 
or the  new company 
1 .  During the last session  of the group of 
national  experts  held  at Brussels  on 8  and 9 
December  1971,  the  Italian  delegation  was 
authorized to submit a note giving  an account 
of the terms of the plea of non-admissibility it 
lodged  in  connexion  with  the  proposal  to 
institute a conventional system of representation 
of  employees  in  the  organs  of  the  acquiring 
company or the new company arising out of a 
merger.  · 
From the start of the negotiations  the  Italian 
delegation expressed the view that the problem 
raised  by  the  fact  that  there  were  national 
systems  of  participation  differing  from  one 
country  in  the  Community  to  another  was 
outside the field  of application of Article  220 
third indent of the  Treaty of Rome and that, 
consequently,  employee  participation  in  the 
administration of the acquiring company or the 
new  company  should  be  governed  by  lex 
societatis,  in  application  of  the  principles  in 
force  in  regard  to  conflicts  of  laws;  to  the 
exclusion of any rule of substantive law to be 
inserted in the Convention. 
The  arguments  put  forward  by  the  Italian 
delegation  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 
(a)  The institution of participation (as  estab-
lished  in  German  and  Netherlands  law)  is 
entirely  alien  to  the  process  of  international 
mergers.  Consequently  regulation  of  the 
participation of employees in the organs of the 
company  has  no  connexion  with  the  specific 
object of  the Convention under Article 220  of 
the Treaty of Rome, namely the elimination of 
obstacles  which  in  the  present  state  of  the 
national  legislations  stand  in  the  way  of  the 
concentration  of  undertakings  of  different 
nationalities in a single legal unit. 
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(b)  Under  the  terms  of  Article  220  of  the 
Treaty,  the  Convention  is  intended  for  'com-
panies or firms governed by the laws of  different 
countries'.  This  means  that for  all  the  pro-
blems. relating  to  the  organization  of  the 
company, the structure and the composition of 
its organs, there can be no solution within the 
framework of  the  Convention other than that 
resulting from  the application  of the national 
law. 
(c)  A  merger  involves,  by  definition,  the 
extinction of the company acquired (and hence 
its  organs).  The  adoption  of  a  conventional 
system  under  which  the  system  of  partici-
pation  applicable  to  the  company  acquired 
would 'survive' the extinction of the company 
(and  its  organs)  even  where  the  acquiring 
company  comes  under  a  legal  system  which 
knows  nothing  of  participation  seems  to  be 
incompatible  with  the  very  notion  of  inter-
national mergers. 
(d)  The problem of participation was raised in 
the course of the sessions of the group because of 
the  diversity  of  national  legislations  in  this 
company  law  area  and the  possibility  of  the 
machinery for  intra-Community mergers  being 
used by  the companies  of certain countries to 
avoid  a  national  system  of  participation they 
find  distasteful.  There  is  similar  danger  of 
'evasion', as has been pointed out, in respect of 
the regime in force in Italy under which shares 
are required to be registered. 
Thus  participation  constitutes  a  problem  of 
coordination of  national legislations.  But this 
coordination of laws is not the object of Article 
220 but comes within the field of application of 
other Articles of the Treaty of Rome (Articles 54, 
para. 3, (g) 100, 101 and 235). 
(e)  It  was  recognized  that  in  ratifying  the 
Treaty  of  Rome,  the  Member States  did  not 
assume the obligation at an international level, 
to negotiate participation within the framework 
of  the  Convention  on  Mergers.  Hence  it  is 
impossible  to  deny  the  right  of  national  del-
egations  to  reject  prima  facie  any  proposal 
relating to participation. 
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be  well  to  add  a  few  observations  concerning 
the objections raised to the Italian delegation's 
attitude. 
(a)  The statement that 'the very feasibility' of 
an international merger depends on settling the 
issue  of  participation  is  untenable.  On  the 
contrary,  it  would  seem  evident  that  failing 
the introduction in the prospective Convention 
of provisions  relating  to  participation  by  the 
employees in the administration of the acquiring 
company,  or  the  new  company,  would  be 
governed by the lex societatis, and this  would 
have  no  impact  on  the  feasibility  of  inter-
national  mergers.  It  was  also  held  that  the 
question  of  participation  should  be  regarded 
as  coming  within  the scope  of Article  220  of 
the Treaty of Rome,  since  it is  probable that 
the countries of the Community most directly 
interested  in  this  problem  will  not  ratify  the 
Convention  unless  it  has  suitable  provlSlons 
on participation. 
Quite  clearly,  it  is  impossible  to  draw  any 
inference  of  a  legal  nature  concerning  the 
interpretation  of  Article  220  of  the  Treaty 
from  the  above  statement.  The  argument 
moreover  has  a  negative  counterpart:  the 
introduction of provisions relating to participa-
tion  could  cause  other  Member  States,  even 
though they intend to honour the international 
commitments undertaken in virtue of Article 220 
of the Treaty, not to conclude the Convention. 
(b)  Even if it were agreed that Article 220 of the 
Treaty is an indicative text and does not restrict 
the jurisdiction of the Member States, it could 
not be inferred that the countries of the Com-
munity have the sovereign right to enlarge the 
scope of the Convention unrestrictedly. 
The problem of participation as  was observed 
above,  is  linked  with  the  coordination  of 
national legislations  in regard to the structure 
of companies limited by shares. 
But the legal instrument laid down in the EEC 
Treaty  for  the  coordination  of  legislation 
(see Articles 54, para. 3,  (g)  100,  101,  and 235) 
is  not  an  inter-State  Convention,  but  a 
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regulation  or  directive  of  the  Community 
institutions. 
In other words, by ratifying the Treaty of Rome, 
the Member States have limited their sovereignty 
in  certain  fields  and  consequently  have 
renounced  the  option  of  negotiating  among 
themselves  agreements  on  matters  for  which 
the  Treaty  has  transferred  jurisdiction  to  the 
Community's institutions. 
Nor  would  it  appear  possible,  conversely,  to 
use  the argument of the precedent  constitute~ 
by  the  Convention  on  Jurisdiction  and  the 
Enforcement of Judgements. 
There is  no question but this Convention does 
effectively embody provisions which go beyond 
the scope of Article 220.  But this  broadening 
of scope has not involved any encroachment on 
the rights of the Commission and the Council, 
and it has been made possible by the agreement 
of  all  the  States.  On the other hand,  as  far 
as the question raised here is concerned, not all 
the  delegations  have  agreed  to  extend  the 
scope of the Convention to cover participation. 
This  fact  cannot  be  regarded  as  negligible, 
since quite apart from the fact that the Member 
States  are  not at liberty in  any  circumstances 
to  usurp  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Community 
institutions,  the  possibility  of  extending  the 
negotiations  to  matters  which  do  not  come 
within  the  scope  of  Article  220-and  which 
consequently the Member States  are under no 
obligation  to  deal  with  in  this  context-
presupposes  agreement  by  all  the  national 
delegations.  · 
With  regard  to  the  objection  raised  in  the 
course  of  the  session  of  8  December  1971, 
namely  that  before  the  Convention  can  be 
concluded,  all  the  provisions  of  the  draft 
must  be  approved  unanimously  (so  that  the 
problem of participation would in this respect 
not differ from  the other aspects  of the Con-
vention  already  examined  by  the  national 
experts)  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  that 
statement  does  not  dispose  of  the  distinction 
between  questions  of  admissibility  and 
questions of substance. 
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related to the operation of international mergers 
(and  consequently  covered  by  the  terms  of 
reference of the national experts), the problem 
which arises is only that of reaching agreement 
on the  content  of  the  texts  proposed,  where 
they  are  not  so  related it is  essential  first  of 
all  to  solve  a  problem  of  procedure-that of 
verifying the admissibility of the question. 
(c)  While  it  is  true  that  the  technique  of 
coordination of national legislations by recourse 
to  provisions  of  substantive  law  has  already 
been  used  in  many  of  the  provisions  of  the 
draft  Convention  already  approved  by  the 
national  experts,  this  does  not  invalidate  the 
present argument. 
Recourse  to  this  technique  is  after  all  fully 
justified  in  regard  to  the  uniform  provisions 
of  substantive  law  at  present  embodied  in 
the  draft  Convention  (e.g.  the  provisions 
determining  the  content  of  the  merger  plan, 
that  relating  to  the  expert  reports  on  the 
share exchange terms of the merging companies, 
that  regulating  the  sharing  of  juri:;diction 
among  national  authorities  concerned  with 
control of the merger,  etc.)  These provisions 
are concerned with the iter by  which an inter-
national  merger  proceeds,  and  consequently 
they are directly related to the terms of reference 
of the national experts. 
On the other hand, for the reasons pointed out 
above  (see  sub-para.  (b))  the  possibility  must 
be  ruled  out  of  introduction  into  the  draft 
Convention  provisions  of  substantive  law 
relating to juridical institutions such as  partici-
pation which are not only totally  alien  to the 
purpose of the Convention but in fact relate to 
problems  of coordination of  the structures  of 
companies  subject to the jurisdiction of Com-
munity  institutions.  This  conclusion  is  cor-
roborated if  we  remember  that the  acquiring 
company and the new company, as companies 
subject to national law, are bound to observe 
the directives  of  the Council  of the European 
Communities in the matter of coordination of 
the structures of the company organs, so  that 
the  uniform  system  of  participation  which  it 
is  suggested  should  be  incorporated  into  the 
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Convention  might  prove  to  be  incompatible 
with the provisions of the Community's direc-
tives. 
It  need  only  be  observed  in  this  connexion 
that  under  the  proposal  put  forward  by  the 
delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(see Annex 2 B)  the participation scheme which 
seems  likely  to  be adopted for  the 'European 
company'  would  be  applied  to  the  acquiring 
company.  But  on the contrary,  it  cannot be 
dogmatically stated that some future directive 
on  coordination  or  some  regulation  of  the 
Council of the Communities will not impose on 
companies  under  national  law  a  system  of 
participation which will be mandatorily different 
from that of the European company. 
In that event  there would be an unbridgeable 
disparity  between  the  Convention  concluded 
pursuant to  Article  220  of  the  Treaty  and  a 
law-making  act  of  the  institutions  of  the 
Communities. 
Moreover, the fact  that the expert group  has 
no  jurisdiction  to  regulate  by  provisions  of 
substantive  law  matters  relating  to  company 
organization  and  structure  has  already  been 
recognized by the national experts in connexion 
with  the discussions  on the .  regime  of nullity 
of the new  company  arising  out of an inter-
national  merger.  This  regime  is  at  present 
defined in Article 52  of the draft Convention, 
which  contains  a  conflict  of  laws  provision 
-referring  to  the  national  law-and  not  a 
provision  of  substantive  law,  as  had  been 
proposed initially. 
For  the  foregoing  reasons,  the  delegation  of 
Italy cannot see its way to changing its position. 
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Note  by the  Belgian  delegation 
on  Article  9,  paragraph  31 
of the  preliminary  draft  Convention 
on  international  mergers 
The  attention  of  the  Belgian  delegation  has 
been  drawn  by  the  Banking  Commission  to 
the  serious  difficulties  of  interpretation  and 
implementation of paragraph 3 of Article 91  of 
the  preliminary  draft  Convention  on  inter-
national mergers. 
The  Banking  Commission  has  the  following 
observations to make: 
An initial difficulty is  the lack of  precision of 
certain concepts, e.g. those of 'net assets on the 
basis  of  actual  values'  and  'earnings  taking 
account of future prospects'. 
With regard to the first of these  concepts, the 
question arises whether it is used as opposed to 
that  of  net  assets  as  shown  in  the  accounts 
or  the  balance  sheet  envisaged  in  article  7, 
para.  7,  (  c).2  Otherwise, the  reference  would 
be  virtually  meaningless.  If it is  so intended, 
the  text  would  imply  the  necessity,  for  the 
purpose of a merger, of adjusting the evaluations 
shown  in  the  accounts  and  balance  sheet, 
apart from and indeed in contradiction to the 
provisions  often  compulsorily  laid  down  in 
respect  of  accounts  in  some  Member  States 
and  likely  to  be  so  in  due  course  in  the 
Community. 
In  determining  share  exchange  terms  such 
adjustments are of course often made, especially 
where the evaluation criteria and depreciation 
policies  of  the  merging  companies  are  very 
different.  It  also  happens  where  the  assets 
of the merging companies are of very different 
kinds. 
But  these  necessary  adjustments  are  solely 
designed  to  ensure  that  the  evaluations  are 
comparable  for  the  purposes  of  the  merger. 
They can hardly be regarded as  likely to show 
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'actual' value.  They do not necessarily  cover 
the  whole  of  the  assets  and  liabilities.  The 
company  reform  carried  out in  Belgium  and 
the work of the Elmendorf£ group have revealed 
that  the  juridical  notion  of  'actual'  value  is 
ambiguous and indeed misleading. 
The  term  'earnings  of  companies,  taking 
account of future prospects' is  equally lacking 
in precision. 
The second difficulty  is  that according to the 
draft Convention of the experts that the share 
exchange terms are or are not in order that must 
state the grounds  at least as  indicated in sub-
paragraphs  (a),  (b)  and  (c).  It  frequently 
happens in practice that one or other of these 
criteria,  or even  both,  are  regarded  as  insuf-
ficient  to  determine  the  relationship.  It also 
frequently occurs that there is a considerable gap 
between  the  two  sets  of  findings.  In  such 
instances it will be difficult for an expert to give 
the grounds for the declaration by reference to 
tha data in question. 
On the other hand, it would be  useful if the 
expert report could provide, in the absence of 
the report of the competant organ of manage-
ment, precise statements on the criteria used, on 
the justification in concreto of these criteria, the 
way in which they are used, and where necessary 
the relative weighting given them. 
It is foolish to imagine that these reports can be 
drawn  up  more  or  less  automatically  and 
mechanically.  After  all,  the  determination  of 
the  share  exchange  terms  is  invariably  the 
outcome of a choice among many alternatives, 
of basic option as to methods, and of weighing 
the  results  arrived  at  by  these  calculations. 
Reference may be made in this connexion to the 
recent  treatise  by  Mr  G.  Pourbaix  on  the 
'Valeur  de  l'entreprise in which  he  studies  a 
large number of mergers which have taken place 
in Belgium over the last few years. 
1  This has become Article 12,  paragraph 5 in the draft 
Convention. 
2  Now Article 9, (b) and (c). 
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statements give food for thought, emanating as 
they do from a body whose experience in regard 
to  company  mergers  is  based  on concern  for 
the  protection  of  shareholders  and  third 
parties. 
For  the  same  reason  it  could  not  support  a 
text  which  required  auditors  to  implement 
notions lacking precision. 
In view  of the discussions  arising out of these 
texts  in  June  1969  the  Belgian  delegation 
proposes that Article 9, para. 31  be drafted as 
follows: 
'The experts shall examine the merger plan and 
shall  draw  up  a  report  for  the  shareholders. 
The object and content of this  report shall be 
determined, in respect of each company, by the 
law applicable to that company. 
In this document, the experts shall in all instan-
ces declare whether in their opinion the exchange 
terms for securities and the methods followed in 
establishing them are or are not justified. 
This  declaration  shall  state  the  grounds, 
mentioning in  particular the following  points: 
(a)  The precise details and justification in the 
case in point of the criterion or criteria used in 
determining  the  proposed  exchange  terms; 
(b)  If there are several criteria,  the exchange 
terms resulting from the application of each, and 
justification  of  the  weighting  given  to  each; 
(c)  The  exchange  terms  resulting  from  a 
comparison respectively  of the net assets  and 
the  profitability  of  the  merging  companies, 
corrected by the application of identical accoun-
ting  methods  and  rules  of  evaluation  and 
adjustment.  If these methods are not adopted, 
the grounds shall be stated. 
The report  shall  further  mention  any  special 
difficulties  encountered  in  determining  the 
share exchange terms'. 
1  See page 122, note 1. 
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